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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a history of  South Korean policy towards North Korea and its general foreign 
policy at the time of  fluctuation of  relations between the allies, the Republic of  Korea and USA, 
between 1968 and 1979. The thesis shows how American East Asian policy and South Korean 
people‘s aspiration for the reunification and democracy of  Korea affected Park Chunghee‘s Cold 
War strategy. After Park Chunghee failed to find a common ideological foundation with the 
Americans, the South Korean leader started to re-consider the inter-Korean problem and ROK-
US relations in realistic term. In the late-1960s and early 70s, Seoul shifted from antagonism 
toward Pyongyang to negotiation with the North Koreans in order to support American 
rapprochement with China. But simultaneously, the Park regime established the authoritarian 
state and resisted the American influence on its foreign policy. With regards to the ROK-US rift, 
the thesis points to their misperceptions between the South Korean and American leaders in 
their war in Vietnam and East-West reconciliation. In addition, this thesis also shows how South 
Korean nationalism and liberal movement affected Park Chunghee‘s policy. The aspiration of  
South Korean public for the reunification and democracy of  Korea pushed policy makers over 
despotic rule and the aggressive policy toward North Korea.  
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INTRODUCTION   
 
On the Korean peninsula, the southern and northern states – also known as the Republic of  
Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People‘s Republic of  Korea (DPRK) – have continued their 
conflict after end of  the Cold War. A terrible fraternal war was fought in the 1950s, and the 
threat of  war still exists. The border between the two Koreas is one of  the most intensely 
militarized areas in the world and hence there is always the fear of  war on the Korean peninsula. 
Nevertheless, the current perception of  the threat does not seem as acute as it was during the 
Cold War. For historians who study the Cold War, it is important to identify the processes by 
which the political situation on the Korean peninsula has changed. The problem lies in which 
factors to emphasize in that analysis. One of  the most significant indicators of  change lies in the 
evolution of  South Korea‘s Northern policy. Considering the hostility between the two Koreas in 
general, the term ‗policy‘ here will have to encompass both diplomatic and military affairs. In the 
case of  the global history of  the Cold War, it is also necessary to review the South‘s policy 
changes towards the North in order to establish Korea‘s general place in the Cold War. Due to 
severely limited research possibilities in North Korea, however, my thesis focuses on South 
Korea alone.   
South Korea‘s Cold War strategy is clearly distinguished from that of  America‘s other 
allies or of  Third World nations. Most of  these countries could change their relations with 
Washington, Moscow, or Beijing because of  their own economic and/or political interests. 
Throughout the East-West conflict, however, South Korea closely worked with the US and did 
not have diplomatic relations with Communist superpowers. While other American partners, 
such as Japan, opened up diplomatically toward the Communist states, especially during the Sino-
Soviet split and the détente era in the 1970s, the ROK took no such initiatives. The reason for 
this is obvious. South Korea‘s archenemy, Pyongyang, was closely aligned with both the two 
major Communist states, the Soviet Union and China. Seoul continued to reject normalization 
with any Communist state up until the late 1980s. Because of  Seoul‘s heavy reliance on 
Washington and its hostility toward Moscow and Beijing, South Korea was in many ways hostage 
to changes in American foreign policy. This study will analyse why South Korea was very late in 
breaking out of  this diplomatic stranglehold.    
My thesis will first discuss the ROK‘s policy towards the DPRK between 1968 and 1979 
when, under the rule of  President Park Chunghee, South Korea started to make changes in its 
policy towards the North, the other Communist states, and its own allies. These changes later 
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became the basis for ROK foreign policy today. I will also discuss the general aspects of  the 
ROK‘s foreign policy that have affected its Northern policy. In this thesis, the South Korean 
general foreign policy encompasses its policy toward Communist countries other than the DPRK 
and towards its capitalist allies, mainly the US and Japan. Although the research starts from 1968, 
it is also necessary to briefly discuss the historical background from the pre-1968 period. 
My first goal is to identify how South Korea‘s policy towards North Korea was created 
and what its aims were between 1968 and 1979. Then, by examining the ROK‘s foreign policy, 
the influences from the surrounding or allied major powers on Korea will be identified; namely, 
the USA, China, the USSR, and Japan, all of  which continuously affected South Korea‘s 
Northern policy.  Moreover, the political dealings between the two Koreas will be discussed. 
This study will therefore contribute not only to Korean historiography, but to the historiography 
of  the Cold War, because it will help track the process through which South Korea‘s role in the 
later Cold War emerged. 
My own military experience has shaped my understanding of  the interrelation between 
the ROK‘s Northern policy and the level of  hostility between the two Koreas. During my time in 
the South Korean military, the level of  hostility between the two Koreas was a matter of  life and 
death to myself  and my comrades, and the policy of  my government towards the North was a 
principal indicator of  that hostility. For two and half  years, every morning, we recited our oath to 
protect South Korea against the threat posed by our countrymen to the North. It was only after 
developing my academic training that I was able to escape the psychological impositions of  
military service. 
Before starting my MPhil/PhD course at the London School of  Economics, I utilized 
archival sources and oral histories provided by Dr. Sergey Radchenko during his stay in Seoul in 
the summer of  2007.  He required translation and interpretation assistance from Korean into 
English. While helping him, I also benefited from his research. After starting my degree at LSE, I 
further benefited from the tutelage of  my supervisor, Prof. Odd Arne Westad, from other 
faculty members, and from the advice of  my PhD cohort in the International History 
department. All of  this background helped establish my own research methods for my thesis and 
my approach to my subject.  
The most important primary archival sources in my research are government 
documents in South Korea. We are now in a position to gain access to hitherto unavailable 
documents from the Park Chunghee era thanks to recent declassification of  government 
materials, especially from the Foreign Ministry, Reunification Ministry, and within the National 
Archives.  The archive of the Foreign Ministry is administered by the IFANS (Institute of 
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Foreign Affairs and National Security), which also serves as the main training school for 
diplomatic officers. This year, the Foreign Ministry began a gradual opening of its archives for 
the period up to and including 1982.1 Some of the documents on military and/or political 
conflicts or talks between the South and North, and on dialogue between South and North 
Korea and other states, i.e. the US, USSR, and/or China, are now available. Although the topic 
of inter-Korean relations remains an extremely sensitive one, the archive of  the Foreign Ministry 
of  South Korea is the most important source now available to provide information about the 
causes and results of  any change in the Republic of  Korea‘s policy toward the North and other 
nations.  
The ROK National Archives provide materials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
regarding North Korea. They can help to track the policy-making process within the ROK 
government on reunification and national defence, both of which directly link to the ROK‘s 
foreign policy. The 1970 Cabinet meetings on the withdrawal of  US troops from the ROK, for 
instance, provide useful information on the national defence policy-making process.  
Meanwhile, the changes to the ROK Constitution in 1972 (for inter-Korean dialogues) and the 
records of  the establishment of  the Ministry of  Reunification in 1973 provide important 
information regarding reunification policy.  
Other sources are the archives in the United States. There is limited research 
possibilities in South Korea for the decision making process within government for inter-Korean 
talks during this period as it is a sensitive issue. Therefore, it is necessary for scholars to refer to 
American sources in order to fill the gap in the Korean material. Moreover, the combination of 
South Korean and American viewpoints helps us to overcome the bias of a uniquely South 
Korean perspective. Given the United States‘ historical role as one of the most important 
diplomatic partners of the ROK and its concern with inter-Korean relations, US archival 
documents provide important information about diplomatic interaction between Washington 
and Seoul. It is also necessary to directly compare American viewpoints with Korean ones on 
specific issues and examine possible divergences in order to have more objective picture. 
Furthermore, some information, not declassified in South Korean side, is freely available from 
the American material. For example, the details of inter-Korean negotiations in 1972 were 
                                                          
1외교통상부는『외교문서공개에관한규칙』(외교부령)에따라 30년이경과한 1982 년도문서를중심으
로총 1,200여권(16만여쪽)의외교문서를 2012.2.12(목)자로공개합니다.  
―On 12 Feb. 2012, according to 『The regulation on declassification of  diplomatic documents』(The decree of  
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs)Ministry of  Foreign Affairs declassified about 1,200 documents (about 160 000 pages), 
including documents of  1982 and others written 30 years before.‖ 
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released within the US National Security Council files, while the ROK still classifies these 
documents. For this reason, it is vital to review the documents in American archives in order to 
locate any discrepancies or divergences between Seoul and Washington.  
Secondly, a great deal of useful documentary material has become available in US 
presidential libraries. The libraries which have documents covering the period of my research are 
the Lyndon B. Johnson Library (1963- 1969), Richard M. Nixon Library (1969 - 1974), Gerald R. 
Ford Library (1974- 1976), and Jimmy Carter Library (1976 -1980). These libraries also provide 
oral history collections available online. For instance, an interview with Cyrus R. Vance, the 
former US special emissary from Washington to Seoul, is used in Chapter 1 of this thesis. The 
National Security Archives at the George Washington University and its Don Oberdorfer 
Collection also help track the ROK-US Foreign relations in this period. Recently published 
materials in Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] are another important source. Its 
documents are especially helpful to get an overview of diplomatic affairs between the ROK and 
the United States. It is especially useful on the summit talks that took place between the leaders 
of the two countries. In short, the US documents provide much general information about 
American influence on Park Chunghee‘s foreign policy 
 Along with archival sources, a number of  books, newspapers, memoirs, documents with 
oral histories, and testimonies on modern Korean history contributed to my research. The first 
and probably most important one is Park‘s own books on Korean politics. In these books and 
articles, Park Chunghee presents his political philosophy and ideas on specific political events.2 
As a result of  his assassination, Park Chunghee did not get to publish his own memoirs and 
autobiography. For this reason, these books might be one of  the few sources directly outlining 
Park‘s ideas, and they should be taken seriously. Furthermore, some of  his personal diaries are 
available. These documents will be helpful in identifying the American influence on the ROK‘s 
Foreign policies between 1968 and 1969. In addition, even though Park himself  is dead, there are 
a number of  people still alive who worked in his government and cabinet. Their testimonies help 
evaluate the Park regime‘s attitude towards North Korea and the political environments of  South 
Korea at that time. For example, I have interviewed Kang Induk, the former head of  the Korean 
Central Intelligence Agency, whose main responsibility was to combat guerrilla operations 
launched from the North. He explained how the Park regime reacted to North Korean 
                                                          
2 Park wrote a number of  articles about Korean politics. Recently, one publisher collected those articles and 
published them as books. ParkChunghee, Korea Reborn: A Model for Development (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1979); Park Chunghee, Nara‟ga Wihum Hal Tae Uchi Mokseumeul Aggiri?[How Can I Spare My Life when My 
Nation is in Danger?], (Seoul: Dongsuh Books, 2005; Park Chunghee, Hanguk Gukmin‟ege Go‟ham [To Announce to My 
Dear Korean People]. Seoul: Dongsuh Books, 2005); Park Chunghee, Ha‟myun Doen‟da! Teolcheo Il‟eonaja [Just do it! Let‟s 
rise up!], (Seoul: Dongsuh Books, 2005). 
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provocations in 1968 and described his experience in North Korea during the inter-Korean talks 
in 1972. He also published his book, Inter-Korean talks: From 4 July to 15 June, and provided an 
official position of  South Korea in those negotiations between the two Koreas.3 In addition, 
Kim Sungeun, the Minister of  National Defence in Park‘s cabinet, detailed his experiences with 
and ideas about Park through his memoirs.4 Thanks to Kim‘s memoir and other ROK elites‘ 
records, I am able to describe the political scenes in which Park and other ROK elites struggled 
against the DPRK and, sometimes, against their US allies.  
Along with the testimonies of  persons close to Park, I have also reviewed the memoirs 
and testimonies of  his political enemies in the interest of  a more balanced viewpoint towards the 
period. They provide the information about the influence of  the domestic power game on Park‘s 
foreign policy. Moreover, they will also counter-balance any bias towards the Park regime. Since 
many politicians opposed and challenged Park‘s despotic rule and his confrontational policy 
toward communists, their significance and influence on Korean politics is worth examining. A 
specific example would be Kim Daejung, later ROK president from 1998 to 2002, who as an 
opposition politician in the 1970s advocated a more lenient approach toward North Korea. 
Indeed, popular support for his democratic and peaceful approach towards the North made him 
a serious threat to Park. Kim Daejung died in 2009, but his autobiography and memoirs describe 
his proposals for new Northern policy initiatives and his fierce competition with Park in the 
1971 presidential election, which reflects much of  the dynamics of  the South Korean political 
scene. Next, mass media indicates the general perception/opinion of  society and shows the 
political issues of  the international affairs of  South Korea. The analysis in the press of  the ROK 
and other countries will show how international affairs affected domestic political discussion and 
vice versa. These sources show how political affairs worked in the period and help me explain 
the changes in international politics, détente, and the origin of  the breach between South Korea 
and the United States, all of  which affected South Korea‘s policy towards the North.  
Many scholars from around the world have conducted research on the Korean War and 
on Korea during the Cold War period. Seldom, however, has Korean foreign policy itself  been 
the focus of  their research. Past emphasis has been on the researchers‘ home countries or on 
world politics. This is because Korea‘s place in the Cold War cannot be understood as just a 
matter between two Korean states. As a result, there are also many different approaches to how 
to interpret changes in South Korea‘s foreign policy.     
                                                          
3 Kang Induk and Song Jonghwan, Inter-Korean talks: From 4 July to 15 June, (Seoul: Institute of  Far Eastern Studies, 
2004). 
4 Kim Sungeun, Sugneun Hoegorok, Naeu‟i Jan-i Numchi Naiad [Kim Sungeun Memoirs, You filled my cup to the brim], (Seoul: 
Itempool Korea press, 2008). 
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Cho Kabje, a former journalist and incumbent member of  the Korean National 
Assembly, in his analysis introduced the key figure, President Park Chunghee, and outlined the 
decision making processes of  the ROK government under Park‘s rule. In his book, Park Chunghee, 
Cho explains Park‘s background, how he rose to power and how he later ruled the state.5 This 
book also provides information about the formation and aims of  Park‘s Northern policy and 
sheds light on the relationship between the ROK and other nations through the examination of  
various records, e.g. interviews with politicians, memoirs and newspaper articles, all of  which 
provide a good starting point for my own research. Through this biographic work, Cho indicates 
that Park‘s dictatorship was a natural product of  the instability which resulted from the 
competition between the two Koreas. He sympathized with Park, who in Cho‘s view sought to 
establish a stable society and defend his nation against the Communist threat.  
Conversely, there are many scholars who take a critical view of  Park‘s dictatorship. Yang 
Seongcheol is one of  the most prominent critics. To support his criticisms of  Park, Yang 
examined the structure of  South Korean leadership as it compared to that found in North Korea. 
In his work, Bun‟dan‟eui jung‟chi- Park Chunghee‟wa Kim Ilsung bi‟gyo yeongu (The politics of  division - A 
comparative study of  Park Chunghee and Kim Ilsung), he argues that Park used Korean insecurities to 
justify his lifetime tenure and despotic style of  ruling, asserting that the aim of  the Park regime 
was to maintain his leadership rather than to establish a stable nation.6  In another work, Han-mi 
anbo gwangyeui jaejomyeong: Pueblo ho sageoneui uigi mit dongmaeng gwanri saryerul jungsimeu ro (A renewed 
discussion of  the security relationship between Korea and the United States: The “Pueblo” incident and crisis), 
Yang also discusses the relationship between Park‘s Northern and foreign policy, both of  which 
were designed to shore up Park‘s rule.7 Shin Wookhee, another prominent scholar of  Korean 
Studies, supports this assertion with his suggestion that the North Korean threat was utilized by 
Park for his authoritarian rule.8 Additionally, Ma Sangyun argued that Park‘s dictatorship based 
on anticommunism resulted in a split in South Korean public opinion and did not establish 
national security as he maintained.9 This thesis generally concurs with the finding that Park 
                                                          
5 Cho Kabje, Park Chunghee, (Seoul: Chogabje.com, 2007). 
6 Yang Seongcheol, Bun‟dan‟eui jung‟chi- Park Chunghee‟wa Kim Ilsung Bi‟gyo Yeongu [The Politics of  Division- The 
Comparative Study between Park Chunghee and Kim Ilsung],(Seoul: Hanwul, 1987). 
7 Yang Seongcheol, and Mun Jeongin, Han-mi Anbo Gwangyeui Jaejomyeong: Pueblo ho sageoneui uigi mit dongmaeng gwanri 
saryerul jungsimeu ro [The Renewed Discussion on Security Relationship between Korea and US: “Pueblo” incident and crisis], (Seoul: 
Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyongnam University, 1988). 
8 Shin Wookhee, ―Giheo‘eseo Gyochk Sangtae‘ro [From Opportunity to Stalemate],‖ Korea politics and diplomatic 
history collection vol. 26 2nd issue; ShinWookhee and Kim Youngho, Jeonhwangi‘eui Dongmaeng: Détente Siki‘eui 
Hanmianbogwangye [Alliance in Transitional Period: ROK-US security relations in the détente era],‖ Korea Political 
History Conference. 7 April, 2000. 
9 Ma Sangyun, ―Anbo‘wa Minjujuyi, geurigo Bak Jeonghui‘ui gil [Security, Democracy and Park Chung Hee‖s Road: 
The Origins of  the Yushin System Revisited],” International Politics Collection of  Treatises 43 (2003). 
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exaggerated the North Korean threat in order to justify his rule. 
A number of  texts examine the general political setting of  the ROK during the Park era. 
Gregory Henderson's Korea: The Politics of  the Vortex explains how the ROK had been ruled until 
the late 1960s.10 The government under Park Chunghee are discussed in Hahn Honggoo, 
Vietnam Pabydyeong‟gwa Byeongyeong Gugga‟eui gil [Dispatching. Troops to Vietnam and Militarization of  
South Korea]11, David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman's Korean Development: The Interplay of  Politics 
and Economics12, Kim Sejin's The Politics of  Military Revolution in Korea13, Oh John Kiechiang's Korea: 
Democracy on Trial14, Kihl Young Whan's Politics and Policies in Divided Korea15, Don Oberdorfer's 
The Two Koreas: Contemporary History16, and The Economic and Social Modernization of  the Republic of  
Korea by Edward S. Mason and others.17 A recent publication by Kim Byung-kook and Ezra F. 
Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of  South Korea, complements the existing 
literature but focuses mainly upon South Korea‘s ―modernization.‖18Among these works, Don 
Oberdorfer‘s The Two Koreas has proven most useful for my research. It is a narrative history of  
the two Korean states between 1972 and 1997. In this book, Oberdorfer explains Korea‘s travails 
and triumphs and focuses on the tensions between North and South within a historical context. 
He puts special emphasis on the involvement of  outside powers, such as the US, the USSR, and 
China. Oberdorfer‘s work is reflective of  the view that foreigners adopt towards modern Korean 
history and, as such, is important for me in discussing Korea‘s place in Cold War history. Kang 
Induk and Song Jonghwan‘s volume, Inter-Korean Talks: From 4 July to 15 June, provides a 
systematic analysis of  the negotiations between the two Koreas in the early and mid-1970s. 
Furthermore, Lee Chongsik‘s Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, Victor Cha‘s Alignment Despite 
Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle19, Gregg A. Brazinsky‘s Nation Building in South 
Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of  a Democracy,  and Mark Clifford‘s Troubled Tiger: 
Businessmen, Bureaucrats and Generals in South Korea are also helpful in understanding the 
                                                          
10 Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of  the Vortex. (Cambridge: Harvard University  Press, 1968). 
11 Hahn Honggoo, Vietnam Pabydyeong‟gwa Byeongyeong Gugga‟eui gil [Dispatching. Troops to Vietnam and Militarization of  
South Korea], (Seoul: Changbi, 2003). 
12 David C Cole. Princeton N. Lyman,The Interplay of  Politics and Economics, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1971) 
13 Kim Sejin, The Politics of  Military Revolution in Korea. (Chapel Hill: University of  North Carolina Press, 1971). 
14 Oh John Kie-Chiang, Korea: Democracy on Trial. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970). 
15 Kihl Young Whan, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea,(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984). 
16 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Washington: Basic Books, 2002). 
17 Edward S. Mason and et al, The Economic and Social Modernization of  the Republic of  Korea,(Cambridge: Harvard East 
Asian Monographs, 1980). 
18 Kim Byungkook and Ezra F. Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of  South Korea, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University, 2011). 
19 Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism:The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999); Lee Chongsik, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1985); Gregg A., Brazinsky Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of  a Democracy, (Chapel 
Hill: University of  North Carolina Press, 2009); Mark Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats and Generals in 
South Korea, (Armonk: M E Scharpe: 1998). 
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relationship between Korea and the US as well as between Korea and Japan during the period 
under review. 
The other party in the inter-Korean relationship and the object of  the ROK‘s 
Northern policy is the DPRK. Suh Daesuk‘s work, Kim Il Sung: North Korean Leader, is particularly 
valuable in understanding this relationship because of  its treatment of  modern and 
contemporary history of  North Korea. This book investigates and analyzes the life of  Kim 
Ilsung (1912-1988), with particular attention given to Kim‘s revolutionary history, his rise to and 
consolidation of  power, his policy toward South Korea, his relationship with both Soviet Union 
and China, and his self-reliance ideology, Chuch‟e. In his biography of  North Korea‘s leader, Suh 
illustrates how the confrontational policy of  DPRK leaders with military backgrounds affected 
the development of  the ROK‘s Northern policy from its inception. He also suggests that DPRK 
leaders utilized threats from South Korea and the US to justify their political persecution of  
rivals.20 Wada Haruki supports Suh‘s position in his analysis of  the political structure and 
philosophy of  North Korea; he argues that internal power conflicts within the DPRK ultimately 
contributed to the hostile relationship between the two Koreas since 1945, the year Korea was 
liberated from Japanese colonial rule.21 It is also noteworthy that both scholars discuss the 
influence of  the Sino-Soviet split on the DPRK‘s aggressive Southern policy. They argue that 
this conflict resulted in a lack of  checks on the DPRK, who had played the two Communist 
giants against each other. Together with the military background of  the DPRK leadership, the 
decline of  the political influence of  both Moscow and Beijing on Pyongyang allowed Kim Ilsung 
to assume a more assertive role towards the US and South Korea. Using Russian archival sources, 
Sergey Radchenko indicates that the North Korean elites acted on their own without prior 
consultation with Moscow or Beijing when planning the raid on the Blue House, South Korea‘s 
presidential residence, and the attack on the USS Pueblo in January 1968.22 In short, these works 
outline the policy making process of  the DRPK leadership and highlight the influence of  the 
Sino-Soviet split. Although their works are generally based on Russian and/or Chinese sources, 
they provide a context through which to clarify the modern history and political structure of  
North Korea. Additionally, Andrei Lankov‘s From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of  North 
Korea, 1945-196023 and Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of  De-Stalinization, 195624and Charles K. 
                                                          
20 Suh Daesuk, Kim Il Sung: North Korean Leader. (Honolulu: University of  Hawaii Press, 1995). 
21 Wada Haruki, Buk joseon [North Korea- The Present Stage of  Guerrilla State], (Seoul: Dolbegae,2002). 
22 Sergey S. Radchenko, ―The Soviet Union and the North Korean seizure of  the USS Pueblo, Evidence from 
Russian Archives,‖ Cold War International History Project Working Paper 47 (2005): 20. 
23 Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of  North Korea, 1945-1960. (New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 2003).  
24 Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of  De-Stalinization, 1956, (Hawaii: University of  Hawaii, 2007). 
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Armstrong‘s The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 25 are also helpful to understand the 
establishment and nature of  North Korea and Kim‘s regime.  
All of  the works cited above provide general ideas of  modern and contemporary 
Korean politics. However, a number of  works focus on specific determinants of  Korean politics 
and the relationship between the two Koreas. In the book A History of  Contemporary Korea, Kang 
Mangil explains how the national democratic movement contributed to the changes in South 
Korea‘s policy towards North Korea between the 1960s and 1970s. The military government of  
Park Chunghee promoted economic development as well as anticommunism. Kang suggests that 
the promotion of  economic development resulted in the growth of  education, and hence an 
eventual increase in the number of  highly educated people. The educated championed their 
democratic rights and wanted more liberal foreign policies including those towards North Korea. 
As a result, he argues, the national democratic movement strongly pushed for a policy with a 
more liberal perspective and invoked change.26 
In addition to domestic democratic movement, one of  the most important factors 
affecting South Korean foreign policy is the ROK-US relationship. In his article, ―The US and 
ROK Alliance: An Asymmetric Alliance over Time‖, James D. Morrow explains the model of  an 
alliance in asymmetric form and applies it to the ROK-US case to explain the limit of  the US 
influence on ROK politics.27 An asymmetric alliance is one that joins a major and minor power. 
Clearly, the ROK-US alliance does not represent the conventional form of  an alliance: facing an 
external threat, countries seek out their alliance partner(s) based on their military power.28 
Morrow argues that these countries formed an alliance for their own strategic interests and in 
spite of  their differences in national power.29 While South Korea received protection from the 
US, Washington oriented the policy of  Seoul. The problem in this unusual form of  alliance is the 
level of  ‗protection‘ provided by the major power, the US.30 The ROK-US conflicts over the 
Nixon Doctrine and Jimmy Carter‘s pullout pledge show South Korea‘s fear of  abandonment as 
well as America‘s fear of  entrapment with ROK. 
For the purposes of  this thesis, the most important point is that we can measure the 
support from Washington and its influence on South Korean politics. Clearly, the American 
commitment to South Korea‘s security cannot be determined only from US spending for Seoul, 
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but also through the presence of  US forces. Although Nixon reduced the US troops in South 
Korea, he provided aid to Park Chunghee for the modernization of  South Korean armed forces. 
Moreover, Jimmy Carter promised enormous compensation for the total withdrawal of  US land 
forces from South Korea. Nonetheless, Park did not want Washington to pull out its forces from 
South Korea and used a number of  political and diplomatic measures to prevent the withdrawal 
plans. That is, for Seoul, the level of  US support was determined by the number and quality of  
US forces and its willingness to intervene in inter-Korean conflicts rather than the amount of  
funding from Washington. South Korea had an empirical reason for its criteria: the situation 
resulting from the American pullout from Vietnam made Seoul require a more tangible form of  
American support. In 1975, once South Vietnam collapsed, Park consistently requested an 
American guarantee for South Korean security and tried to build nuclear missiles, which Gerald 
Ford did not allow. The South Korean nuclear weapons programme was stopped only after 
Washington announced the Ford Doctrine.31 This confirmed an American commitment to the 
security of  its East Asian allies and helped Seoul conduct a reprisal attack on Pyongyang that 
attacked the US and South Korean soldiers in the DMZ. 
Some scholars contend that Korean nationalism in South Korea also affected the 
American influence on South Korean politics. In his work on Korean history, Korea‟s Place in the 
Sun, Bruce Cumings examines pre-modern, modern, and contemporary history before 1997 and 
places a special emphasis on the nationalism that Korea developed from its traditions. He 
considers Korea‘s inherent nationalism, rather than simply the international environment, to be 
an important independent determinant of  modern Korean history. Cumings emphasizes that 
Korea has a strong national identity and thus resists external influences. This nationalist idea was 
established due to its colonial history. In the same vein, he argues that South Korea‘s policy 
towards North Korea did not necessarily reflect major changes in world politics, such as 
détente.32 His suggestion is helpful in explaining the origin of  South Korea‘s ―Korean style 
democracy of  Park Chunghee‖33, which rejected international pressure on the Park regime‘s 
undemocratic policy making process. Regarding this, in the pragmatic sense, he suggests that the 
traditional concept of  democracy is not efficient for South Korea, which faces a Communist 
threat. Consequently, he claims that some degree of  democracy had to be sacrificed for the sake 
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of  national security. Cumings argues that the Park regime ―sought to draw upon the Korean old 
virtues of  obedience and loyalty, family values and filial piety, and the leader as father of  the 
nation.‖34 In Cumings‘ view, the Korean tradition was useful for Park to limit the potential 
international influence on Korean politics although he benefited from American economic and 
military aid. 
Suh Daesuk has challenged Cumings‘ perspective on the role of  inherent Korean 
nationalism in the policy making process. In his two works, Kim Ilsung, the North Korean Leader and 
Korea and the United States: A Century of  Cooperation, he criticized Kim Ilsung‘s ―Chu‟che ideology‖35, 
in that it was not developed for inherent nationalism, but for political struggle. He asserts that 
the ideology was mainly used for persecuting Kim‘s political rivals in North Korea.36 Similarly, 
he argues that Park Chunghee‘s ―Korean style democracy‖ was merely a political tool, used for 
oppressing democratic movements. Moreover, he explains that Park Chunghee and Kim Ilsung 
did not hesitate to accept foreign support while at the same time placing an emphasis on national 
independence.37 In Suh‘s view, inherent nationalism cannot explain the policy aims of  South and 
North Korea towards each other. Suh does not deny that North Korea kept its sovereignty even 
during the Sino-Soviet conflicts, but he points out that North Korea has never been independent, 
particularly with regards to economics.38 The same can be said of  South Korea; its economy and 
military were heavily dependent on the US until the late 1970s. Therefore, South Korea‘s policy 
towards North Korea was more shaped by American foreign policy and interventionism than by 
its own nationalistic conceptions. In this point, Suh considers that international factors, i.e. 
American influence, were the most important driving forces of  South Korea‘s politics towards 
North Korea.39 Donald S. Macdonald‘s work, U.S–Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance, 
supports Suh‘s arguments on American influence on the ROK‘s politics. Based on a 
comprehensive examination of  documents regarding Korea from the US Department of  State 
archives, this book summarizes and interprets the record of  US relations with Korea during the 
crucial two decades following World War II. In his work, Macdonald illustrates Seoul‘s heavy 
reliance on Washington in the 1950s and 1960s. He argues that, under the circumstances, it was 
in fact American power that directed the ROK‘s policy. Although he admits that the ROK 
established a self-sufficient economy in the 1970s, he concludes that US support was still 
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indispensable for the ROK‘s national defence.40 In their analysis of  Korean politics, Suh and 
Macdonald generally put more emphasis on international factors than on domestic factors. 
The secondary sources reviewed above suggest various interpretations of  Korean 
history during the Cold War era. Kang pointed out the internal dynamics of  South Korean 
politics and the role of  the national democratic movement in South Korea‘s policy towards 
North Korea. This idea may have contributed to the discussion in the 1970s when the 
democratic movements became active. The contrasting ideas suggested by Cumings and Suh 
allow for further discussion on the major driving forces in the South Korean policy making 
process regarding Northern policy. There is no definite answer for this topic; I think that both 
points are valid. The ROK could successfully pursue ―economic development‖ thanks to 
substantial US aid, which in turn allowed American foreign policy to guide South Korea‘s policy 
in many cases. On the other hand, the ROK had and still has a strong tendency to reject foreign 
intervention. In my thesis, both perspectives will be discussed on equal terms. Nonetheless, it is 
important for me to identify when and how those factors influenced Korean politics. 
Following Yang Seongcheol and Shin Wookhee, I assert that South Korean foreign 
policy at the beginning of  the period covered in my research was created by the Park regime in 
order to justify its despotic style of  governance and secure the safety of  South Korea, but then 
steadily changed in response to domestic and international pressures. Even though Park could 
have usurped the prime power of  the ROK through his coup in 1961, the United States used 
frequent threats to tie aid to the holding of  elections to coerce Park to run for the presidency of  
South Korea.41 This meant that his political power was subject to Washington and to the Korean 
electorate, rather than to the spectre of  a potential North Korean invasion. In reality, in 
institutional terms, the ‗checks and balances system‘, of  the Park regime was not free from 
legislative obstruction from the National Assembly. Since Park Chunghee‘s Democratic Republican 
Party (Minju Gonghwa dang) held a majority throughout his entire tenure in power, the legislature 
could be denounced as a rubber stamp institution of  the regime. The minor parties, however, 
organized to struggle against the Park regime. For instance, when Park attempted to attain 
lifetime tenure in 1972, it was the opposition parties who played a leading role in the protest 
against Park‘s authoritarian rule.42 
Park needed legitimate justification in order to defend his position from existing 
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political threats presented by other politicians and the public. One of  the most important 
arguments he made was that South Korea needed a strong leader in order to prevent invasion 
from the North and undue influence from Communist states, such as China and the USSR. It 
had been less than ten years since the end of  the Korean War, so Park‘s charismatic military 
leadership appealed to the electorate‘s memory of  that war. As a result, during the first stage of  
Park‘s rule, anticommunism and strong political leadership constituted South Korea‘s policy 
towards North Korea, other Communist powers, and South Korea‘s allies. Park‘s aims were to 
maintain South Korean stability and to prevent war through military and economic prowess, 
rather than to achieve Korean unification. International factors, such as Washington‘s  
anticommunist policy and its interventionism, also affected the creation and aims of  domestic 
and foreign policy making in Seoul. Because of  their common ideological ground, the Park 
regime received political and economic support from the US government and could built 
economic and military foundation for South Korea‘s national security throughout this period.43 
Park‘s anticommunist policy, however, was put into question by South Korean 
nationalism and the international trend of  détente. Although South Korean fear of  North 
Korean hostility continued to exist, most South Koreans also hoped for a peaceful reunification 
for Korea. The post-Korean War generations acquired the right to vote in the early 1970s and 
supported the liberals who advocated reconciliation with the Communists. South Korean citizens 
became organized and confronted policy makers on the authoritarian nature of  their governance 
and on the hostile South Korean policy towards North Korea. Park‘s political rival, Kim Daejung, 
publically appealed for a peaceful approach to reunification and for a generous perspective 
towards the North. Moreover, due to the negative outcomes from the war in Vietnam, the US 
started to re-think its anticommunist and interventionist strategies in East Asia, at least in form. 
The Park regime did not welcome the new outlook in American foreign policy but gradually 
entered the new détente phase of  the Cold War from 1968 onwards.44 
In 1968, Seoul became aware of  Washington‘s reluctance to become more deeply 
involved in the Korean problem because of  the consequences of  America‘s war in Southeast 
Asia. In January 1968, North Korean forces raided the Blue House, the presidential residence of  
the ROK, and captured the US spy ship, Pueblo. Due to the war in Vietnam, Washington chose 
not to regard these incidents as serious provocative actions and curbed an aggressive ROK 
reaction against the North.45 After Richard Nixon was elected US President, Washington further 
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restrained the Park regime‘s aggressive attitude towards the North so to encourage the 
normalization of  US-China relations in the early 1970s. International pressure forced the Park 
regime to change its policy towards communists.     
However, the pragmatic and authoritarian nature of  the Park regime resisted this 
international and domestic trend. South Korea was forced to join the détente system in East Asia 
because of  the shift in American foreign policy in that direction, yet the Park regime never 
expected North Korea to be militarily weaker than the South and was therefore reluctant to 
negotiate with Kim Ilsung over national reunification. Moreover, Park Chunghee needed to 
continue reemphasizing the Communist threat at home in order to sustain his long-term 
draconian rule. The democratic voices in South Korea that advocated reconciliation with 
Pyongyang and the end of  domestic military rule were suppressed by the Park regime.46 Until 
his death, Park struggled with democratic activists in South Korea and with American leaders 
who tried to withdraw troops from South Korea and encourage reconciliation between Seoul and 
Pyongyang. 
In conclusion, during the 1960s and 1970s, the creation and aims of  South Korea‘s 
Northern and general Foreign policies depended on continuous compromise between 
dictatorship and democracy and between the Cold War and détente. Without any doubt, these 
domestic and international influences were entirely interrelated and therefore could not be 
considered separately. Clearly, the liberal and democratic voices in South Korea were encouraged 
by détente and the American concern over the morality of  its allies in the 1970s. South Korean 
democratic resistance towards the Park regime also affected Washington‘s decisions about its 
South Korean policy.    
While many scholars have focused on only one of  these dimensions, none have argued 
against their mutual influence. This thesis shows that the impact of  these domestic and 
international driving forces for South Korea‘s policy is chronologically inconsistent throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s. As an American ally, South Korea had quickly developed both militarily and 
economically since the Korean War. In 1975, the US government faced difficulties in preventing 
South Korea‘s nuclear development since it had failed to assure South Korea‘s national security 
after the US defeat in the Vietnam War.47 Therefore, Washington‘s influence on Seoul in the 
1970s was less powerful than it had been in the 1960s. Additionally, at the domestic level, 
democratic actions were tightly controlled by the Korean government, and South Korea‘s 
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security concerns sometimes led to the silencing of  critics of  the Park administration. Hence the 
domestic factor was insignificant in some cases because of  the powerlessness of  the 
government‘s opposition. Therefore, my research aim has been to identify the significance of  
domestic and international influences on the creation and goals of  the ROK‘s Northern and 
foreign policies. 
It has also been my aim to contribute to the historiography of  the Cold War as well as 
to that of  Korea. Arne Westad‘s Global Cold War, arguably one of  the most influential of  books 
looking at the topic of  the Cold War in the context of  third-world politics, substantially helped 
my own research in finding the role of  South Korea within the area of  Cold War history.48 The 
difficulty is the extent to which it is accurate to claim that the ROK played an important role in 
the Cold War. Arguably, in the Korean War, the survival of  the ROK was dependent on UN 
forces, while the ROK‘s contribution and participation in the Vietnam War was of  little 
significance because of  the eventual Communist victory. Nonetheless, the history of  the ROK‘s 
government during the Cold War deserves to be studied primarily for its exceptional strategy in 
adapting its domestic and foreign policies. South Korea attenuated American efforts for détente 
in East Asia and hence accelerated the resumption of  the Cold War beginning in the mid- 1970s. 
Moreover, the Korean peninsula is the only region in the world where the Cold War did not end, 
and it is thus a necessary factor for a historian to consider when explaining what contributed to 
the present setting of  the Korean peninsula and East Asia. Therefore, my research will help 
historians identify Korea‘s place in the early Cold War and track the process through which 
Korea‘s role in the later Cold War emerged.  
The volume of  literature on South Korean politics and history in the Cold War is 
enormous. Nevertheless, I feel that there are deficiencies in this field of  study. Very few works 
have dealt with the role of  South Korea in America‘s war against Communism or how the two 
Koreas failed to end their own Cold War. For instance, many authors have neglected to explain 
the impact of  Seoul‘s resistance against détente in the 1970s, a policy which discouraged 
Washington‘s efforts to calm its conflict with Moscow and Beijing. The inter-Korean rivalry 
discouraged the further development of  relations between the US, USSR, and China. This thesis 
will provide an explanation of  Korea‘s influence on the Cold War in East Asia and a therefore be 
a useful resource for current and future historians working of  the subject.  
I will divide the period covered in my research on the political history of South Korea 
into four chapters according to changes in South Korea‘s Northern and foreign policies caused 
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by domestic political shifts and/or changes in the international political environment. 
The first chapter covers the dramatic year of 1968. The overall purpose of  this chapter 
is to examine South Korea‘s Northern and foreign policies with respect to its military conflicts 
with North Korea in 1968. This will be addressed in the context of  the international 
environment where the United States and South Korea are engaged in the Vietnam War.  
The raid on the Blue House and the abduction of  the USS Pueblo by North Korean 
forces in January 1968 challenged the ROK‘s anticommunist policy. Since the Korean War in the 
1950s, South Korea had assumed a firm stance towards the North based on military, political, 
and economic support from the US and other Western countries.  
Committed to its anticommunist policy, Seoul intended to retaliate against North Korea 
and expected US support in doing so. However, in both instances, the US, which was directly 
affected by the capture incident, held a different opinion and pursued a strategy of appeasement 
toward the North because of ongoing hardship in the Vietnam War. The South Korean 
leadership rejected the American decision and sought for additional US aid to help bolster 
national security. Despite its diplomatic efforts and its commitment to anticommunism, 
American reluctance to be involved in the Korean peninsula made it difficult for the Park regime 
to maintain its aggressive Northern policy.49 This chapter will contribute to the understanding of 
the immediate impacts the changes in US foreign policy had on Korea and East Asia during the 
Cold War.  
The second chapter covers the period of 1969 to 1971. The aim of this chapter is to 
identify the influence of the Nixon Doctrine and the Sino-American rapprochement on South 
Korean foreign policy. In 1969, Nixon announced his new plan for foreign affairs which later 
became known as the Nixon Doctrine. Washington pledged not to get directly involved in any 
conflict outside her own borders. The White House planned the withdrawal of US troops from 
South Korea and thus undermined the foundation of Park‘s anticommunist policy. As a result, 
liberal politicians in South Korea raised their voices to advocate peace talks with Pyongyang. The 
Park regime started to recognize that the anticommunist policy was no longer sufficient to 
safeguard national security and ensure Park position in power.50 
In addition to the pullout scheme, the rapprochement between the US and China also 
undermined the common ideological ground between the ROK and the US. This development 
forced Seoul to accept the détente trend in the East Asia. Because of Sino-Soviet clashes in 1969, 
                                                          
49 ―North Korea‘s provocation incident in 1968,‖1968, Class Number 2664. 729.55,Diplomatic Archive, Republic of  
Korea; Joseph S Bermudez Jr.., North Korean Special forces (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 32. 
50 Kim Daejung, op. cit., 121; Shin Wookhee and Kim Youngho, op. cit., 4-5. 
  
21 
 
China sought to improve relations with the US.51 The US, in turn, was all too willing to talk with 
China due to its unsuccessful military campaign in Vietnam.52 In its quest for amicable relations 
with China, Washington effectively pushed South Korea to soften its policies towards the North. 
In order to maintain its anticommunist efforts, the Park regime moved to improve relations with 
Japan, which shared the fear of abandonment by Washington. He succeeded in winning political 
as well as economic support from Tokyo. Thanks to Japanese cooperation, Park was able to 
protect his grip on power against the liberal challengers, especially Kim Daejung, in the 
presidential election of 1971.53 Despite these efforts the South Korean government proposed 
inter-Korean talks in August 1971 due to continuous pressure both from Washington and the 
electorate. In October 1971 Park finally declared martial law and fought to minimize the impact 
of his liberal approach on his own political basis, anticommunism.  
Park‘s decision made it clear that the South Korean political leaders felt insecure about 
on going global changes that required South Korea to take a more lenient view and pursue a 
more peaceful policy towards North Korea as well as other communist nations. The new 
American foreign policy stance and the rise of liberal movements directly threatened the Park 
regime which had thus far justified its lengthy tenure and authoritarian rule by pointing out the 
persisting danger of renewed military conflict with the North. The regime needed to meet the 
demands of the international community and its citizens. South Korea changed its Northern and 
general foreign policies with reluctance.54 This chapter will show the gap between the new 
foreign policy and the real intentions of South Korea‘s leadership.  
In the third chapter, We will discuss the drastic changes which took place politically in 
South Korea from 1972 to 1974 .this is the period that the ROK government proposed direct 
talks with the DPRK and won Nixon‘s promise to suspend the withdrawal plan for the time 
being. The top-level talks, held both in Pyongyang and Seoul during the first half of 1972, 
culminated in the joint communiqué for the peaceful reunification of Korea. However, because 
both camps did not honour their respective commitments, inter-Korean negotiations soon 
stalled.55 While talking with Kim Ilsung, Park Chunghee continuously fanned fears of the 
Communist threat and planned an authoritarian reform for further negotiation with Kim and his 
presidency.56 
                                                          
51 Odd Arne Westad, op. cit., 194- 195. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Victor Cha, op. cit., 59- 99. 
54 Ma Sangyoon, op. cit., 176- 181. 
55 Don Oberdorfer, op. cit., 25. 
56 ―SEOUL NIACT [WE AGREE THAT…]‖, 1972, 10, 16, POL 23- 9 KOR S 2-28-72, Box 2427, RG59; ―Press 
Guidance‖, 1972, 10,17, POL 23-9 KOR S 2-28-72, Box 2427, RG59; ―Martial Law and Government Changes‖, 
  
22 
 
In October 1972, the ROK leadership announced the Yusin Constitution (Restoration 
Constitution) that allowed Park to be elected by politicians and appoint one-third of the 
members of the National Assembly. It is important to point out that Park established the Yusin 
Constitution under pressure from Washington: Since 1969, the White House had urged the Park 
regime to improve relations with North Korea. However, this could have undermined the 
foundation of regime. Facing a possible defeat in the next round of elections, Park had to 
consider new ways to secure his power. Therefore, ROK elites considered it necessary to silence 
the liberal opposition movement before entering into further negotiations with Pyongyang.57   
The entering into force of the Yusin Constitution ruined the first détente on the 
Korean peninsula and even led to a deterioration of South Korea‘s relations with its two main 
allies, the US and Japan. Pyongyang increasingly lost its interest in the dialogue with Seoul 
because of Park‘s aggressive rhetoric proclaiming a ‗war against Communists without gunfire.‘ 
Washington and Tokyo disapproved of Park‘s over-emphasis on the Communist threat because 
their own talks with communist countries were still ongoing at the time. A sequence of political 
and diplomatic spats surrounding the diverging perceptions of the communist threat erupted 
between Seoul and Tokyo in 1973 and 1974.58 These differences clearly demonstrate the split 
between ROK and Japan as well as between ROK and the US. 
The final chapter covered in this thesis stretches from 1975 to 1979, the year Park died. 
The fall of  Saigon opened this turbulent era of  South Korean history. The most important issues 
of  this period are the ROK-US conflict over the development of  the nuclear missile in South 
Korea; Jimmy Carter‘s Korean policies and the liberal and democratic movement against Park. 
The renewed intensity of  conflict with Pyongyang; the defeat of  South Vietnam and the Ford 
administration‘s lukewarm attitude toward South Korean security also mounted pressure on the 
ROK. In the early post- Vietnam War period, Park tried to obtain the ‗ultimate weapon‘ in order 
to strengthen national security and limit fluctuations in American support in South Korea. The 
nuclear issue illustrates the fact that the Park regime had an obsessive preoccupation with 
national security issues. This prompted a stern warning from Washington not to pursue a nuclear 
weapons program. As a result, Park gave up his nuclear ambitions in return for US security 
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guarantees.59  
Yet the advent of  the new American administration marked the end of  unconditional 
US support for the Park regime. Carter and senior members of  his administration were highly 
critical of  Park‘s dictatorial rule. Park and his staff, however, did not have any intention to seek 
democratic government reforms.60 As a result, Carter planned the total withdrawal of  US forces 
from Korea. Park could prevent the pullout bill from being passed in the US Congress thanks to 
the cooperation of  US Army commanders stationed in South Korea.61 Yet, due to Carter‘s 
stubborn quest for the bill, Park was forced to enter into talks with the US president in 1979 and 
accept Carter‘s demand for the observance of  human rights and the introduction of  political 
freedom in South Korea. Carter‘s policy encouraged the liberal and democratic movements in the 
ROK while increasing numbers of  South Koreans began to challenge Park‘s lifetime tenure.62  
In the end, the Park regime collapsed under the pressure as Park himself  was 
assassinated by the chief  of  the KCIA who was responsible for suppressing democratic 
movements. Kim Jaegyu, the chief  of  the KCIA, had been reprimanded by Park for his poor 
performance and grew increasingly frustrated with his leader. As Kim argued, the split between 
him and his boss came out of  disagreements on how to suppress the democratic movement and 
counter increased US influence.63 Even though Kim was the one who killed Park, it could be 
said that his death was the result of  domestic and international pressure.  
 Before beginning Chapter 1, we need to briefly set out some key events in Korean 
history prior to 1968. Defeated by the US, Japan had to retreat from Korea, and the Korean 
people finally gained independence in 1945 after 36 years of  foreign domination. It began in 
early August 1945 when Soviet and US forces freed Korea from Japanese occupation. On 10th 
August, the US proposed to the USSR a temporary division of  the Korean Peninsula along the 
38th parallel. This suggestion was accepted in Moscow. Three years later, in 1948, independent 
governments were established in both South and North Korea after the US and USSR could not 
come to an agreement on the establishment of  a unitary government in the Korean Peninsula.64 
Rhee Syngman, the president of  the Korean provisional government in China, was elected as the 
first president of  the Republic of  Korea, also known as South Korea. In the North, Kim Ilsung, 
                                                          
59 Don Oberdorfer, op. cit., 49- 83. 
60 Ma Sangyoon and Park Wongon, ―Détentegi‘eui Hanmi Galdeung: Nixon, Carter‘wa Park Chunghee [ROK-US 
Split in Détente Period: Nixon, Carter, and Park Chunghee].‖ Yeoksa Bipyeong 86 (2009): 113- 139. 
61 Ibid; Cho Kabje, op. cit., vol. 11, 143- 144; The Washington Post, 19th May 1977. 
62 William H. Gleysteen and William H. Gleysteen Jr., Massive entanglement, ,marginal influence: Carter and Korea in crisis, 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution: 1999), 51. 
63 Ahn Dongil, 10.26 Eun Sala Itta [The 10.26 Incident is Still Ongoing], (Seoul: Random House Chungang, 2005), 85- 
86. 
 
64 William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Press, 1995), 10- 46.  
  
24 
 
an officer of  the Soviet forces, was appointed as Prime Minister of  the Democratic People‘s 
Republic of  Korea. They did not, however, consider each other as qualified leaders. Both argued 
that the respective counterpart on the opposite side of  the new dividing line were merely 
puppets of  either the US or USSR - occupied without justification.65 Therefore, the fundamental 
policies of  the South and North towards each other prior to and during the Korean War were 
hostile. As is well known, the Korean War did not end with a clear victory for either side. Instead, 
in 1953, the armistice treaty was signed and the war subsided into the long-term conflict, a 
solution both camps had feared.66   
The Korean War introduced two major driving forces in the policy-making process of  
South Korea‘s Northern policy which then further developed after the war. Firstly, national 
defence. The population on both sides of  the 38th parallel continued to live in fear of  full scale 
war and could thus be identified as the real losers. The second force was US influence. The US 
demonstrated a strong will to intervene in East Asian affairs. The formulation and objectives of  
post-war South Korea‘s policy towards North Korea reflected the influence of  these two driving 
forces. Due to the constant fear of  war, policy was created and based on the perspective of  
national defence. The aim of  the policy, therefore, was not the reunification, but the prevention 
of  a potential threat from North Korea. Moreover, policy makers assumed American 
intervention in Korea. In short, South Korea‘s post-war Northern policy focused on the 
prevention of  the military threat from North Korea with the help of  US forces.67  
American influence on South Korea‘s policy towards North Korea intensified after the 
leadership change in Seoul at the beginning of  the 1960s. To the US the nationalistic Rhee 
government was a difficult partner. It rejected the US determination to seek a truce in the 
Korean War and refused the US proposal for rapprochement with Japan. As a result, American 
support for South Korea was limited until 1961. South Korea, led by corrupt and incompetent 
policy makers, was in total disarray after the war. Rhee Syngman resigned in 1960 following 
demonstrations against a rigged election, and the parliament took power. 68  
On 16th May 1961, Park Chunghee staged a coup and seized power. Park and a group of  
army and navy officers positioned forces at strategic points in the capital, securing the city and 
taking control of  both the government and the media on the same day. By 17th May, his junta 
had banned all political activity.69   
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Park Chunghee was born in 1917 and joined the Japanese Kwantung Army in 
Manchuria. In 1946, after the liberation of  Korea, Park graduated from the Korean Military 
Academy. During the communist rebellion in Yosu-Sunchon in 1948, he and his brother joined 
the insurgents; Park was arrested but helped the authorities track down insurgents. Thanks to 
this collaboration, he was granted a special amnesty and was allowed to rejoin the ROK Army.70 
At the beginning, Park received a cold welcome by Washington due to his communist 
background and the undemocratic temperament of  his.71 However, he seemed to understand 
this concern well. For example, his junta, called the ―revolutionary committee‖ pledged 
anticommunism and close ties with the US.72 Furthermore, unlike Rhee Syngman, who had 
always shown hostility towards Japan, Park actively worked on rapprochement with Japan as the 
US wished. Washington wanted to ease the tensions between South Korea and Japan, its two 
main allies in East Asia. Park finally resumed diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965. This was 
an important movement since the treaty between the ROK and Japan built a link between the 
ROK, Japan, and the US in East Asia, a connection that influenced the DPRK in terms of  its 
Cold War strategy, putting in on a confrontation course with Japan. Park‘s logic was simple, the 
enemy of  my enemy is my ally. Park‘s realpolitik put more emphasis on the practical benefits of  
improved ROK-Japan relations than on cultivating national antagonisms. Although the US had 
repeatedly called upon South Korea to work towards a normalization of  relations with Japan, 
Rhee Syngman did not make any amicable gesture towards Tokyo and literally ignored the 
Japanese economic potential that could have benefitted South Korea in its war against the 
Communists. Rhee‘s nationalistic background, the anti- Japanese resistance during the imperial 
rule, limited practical diplomacy with Japan. Park, however, established diplomatic ties with Japan 
even in the face of  fierce demonstrations that decried the trauma Korea had suffered under 
Japanese colonial rule. This rational action laid the economic foundation for Park‘s enthusiastic 
campaign focused on national security.73 For Park, Japan was not a threat since the two countries 
had to confront common enemies in North Korea and other communist states. His practical 
diplomacy clearly distinguished between friends and enemies along the lines of  the Cold War 
realities.  
Nevertheless, it has frequently been questioned, whether Park was really guided by 
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ideology. Even though he was one of  the most vocal proponents of  anticommunism in East 
Asia at the time, he rarely criticized Marxism and the institutional competition between 
Capitalism and Communism. It stands beyond a doubt that his authoritarian rule and 
government-planned economy did not conform to the conventional understanding of  Capitalist 
states. His concept of  anticommunism does not imply the ‗philosophic or institutional criticism 
on Communism.‘ Rather, it means the ‗realistic perception of  the Communist threat.‘ 
Therefore, despite fundamental similarities between Rhee‘s Northern policy (post-war) 
and Park‘s national defence, Park‘s regime was more threatening towards the DPRK due to his 
more realistic interpretation of  anticommunism.74 Regarding international politics, for Rhee, 
nationalism was the most important principle when establishing relations with other nations. In 
this sense, the US, which occupied the southern half  of  Korea, could be the potential enemy that 
could threaten the autonomy of  the Korean people. Furthermore, the majority of  South 
Koreans opposed the rapprochement with Japan proposed by the US. They felt strong animosity 
towards Japan because of  its colonial past. On the one hand, despite his anticommunist 
emphasis, Rhee did not build any concrete relationship with other Capitalist nations, especially 
with Korea‘s neighbour, Japan, and hence his foreign policy was very limited. As a result, his 
regime was not particularly threatening to the North in spite of  its emphasis on anticommunism 
in domestic politics. On the other hand, for Park, anticommunism dictated Korea‘s allies and 
enemies in the world in terms of  national security. In other words, anticommunism was not only 
the guiding thought of  his Northern policy, but also that of  all his foreign policy. In this context, 
Park was relatively cooperative with the US and even willing to improve South Korea‘s 
relationship with Japan.  Consequently, his regime, which had a strong connection with Japan 
and the US, was more threatening towards North Korea.75 
In addition, in 1964, Park dispatched Korean forces to Vietnam in order to support the 
American forces there. In turn, US support for Korea increased in this period.76 The Vietnam 
War reaffirmed the strong connection between the ROK and the US, as well as the ROK‘s 
hostility towards communist nations. Consequently, it sent a strong message to the DPRK, which 
considered North Vietnam a communist brother. The in turn pushed to adopt a more aggressive 
policy towards the ROK based on its perception of  the global communist movement.77 
However, the term ‗hostility‘ does not clearly explain the difference in policies between 
South and North Korea toward each other. North Korea was in an offensive position. Kim 
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completed the establishment of  his regime in North Korea after the Korean War. Although the 
people of  Korea were the real losers of  the war, Kim Ilsung should not be regarded as one. He 
utilized the great failure of  his ambitious political career to persecute rivals, especially domestic 
communists. This explains the stable development of  Kim‘s regime in North Korea after the war 
and the aggressive approach to its reunification strategy since the 1960s.78 
In contrast, Park did not consolidate his rule as strongly as Kim. Park was forced to run 
for election, and continuously faced political threats to his rule, such as veto points in the 
presidential system such as the legislature and judicature; future presidential elections posed 
threats from other presidential candidates and demonstrations. Furthermore, the economic and 
military power of  North Korea overwhelmed South Korea meagre equivalent until the late 1960s. 
Therefore, Park had to focus on keeping domestic political stability rather than pursuing an 
active Northern policy. For these reasons, the Park regime‘s policy toward North Korea was not 
fundamentally different to the Rhee regime‘s post-war policy despite their different 
interpretations of  anticommunism. National defence remained the priority.  In this one sense, 
the aims of  Park‘s Northern policy were similar to Rhee‘s. Both emphasized anticommunism, 
assuming that there were only conflicts between the two Koreas. As Park remarked in one of  his 
essays, ―…We must establish a determined anticommunism in this land (South Korea) to repel 
the terrible communists.‖79 
Nevertheless, overall Park‘s and Rhee‘s aims and strategies were very different except 
for the reliance on US forces. The major differences in Northern policy between the regimes of  
Park and Rhee can be found in the policies flanking the Northern policy rather than in the 
Northern policy itself. For diplomatic reasons, as we have discussed above, Park was willing to 
cooperate with Capitalist partners under the common banner of  anticommunism. The Park 
regime was more likely to utilise diplomacy as an instrument of  its Northern policy. At the 
domestic political level, Park emphasized economic development under his own strong 
leadership. Specifically, he argued that the only way to effectively address the Northern military 
threat consisted of  a national defence strategy supported by export-oriented economic policies.80 
This marked a considerable shift in South Korea‘s place in the 1970s to a developed economy. 81 
With this South Korea built up considerable military power and could no longer be considered a 
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client state of  the US by the mid-1970s. Yet, it is noteworthy that the presence of  US forces 
remained essential in a situation where the DPRK, which felt threatened by economic and 
military development in the ROK, further strengthened her armed forces. 82  Since 1961, 
supported by new economic and diplomatic policies, the ROK‘s policies towards the DPRK had 
been designed to improve national defence capabilities and stabilize Park‘s relatively insecure 
political position. With a relevant economic policy and with aid from the US and Japan, the 
ROK‘s economy developed dramatically which resulted in a reinforcement of  national defence 
that emboldened the regime to take a more assertive policy stance toward North Korea. It was 
simply logical. If  the ROK becomes stronger than the DPRK, the latter would not consider war 
a viable option.83 At a first glance, Park‘s regime was firmly established based on its Northern 
and foreign policies whose primary concern was national defence. 
However, there were international and domestic issues which could challenge the 
established ROK‘s Northern and foreign policies. It is necessary to consider those events since 
they provide the background of  two incidents in 1968 which resulted in profound changes to the 
relationship between the ROK and USA and to the pattern of  competition between South and 
North Korea. One of  the most important events is the Vietnam War. In 1966, Washington 
requested Seoul dispatch additional troops to Vietnam. In return, the ROK demanded more 
financial and military support in order to maintain its security and develop its economy.84 
However, as is well known, the US suffered significant loss of  life and material in the course of  
the Vietnam War. Hence, this decision to expand support for Seoul further aggravated 
Washington‘s financial troubles. In other words, while the Vietnam War put a burden on the 
American economy, it boosted economic activity in the ROK.  The difference between two 
allies in their interpretations of  the Vietnam War bore the potential to negatively affect their 
post-war relationship.85  
Secondly, we must consider the Sino-Soviet split. In the 1960s.As O. A. Westad argues, 
―the Sino-Soviet split opened up both great opportunities and great dangers for Communist 
parties in the Third World.‖86 Likewise, this conflict resulted in a lack of  checks against the 
DPRK who kept a balance between two Communist giants.87 The decline of  China‘s political 
influence on the DPRK and that of  the USSR too, allowed Kim Ilsung‘s regime to be more 
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autonomous and pursue a more aggressive policy vis-à-vis the US and South Korea.    
Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet split also encouraged the normalization of  relations 
between the US and China in 1969.88 As a result, the US was reluctant to support the ROK‘s 
confrontational Northern policy because it feared antagonizing China. On the other hand, this 
situation was advantageous to the North Koreans who wanted to remove American influence 
from the Korean Peninsula.89 According to Kang Induk, head of  the North Korea department 
of  the KCIA at the time, the Park regime was unwilling to address North Korea‘s frequent 
provocations in direct talk with Pyongyang but was forced to do so by the US who wanted to 
alleviate tensions on the Korean Peninsula and to improve its own relationship with China.90 
Thirdly, the most important domestic issue was the rise of  Park Chunghee‘s political 
rivals. In 1967, five years into his first term as president of  the ROK, Park was re-elected. From 
this point onwards, many politicians began to worry about Park having lifetime tenure. On the 
3rd of  May 1967, Park won his second term with 5,688,666 votes, more than half  of  the total 
votes. The difference between Park and Yun Bosun, the former president from 1960 to 1963 and 
presidential candidate in the elections of  1963 and 1967, was 1,162,125 votes. This difference is 
significant since the difference in 1962 was only 156, 026 votes.91 At first glance, we can deduce 
from these statistics that Park‘s economic and anticommunist policies enjoyed broad public 
support. Yet, this result could also have encouraged Park to run for president once again in 1971. 
On this manner, minor parties rallied public opinion against Park‘s lifetime tenure and his 
Northern policy which provided justification for his despotic ruling style. Among these 
politicians opposing Park was Kim Daejung. He would eventually become president of  the ROK 
from 1998 to 2002and stood out for his strong criticism of  Park‘s undemocratic rule and 
confrontational Northern policy. In 1967, Park became aware of  Kim as the spokesman of  the 
New Democratic Party, Sinmin dang. Before the presidential election in 1967, Kim criticized Park‘s 
illegal campaign with exact data, and this irritated Park.92 Afterwards, Kim proposed a more 
conciliatory political stance towards North Korea, and his idea promoted democratic movements 
in 1970s pushing inter-Korean dialogue in 1971.93 Along with the political apprehension of  
Park‘s lifetime tenure, Kim‘s peaceful reunification idea raised the level of  domestic political 
pressures on Park and on his Northern and foreign policies initiating changes in both policies. 
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All of  these issues posed potential threats to the ROK‘s Northern and foreign policies 
in the Park era. However, they were insignificant until 1968, the starting point of  this research 
project. Regarding the Vietnam War, the Park regime did not seriously consider American travails 
in Vietnam until the Tet Offensive of  1968.94 Even worse, the ROK did not expect that the 
Sino-Soviet split would lead the DPRK to be more aggressive. Only when North Korean forces 
raided the ROK presidential residence, the Blue House, and seized the USS Pueblo in January 
1968, did this analysis change. Moreover, domestic political pressure also came to be more 
serious after 1968 when Park used more despotic methods to maintain his rule. Due to these 
changes, the previous Northern and foreign policies were rendered irrelevant and useless for 
ensuring the security of  the ROK as an independent capitalist country and Park as its undisputed 
supreme leader. As a result, a new South Korean policy towards the North and other nations 
began to take shape. In this thesis I seek to explain how these international and domestic 
changes affected the ROK‘s Northern and foreign policies after 1968. 
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Chapter I: The turning point: A rift between the Republic of Korea and the United 
States, 1968 
 
In January 1968, the Democratic People‘s Republic of  Korea (DPRK) dispatched 31 
commandos on a mission to assassinate the leader of  the Republic of  Korea (ROK), Park 
Chunghee, and North Korean naval forces seized the American spy ship, the USS Pueblo. These 
events intensified the rivalry between the two Korean states and redefined the relationship 
between the ROK and the United States. This period has become known as the Korean Crisis of  
1968 and is widely accepted to be the cause of  the following political rift between Seoul and 
Washington with respect to the US polices on Communism. 
Following Park Chunghee‘s coup and usurped rise to ROK‘s prime political position 
in1961 his political successes went from strength to strength. Under his leadership, South Korea 
established a fast growing economy and achieved considerable military strength. Thanks to his 
achievements, he was re-elected in 1967 for a second term with significant turnout.1 Yet his 
accomplishments were heavily based on American support and giving the US significant 
influence on ROK politics. Park‘s foreign policy, defined as a strong anticommunism and 
inspired by Washington, shaped his confrontational Northern policy. Anticommunism also 
determined the political strategy of  his North Korean rival Kim Ilsung, who was supported by 
Moscow and Beijing. Therefore, conflicts between the two Koreas have always been described as 
being fundamentally between Washington and Moscow, and/or Beijing.2 
However, historical evidence on the Korean Crisis of  1968 questions this notion. The 
North Korean elites planned the raid on the Blue House and seized the USS Pueblo by themselves 
and without prior consultation with their patrons in the Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) or People‘s Republic of  China (PRC).3 South Korean leaders, after being rejected by 
Washington for military intervention in the conflict of  1968, became aware of  the limits of  their 
superpower patron. South Korea started to develop its own military force in order to maintain its 
anticommunist policy and ensure national security. 
Why couldn‘t South Korea use US power to settle the inter-Korean problem in 1968?  
The simple answer for this question is that the United States was unable to focus on Korea 
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because of  its fierce war in Vietnam. Compared to the war in Southeast Asia, the military threat 
from North Korea was not serious and did not undermine overall US Cold War strategy. In 
contrast, South Korea believed that the North Korean threat was an effort to destroy Capitalism 
through superior military strength and posed a significant threat. 
The overall focus of  this chapter is to examine ROK‘s Cold War strategy in 1968. This 
will be accomplished by focusing specifically on the international environment during the 
Vietnam War period between the US and the ROK. Specific focus will be given to the Blue 
House raid and the attempted seizure of  the USS Pueblo in January 1968. The cause of  the crisis, 
and the impact on ROK‘s Northern and foreign policies will be addressed. This chapter will also 
discuss the origins of  the gap between Seoul and Washington and outline how the ROK built the 
foundations for its new competition with the DPRK. 
 
(1) The origin of  ROK-US split towards the North Korean threat: The Korean Crisis of  
January 1968 
 
On the 17thof  January1968, 31 North Korean commandos in ROK Army uniforms 
infiltrated South Korean territory. They moved carefully for two days and nights through the 
border area. On 19th January, the team encountered four South Korean woodcutters who 
immediately identified them as North Korean soldiers based on their awkward outfits and 
Northern dialect. The North Korean soldiers let the woodcutters go after a stern warning not to 
inform the police. However, the woodcutters disregarded this warning and notified the police 
who in turn passed the information on along its chain of  command.4 
On 20th January, the commandos entered Seoul and mounted an attack on the 
presidential palace. The ROK‘s counter-guerrilla apparatus had already commenced operations 
and had mobilized thousands of  police and soldiers. As a result, the North Koreans posed as 
soldiers and marched towards the Blue House. A scant 800 meters from there, a police officer 
halted the platoon and asked questions. The North Korean infiltrators became nervous and shot 
the policeman after he tried to draw his pistol. A melee ensued in which two of  the guerrillas 
died. The remaining North Koreans scattered, pursued by police and army units.5 28 of  the 31 
guerrillas were killed; two escaped to the North and one was captured. In the course of  this 
counter-guerrilla operation, 30 South Koreans were killed and 52 were injured (including 
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civilians). On that day, Seoul‘s citizens could hear the sound of  gunshots in the centre of  the 
capital. The captive, Kim Shinjo, announced that he and his team came to destroy the Blue 
House and to assassinate Park Chunghee. This was the first direct threat by the North on the 
president and high-ranking officials since the Korean War in the 1950s. This was just the 
beginning of  a nightmare saga.6 
Just three days later on 23rd January, the USS Pueblo was captured by the North Korean 
navy. On 5th January 1968, the USS Pueblo departed from Sasebo, Japan with particular orders to 
gather signal and electronic intelligence from the DPRK.7 According to American accounts, on 
23rd January, the vessel was sailing in international waters, approximately 15.8 miles off  the coast 
of  the nearest North Korean island when it was approached by a North Korean sub-chaser 
which challenged the Pueblo‟s nationality. The captain raised the US flag. The North Korean 
vessel then signalled a heave to under threat of  fire. Additionally, three torpedo boats and two 
MIG-21 fighters arrived on the scene. The USS Pueblo had been in constant radio contact with 
the US Naval Security Group in Kamiseya, Japan during the incident. Nevertheless, no attempt 
was made to rescue the crew. By the time President Johnson learned of  the incident, the spy ship 
had already been captured. North Korea claimed that the vessel had strayed into its territorial 
waters and would be taken to port at Wonsan.8 Both the Blue House raid and the Pueblo crisis 
reminded South Koreans of  the horrors of  the Korean War and revived South Korean hostilities 
against the North.  
Park Chunghee was enraged by the North Korean assassination plot against him and 
the attack on American forces. On 24th January, he argued that such provocative actions had to 
be recognised as major violations of  the Armistice treaty signed in 1953.9 Moreover, the US too 
had been involved in the USS Pueblo incident. Therefore, the Park regime positioned itself  to 
impose strong countermeasures alongside the US against North Korea, and diplomatic 
compromise with the DPRK regime was forbidden. Park planned revenge and expected full 
cooperation from Washington, as the ROK‘s partner in the anticommunist camp and as a victim 
of  the USS Pueblo incident. ROK-US relations during the Johnson administration were better 
than they had been ever before. ROK‘s enthusiastic support for the American war in Southeast 
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Asia clearly promoted Seoul as one of  Washington‘s closest allies.10 South Korea considered the 
inter-Korean and DPRK-Washington conflict in the same context as the Vietnam War. The Blue 
House held the opinion that the US should intervene in the inter-Korean conflict as it did in 
Vietnam. The Park regime prepared for another war against the communists.  
At first, ROK and US reactions were similarly characterised by surprise and outrage. 
The US moved a number of  mobile troops including the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, from 
Okinawa to the ROK on 24th January 1968 and took a strong preparatory posture against a 
possible state of  emergency. President Johnson lived up to his pledge that the US would not 
tolerate this kind of  hostile act.11 However, William J. Porter, US ambassador to South Korea, 
was also told to advise the ROK government ―in (the) strongest terms against any attempt at 
action against North Korea in retaliation for the Seoul raid,‖ particularly for the USS Pueblo 
seizure. This US initial and military decision only further entrenched Park‘s conviction in 
maintaining his hostile stance toward Kim Ilsung.12 This marked the start of  a deviation in 
policy between the ROK and the USA because The White House became increasingly reluctant 
to resolve the conflicts with North Korea. 
After contacting Moscow and Beijing, Washington found that the patrons of  North 
Korea neither knew about the plan to attack South Korea nor directed the seizure of  the US ship. 
Moreover, both the Soviet and Chinese rejected the idea of  North Korean-US talks.13Washington 
concluded that the DPRK aggression was an isolated operation of  Pyongyang without links to 
its two allies and the Communist campaign of  the Cold War. Simply put, it was pointless for 
Johnson to take the North Korean threat seriously since the incidents did not affect the war 
between East and West in the broad sense.14 Evidence supports the American point of  view and 
can rationalise how and why the White House reached such a conclusion. 
It is commonly agreed that the Sino-Soviet conflict of  the 1960s was one of  the most 
important foundations of  the North Korean aggression in 1968.15 Compared to their comrades 
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in Eastern Europe, who were firmly controlled by the USSR, the North Korean elites enjoyed 
considerable autonomy in policy-making thanks to the conflict between its two patrons. That is, 
the DPRK‘s policy making towards the South could reflect the intentions of  its own leaders 
rather than those of  Moscow or Beijing. Unlike the USSR and China, both of  which focused on 
each other as much as their Capitalist enemies, the DPRK maintained its focus on the war 
against the Capitalists. Kim Ilsung and his partisans, who had had great success in their guerrilla 
war against imperial Japan, dominated the leadership of  the DPRK in the 1960s.16 Suh Daesuk 
explained that the military background of  the DPRK‘s leaders led the government to adopt a 
hostile Southern policy whose aim was the reunification of  Korea through military power.17 
Regarding the fierce conflict which raged between the USSR and China during the 1960s, North 
Korean elites developed a neutral attitude and were able to formulate independent policy. 
Whereas the USSR was mindful of  its relationship with Western nations, North Korea did not in 
this sense follow Moscow‘s line.  
Due to their travails in the Korean War, Kim Ilsung and his partisans returned to their 
roots, namely guerrilla warfare. They trained the commandos which were dispatched on the Blue 
House Raid. Even though the assassination attempt on Park Chunghee failed, the DPRK was 
not discouraged. They dispatched more armed forces who then engaged in guerrilla warfare and 
propaganda activity in almost every part of  South Korea.18 In January and February 1968, the 
Soviet leadership failed to reign in Kim Ilsung due to the Soviet ideological commitment to the 
DPRK, in addition to Kremlin‘s desire to keep Kim on the its side of  the Sino-Soviet split.19 
Since DRPK‘s two sponsors were unable to intervene in its policy making and the US was 
engaged in the Vietnam War, North Korea might have seen this as an opportune time to use its 
strong military power for its benefit in the inter-Korean competition.  
The ROK leadership considered that North Korea resorted to guerrilla tactics because 
of  North Korean domestic politics. In his essay collections, written throughout his tenure, Park 
Chunghee stated, ―…I think that there are several reasons for the recent reckless actions of  Kim 
Ilsung and his partisans… First, by cultivating a sense of  insecurity among North Korean people 
regarding war or invasion, they had hidden the irrational rules of  communists… And it was well 
known that they had no choice but to cultivate people‘s feelings of  insecurity for the stabilization 
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of  the regime.‖20 ROK government documents also indicate this intention and concluded that 
the ROK should make a strict countermeasure toward DPRK in order to discourage Kim Ilsung 
from using military action for political gain and prevent further aggression from Pyongyang.21 
On 25th January, Park sent a letter to Johnson through the US embassy in Seoul in 
which it urged the Johnson administration to push Pyongyang to return Pueblo and its crew and 
take responsibility for its violation of  the Armistice treaty.22 But Washington was concerned that 
the Park regime was preoccupied with the North Korean threat, which did not represent the 
general ideals of  the Communist bloc. Seoul‘s determination in engaging in military conflict was 
regarded as an overreaction by the US government. Since the American campaign in Vietnam 
had suffered major setbacks, the White House did not want to expand its military involvement 
into new theatres.23 Moreover, the US worried about Soviet and Chinese intervention on the 
Korean Peninsula. The USSR and the DPRK concluded a Treaty of  Friendship, Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance on 6th July 1961. Article 1 of  this treaty states that if  either party suffered 
from an armed attack ―and thus finds itself  in a state of  war, the other Contracting Party shall 
immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means of  its disposal.‖24 For these 
reasons the US was ‗not willing‘ to exacerbate the problem by engaging in hostilities against the 
DPRK. Furthermore, after launching the Tet offensive in Vietnam on the 30th of  January 1968, 
the US was no longer able to use a ‗tactical measure‘ as used in Vietnam, against the DPRK. In 
this situation, the US decided to appease the DPRK and simply refused to consider the two 
hostile actions a matter of  serious concern.25 This decisive US outcome upset the South Korean 
elites.  
ROK paid more attention to the hostile actions themselves than to the impact of  North 
Korean aggression on the Cold War at large. The two attacks revived memories of  the tragedy 
of  the Korean War which had ended only 15 years earlier. It was for this reason that the ROK 
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government became extremely intent on revenge. 
Before January 1968, North Korean guerrilla operations were not unusual in post-war 
Korea. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency, KCIA, already expected guerrilla operations by 
North Korean spies. Kang Induk, the head of  the North Korean department of  KCIA at that 
time, anticipated that North Korea would dispatch guerrillas to the South in early January 1968. 
However, nobody in the Blue House expected President Park to be the target of  such an attack. 
The USS Pueblo incident further aggravated the situation.26 The North Korean aggression in 
January 1968 was recognised as far more serious than past cases. 
Public opinion in South Korea also encouraged its elites to punish North Korea using 
American support. The ROK citizens perceived the two incidents as interrelated. However, due 
to the relationship between Seoul and Washington, South Koreans considered that the raid on 
the Blue House had more urgent security implications than did the Pueblo incident. There was 
widespread public opinion that in order to stop recurring North Korean aggression, the ROK 
and the United States must jointly inflict punishment and impose sanctions on the DPRK. 27 
With public opinion taking this hard line stance, President Park expected cooperation from 
President Johnson. He believed that Johnson would at least allow him to launch reprisal 
attacks.28And yet, Washington decided to put aside the Korean problem.  
The surprising result of  the inter-Korean military conflict in January was an 
estrangement between the ROK and the United States, a situation which might have held an 
unexpected benefit for the DPRK. Decisive differences between the two capitalist partners 
impaired their diplomatic cooperation with respect to North Korea. South Korean diplomatic 
documents clearly reflect the difference between the ROK and the United States regarding the 
response to the two events: the ROK tried to interpret them as serious violations of  the 
Armistice treaty signed in 1953, and hence imposed direct sanction on Pyongyang.29 In addition, 
the ROK did not recognise the DPRK as an independent country and therefore tried to organize 
international political processes against it at a UN Security Council meeting within the absence 
of  North Korean representatives.30 On the other hand, the United States wanted a direct 
diplomatic contact to the DPRK in order to rescue the crew of  the USS Pueblo. The South 
Korean government demanded that the White House prevent North Korean representatives 
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from attending the meeting at the UN Security Council, but Washington refused.31 In addition, 
Lyndon Johnson tried to contact the DPRK through the Polish government to initiate a direct 
talk regarding the USS Pueblo. Regardless of  Seoul‘s clearly expressed opposition to such action, 
the meeting between US and North Korean representatives concerning the Pueblo incident was 
held in early February at Panmunjumon the border between South and North Korea.32  
The ROK now was in a vulnerable position because it had overly relied on the US for 
its security, and its distrust towards the alliance had now intensified. Charles H. Bonesteel, the 
Commander of  US Forces in Korea and Commander-in-Chief  of  the United Nations Command 
for Korea requested an increase of  US army strength on the peninsula from Washington. The 
request was repeatedly deferred until November 1968, when it was finally turned down.33 
Meanwhile, the US government tried to rescue the crew of  the USS Pueblo. Due to Kim Ilsung‘s 
obstinate attitude, this enterprise did not allow for threats or blackmail but required apologies 
instead. Washington acknowledged that the USS Pueblo had invaded territorial waters of  the 
DPRK. This decision, at the same time, nullified Seoul‘s prosecution of  Pyongyang for the Blue 
House Raid.34According to North Korean and American logic, ROK could not criticise the 
infiltration of  North Korean commandos into Seoul because the US spy ship had invaded North 
Korean maritime territory. The two violations of  the Armistice treaty cancelled each other out. 
Seoul‘s political leaders sensed that their wishes were being ignored. In response Park started to 
question America‘s security commitment to South Korea.35 
Disappointed with America‘s low posture diplomacy toward North Korea, the South 
Korean elites had started to review their national defence policies which relied heavily on 
American politics. Specifically, Seoul had to find a way to maintain its national security by relying 
only on their own military power. On 29th January 1968, the Blue House held an emergency 
security meeting. After passing around rice wine, Park said, ―… Even if  the US is our ally, it is 
reasonable to consider that the alliance is meaningless when national interest conflicts are 
raised… We must find a solution for our security problem by ourselves.‖36 
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Kim Sungeun, Minister of  National Defence at that time, recalled,  
 
On the day, President Park was not just angry; he was absolutely furious. He 
condemned Washington for its lukewarm attitude toward the Korean Crisis. When the 
South Korean military commanders suggested a retaliatory bombing on the North, 
Park was extremely excited and agreed with them. But, the problem was that we 
needed the F-4D Phantom, used by US Air Forces in Vietnam, in order to bomb 
North Korea. Moreover, the modernization of  our armed forces was also required for 
another war. Hence, the president decided to press Washington. On the next day, I 
met Charles H. Bonesteel, the Commander of  United States Forces in Korea and 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the United Nations Command in Korea and lodged a strong 
protest against the US government based on its betrayal.37 
 
Bonesteel agreed with Kim on the matter, but all he could do was appease the angry 
minister, ―I was also disappointed with my government for its decision. But antiwar 
demonstrations are held all over the US […]‖38 Undoubtedly, the American commander could 
not go against Washington and the South Korean leadership understood Johnson‘s trouble in his 
domestic politics. Yet Park and Kim hoped that Johnson clearly recognise the gravity of  Korean 
conflict. They thought that Washington owed Seoul a lot this time.39As its decision to reconcile 
with Japan for its relations with US and ROK economy, the Park regime was very realistic. They 
did not request Washington take retaliatory action against Pyongyang but instead attempted to 
demand financial support for its own military forces. 
The Blue House repeatedly criticised the White House‘s lukewarm attitude towards the 
Korean Crisis. William Porter, the US ambassador to the ROK, had difficulties appeasing the 
aggressive leaders in Seoul. On 3rd February 1968, during his meeting with Park (at Park‘s 
request), the president told Porter, ―If  our government does not get a guarantee that North 
Korea will refrain from further aggressive activities, and another incident occurs, we will take 
retaliatory measures.‖40 Porter calmly conveyed Johnson‘s intention to Park and tried to appease 
him, ―The seriousness of  uncoordinated action lay in the fact that it would undermine mutual 
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confidence and its bad effects could outlast that of  any particular incident.‖41 In his telegram to 
the State Department, he remarked that he had managed to persuade Park, although ―the South 
Korean‖ demonstrated a certain amount of  discontent.42  
Further still, in direct and indirect manners, Seoul kept urging Washington to work for 
South Korean security. At the opening ceremony of  the Gyeongjeon Railway on 7th February, 
1968, right after the talk between the US and DPRK, Park said, ―Forget that we have (American) 
nuclear missiles and UN forces! We must defend ourselves from North Korea through our own 
power first.‖43 He also announced that the ROK would arm 2.5 million veterans.44Although his 
nationalistic comments were well calculated, he really wanted to say, ―If  you (Washington) do not 
want to fight against Kim Ilsung with us, then just help us reinforce our military power in order 
balance the military capabilities of  the two Koreas.‖Park never turned down any support from 
Washington and looked to maximise US assistance. If  he could not expect direct American 
intervention, he would demand financial aid for the modernization of  the ROK armed forces as 
compensation. Through this speech and his protest against Washington, he bluffed the US into 
believing the ROK would turn against it and thus was able to bring the US to the negotiating 
table. Washington was afraid of  losing South Korean troops in Vietnam only due to the North 
Korean threat.45 
Park‘s calculation proved correct. That afternoon, the Pentagon announced the 
provision of  M16 rifles to help modernize the ROK forces. The next day, 8th February, William J. 
Porter, the US ambassador to Korea, was invited to the Blue House to discuss additional 
American aid. The ROK leadership paid more time and attention to the aid package than to the 
political reaction against the North Korean threat. Regarding this matter, Dean Rusk, the US 
Secretary of  State from 1961 to 1969, recalled:  
 
The South Koreans were interested in what might be called close-in retaliation, but 
I never got the impression that the South Koreans wanted to go into full-scale war. 
So to the extent that it was necessary to restrain them, it wasn‘t a very difficult job 
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because they were not itching for war, either. They did get very incensed about the 
Blue House raid and about other types of  infiltration that were coming across […] 
And so we had a little job at times of  cooling them down a bit and restraining them 
from these retaliations which they were inclined to pull off.46 
 
‗A little job at times of  cooling them down a bit‘ might refer to the diplomatic efforts to 
prevent South Korea‘s retaliation against North Korea. This is very impressive if  we review Kim 
Sungeun‘s memoir in which he points out that Washington had a hard time persuading Seoul to 
stand down. He argued that the Americans were seriously worried that South Korea might take 
unilateral action to retaliate against the North.47 It is almost impossible to judge whose argument 
is correct. The important point is that the gap between Seoul and Washington in terms of  their 
policy toward the communist threat indicated a fundamental difference in their interpretation of  
the Cold War. 
Regarding the USS Pueblo issue, Washington still kept a low posture in its talks with 
Pyongyang. As South Korea was aware of  the American intentions, it did not let go of  the issue 
easily and stepped up its bluffing. Park summoned the ROK ambassador to Washington and 
announced that he would withdraw the ROK armed forces from Vietnam.48Washington soon 
dispatched Cyrus R. Vance, the special emissary, to Seoul and invited Park to Hawaii in April in 
order to finally close the case of  the Korean Crisis and narrow the gap between the two allies. 
The widening rift with the US during the Korean Crisis undercut the stability of  South 
Korea, so Park directed his efforts at reinforcing national defence capabilities with limited 
American support. In some sense, ROK elites were overwhelmed by this sudden rift between the 
two allies since close US-ROK relations had traditionally constituted one of  the most important 
bases for Seoul‘s anticommunist foreign policies. Ironically, it was Washington that pushed Seoul 
into reviewing these policies rather than its arch-enemy, Pyongyang. It is useful to consider 
relations between the ROK and the US in context of  the Vietnam War: Washington had borne a 
heavy burden in terms of  economic, social and political costs, while South Korea had gained 
economic benefits, especially as a recipient of  US aid. As the war developed unfavourably for the 
US, this difference between the two allies‘ ongoing fortunes became clear. During the Korean 
Crisis, both parties interpreted the situation differently due to their divergent views on the 
Vietnam War. The Cyrus Vance‘s visit to Seoul in February and the US-ROK summit talks in 
                                                          
46Transcript, Dean Rusk Oral History Interview III, 1/2/70, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
47Kim Sungeun, op. cit., 213. 
48Donga Ilbo, 6th February, 1968. 
  
42 
 
April 1968 demonstrated how both parties interpreted their campaign in Southeast Asia and 
were supposed to narrow this gap.  
 
(2) ROK-US efforts at reconciliation: The negotiations and Summit talks in 1968  
 
Washington needed to appease Seoul who announced its intention to withdraw its 
troops from Vietnam. South Korea had dispatched 48,000 forces to Vietnam, the third largest 
power in the allied camp next to the US and South Vietnam. Johnson wanted to keep South 
Korean troops in Southeast Asia in order to reduce the burden on US forces in the Vietnam War. 
On 12th February 1968, Cyrus Vance, the special emissary from Washington to Seoul, conveyed 
Johnson‘s intentions to Park: 
 
(I tried) Primarily to do two things. First, to prevent any precipitate action in terms of  
a move to the North by Park and the Republic of  Korea‘s army, and secondly, to talk 
with Park about the kinds of  assistance which the United States was prepared to give. 
So it was a double barrelled set of  objectives that we were being asked to discuss with 
Park and his Cabinet.49 
 
The primary purpose of  Vance‘s visit to the ROK was to prevent another war on the 
Korean Peninsula and to ensure the safe return of  the Pueblo crew. Yet the ROK was unwilling at 
first to follow Washington‘s lead and wanted Washington to consider provocations from the 
DPRK with the same degree of  gravity as the war in Vietnam. Vance recalled: 
 
President Johnson was prepared to provide a hundred million dollars of  military 
assistance. He was terribly concerned that President Park might take some action in 
terms of  a military move across the demilitarized zone into the North which could 
precipitate a war, and he made it very clear to me that President Park should be under 
no illusions as to the seriousness of  any such action; and that if  such a step were taken 
without full consultation with the US that the whole relationships between our 
countries would have to be revaluated.50 
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Clearly, there was a gap between Park and Johnson in their stance on the Vietnam War 
as well as North Korean aggression. Despite the fierce battle in Vietnam during the Tet offensive, 
South Korean leadership still thought that Washington had the capability to punish Pyongyang. 
During the offensive, National Liberation Front (NLF) forces suffered grave damage. Park 
Chunghee, a former army general, regarded the strategic victory with some losses as a sign of  
ultimate victory and thus overlooked Johnson‘s political damage at home in the US as being the 
result of  battle and sacrifice.51 Park was deeply disappointed with Johnson whom he regarded as 
a loser who had surrendered his dignity to students. Kim Seongeun recalled, 
 
In the evening of  15th February, Park bitterly told ROK military leaders, ―Johnson 
might be unable to endure a harsh criticism. Even the leader of  the world‘s biggest 
power does not have any ideas against a student protest.‖ On the one hand, he 
sympathized with Johnson. On the other hand, he denounced the US president‘s 
handling of  the crisis.52 
 
Considering the South Korean contribution in the Vietnam War and the close 
relationship between the two countries, the US had little choice but to appease the ROK through 
economic benefits. At the same time, it also had to appease the DPRK in order to negotiate the 
safe return of  the Pueblo crew. To soothe tensions with South Korea and calm down its angry 
president, Johnson sent a letter to Park explaining the problem.  
 
[…] They (North Korean elites) may think by raising tension in Korea they can force 
us to divert our attention from the campaign of  aggression against South Vietnam. 
They will not succeed in that effort. The movements of  planes and ships to the 
Republic of  Korea in these last days have been from our active forces in the United 
States and the Pacific. None have been taken from Vietnam. […]53 
 
However, the South Korean president did not stop complaining about the American 
decision on the USS Pueblo and publicly announced that South Korea should fight against North 
Korea by itself  as if  Washington had already abandoned Seoul. 
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We do not want war. But if  we are invaded by our enemies as in the Korean War in the 
1950s, we have to fight against them to the very end even if  our entire territory is 
destroyed.54 
 
Washington had a difficult time in restraining Seoul while talking with Pyongyang. 
Moscow did not exert similar efforts on North Korea. Johnson administration complained about 
both the Soviet‘s attitude and North Korea‘s excessive demands, such as an official apology and 
written admission that the US spy ship entered the territorial sea.55 The US sentiment towards 
the two Koreas at that time has been well-summarized in the words of  Samuel A. Berger, the 
vice deputy minister of  the Department of  State, to Kim Dongjo, the Korean ambassador to the 
US: ―North Koreans abducted our ship, and you South Koreans demanded us to provide more 
money (for the modernization of  military forces), so we are in trouble and got tired.‖56 
Facing the offense of  the Vietcong, the White House decided to take a step back from 
the Vietnam War which further galvanised South Korea‘s poor opinion of  Washington. On 1st 
April, Johnson announced the cessation of  bombing raids over North Vietnam and proposed 
peace talks to Hanoi. Park, upon hearing the news, harshly proclaimed, ―Such a unilateral 
decision by the US cannot make any contribution to the Vietnamese Crisis.‖57 Once again, Park 
was disappointed with Johnson. The South Korean president thought that the leader of  the 
capitalist camp gave up on war too early and did not show respect to his Allies. However, 
evidence suggests that it is not true that Johnson ignored Park such as the South Korean leader 
thought.    
Just three days later, on 4th April, Johnson invited Park to Hawaii for a summit meeting. 
In reply to the invitation, Park emphasized the importance of  a clear mutual defence treaty to 
counter North Korean provocations and linked it to future Korean engagement in the Vietnam 
War. Park did not hide his opinions on the peace treaty between the US and North Vietnam:  
 
It is vividly recalled that at the Seven Nations Summit conference held in Manila in 
October 1966, we pledged our joint efforts in seeking peace and security for Asia 
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terming this area as ―the region of  security, order, and progress‖ in the joint statement 
of  ―Goals of  Freedom‖. Therefore, we should militarily overcome our enemy until 
they lay down their raving arms […]58 
 
Regarding South Korea‘s position in the Vietnam War, only one of  the reinforcements, 
his rhetoric sounded too determined and grave. Although the key stakeholders in the Vietnam 
War were the two Vietnams and the Cold War superpowers, the South Korean leader also had a 
great interest in the war. He might have regarded Vietnam as another Korea because of  the 
similarities between Korea and Vietnam, not least of  all the division of  the nation by Cold War 
ideology. South Vietnam was a client state of  the US, as was South Korea. Because of  those 
similarities, Seoul would have equated itself  with Saigon. The South Korean president would 
have thought that Washington would abandon Seoul in the future if  it could abandon South 
Vietnam. Johnson‘s decision destabilized the anticommunist foundation of  the South Korean 
elite, already disappointed with America‘s low posture diplomacy toward North Korea since 
January 1968.    
Sympathy for South Vietnam may not have been the only reason why South Korea 
supported the US effort during the Vietnam War. It is possible that Park wanted to continue the 
Vietnam War to continue the economic development of  his country and secure American 
economic and military support for it. Thanks to its participation in the war, South Korea had 
benefited from exports to Vietnam as well as from American aid. Both factors were the major 
driving forces of  the Korean economy and economic foundation of  its military power in the 
1960s.59 The South Korean leadership would have worried about the impact of  peace treaty 
between the US and North Vietnam on its economy and American aid. Park did not think that 
he could make Johnson change his mind on the US-North Vietnam negotiation but could try to 
secure the best possible deal for the ROK. 
 
[….] What the Korean Government asked for through Mr. Vance, in supplement to 
the annual military aids, is a matter of  great necessity for further strengthening the 
national defence capabilities of  the Republic of  Korea. I hope you [US president 
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Johnson] will give a speedy and favourable consideration to that request […]60 
 
It appears Park wanted to obtain assurances against the worst case scenario in which the 
US gave up Vietnam and Korea. Johnson knew of  Park‘s sense of  insecurity, and thus tried to 
assure him that the US would not abandon South Korea. Johnson intended to persuade his 
South Korean counterpart to keep troops in Vietnam, since their withdrawal for the purpose of  
countering to North Korean provocations would have substantially worsened the American 
military situation in Vietnam. In this sense, the sudden invitation for summit talks could be 
interpreted as being designed to prevent the estrangement of  the two allies. Excluded from 
negotiation over the fate of  the Pueblo crew and South Vietnam, Seoul expressed its discontent 
towards America. ―It was a decisive betrayal of  the USA that broke Seoul‘s heart regarding 
Washington‖ said Kang Induk.61 
The South Korean backlash on Washington only built. Facing South Korean protests 
over American commitment in South Korea, Washington became increasingly frustrated with 
Seoul, which it perceived was requesting far too much in terms of  aid. However, the US had to 
prevent further disputes with the Park regime in order to keep South Korean forces in Vietnam. 
Summit talks between the two allies in 1968 were intended to solve this dilemma. On the 17thof  
April during the summit meeting, the US president tried to secure Korean military support for 
South Vietnam by assuring Park of  Korean safety. Johnson said, 
 
The US administration is asking Congress that part of  the $100 million go towards 
activating one air squadron. We had sent to Korea some squadrons already and called 
up reserves because of  the Korean situation, which should have been destined for 
Vietnam. With the increased air power in Korea, the ROK is capable of  defending 
itself  from North Korea in all service military capabilities.62 
 
In return for additional US aid to Korea, Johnson suggested the expansion of  services 
performed by ROK troops already stationed in Vietnam. Additionally, he asked Park to 
understand his decision concerning the cessation of  bombing raids over North Vietnam. 
However, Park was not yet satisfied. He replied, 
                                                          
60―President Park‘s visit to USA from 17 to 19 April 1968,‖ 1968, Class Number 2577. 724.11US, Diplomatic 
Archive, Republic of  Korea. 
61 Interview with Kang Induk, 15th July 2009, Institute of  Far Eastern Studies. 
62―Summary of  Conversations Between President Johnson and President Park, April 17th, 1968,” FRUS 1964-1968 
Vol.XXIX:Korea. 
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I am grateful for your added appropriation request but do not ―feel at ease with this 
amount‖ since North Korea aims at creating a second Vietnam in South Korea. I feel 
that since North Korea has tens of  thousands trained guerrillas, the ROK army must 
strengthen in defences in rear areas. Also, ROK army fire power is ―far inferior to 
North Korea‘s.‖ I would like to strengthen the ROK air force and need US assistance 
for the strengthening of  the local reserve corps.63 
 
Both presidents exasperated each other. Following Park‘s negative response and his 
additional request, Johnson nearly despaired of  his insatiable ally. He declined Park‘s request for 
additional US assistance except for the $100 million pledged by the Vance mission in February. 
On the other hand, Park doubted Johnson‘s leadership abilities and was disappointed with his 
incapable patron. According to US sources, as a result of  his discussions with the US president, 
Park remarked that he sensed Johnson had lost considerable political influence. He also stated 
that the US president was no longer able to exercise effective authority over congressional 
actions on foreign assistance programmes after his announcement not to seek re-election.64 
The political damage to Johnson‘s leadership as a result of  the Vietnam War prohibited 
further warfare against the communists, including the war against the DPRK. Although the 
White House did not intend to discourage the Blue House, it could only refuse South Korea‘s 
additional request. These developments in the Vietnam War reiterate the very origin of  the 
discrepancy between the ROK and the US during the Korean Crisis of  1968. Both parties 
confirmed a mutual breach during the summit meeting in April.  
South Korean policy makers finally recognised that American interventionism was not 
necessarily bound to the Cold War ideology. They came to be aware of  how to best utilise their 
relationship with Washington. In response to Korean protests, the US promised an additional 
100 million dollars worth of  military support to the ROK even though it continued to object to 
retaliatory bombings on the North.65Although the funding for South Korea‘s national security 
prevented a further breach between the two allies in the early half  of  1968, Seoul‘s dependency 
on Washington negatively affected the ROK-US relationship in the later half  of  1968. In regards 
to the issue of  Korean security, the two parties‘ views were not in sync. To Washington, the Park 
                                                          
63 Ibid. 
64―Intelligence Information Cable From the Central Intelligence Agency, April 23rd1968,” FRUS 1964-1968 Vol. 
XXIX:Korea. 
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Regime was a demanding client who requested too much. Park used the defence of  capitalism in 
East Asia and his troops‘ involvement in Vietnam as a bargaining chip for extracting more US 
support. Such an attitude burdened the US, which had already suffered financial pressures from 
the surging costs of  the war in Vietnam. Seoul, on the other hand, considered its request to be 
wholly reasonable. Park had to prevent further aggressions from the DPRK in order to stabilise 
his regime. The ROK president related the stability of  his regime to that of  the whole of  Asia. 
In this sense, he argued that 100 million dollars of  US aid were but a minimum requirement for 
peace in East Asia. For this reason, the gap between the two parties could not be narrowed easily. 
The rift became more evident towards the end of  Johnson‘s term and the beginning of  Richard 
Nixon‘s presidency in 1969. 
Park clearly recognised the frailty of  the ROK-US alliance and did not push Johnson 
further though he failed to change Johnson‘s Korea and Vietnam policy. Arriving in Seoul, Park 
announced that he had reminded the American president of  the vital matter of  American 
support for Korea and was generally satisfied with the result of  his meeting with Johnson.66 
That is, the ROK accepted the fact that it could not rely on US forces alone for its security, and 
had to focus on developing its own defensive systems in tandem with using American 
assistance.67Clearly, the South Korean leadership could keep its hostile relations with North 
Korea thanks to the funding from Washington in 1968.   
The Korean Crisis in 1968 was a watershed event that deeply affected Seoul‘s 
relationship with Washington and demonstrated that the US was reluctant to entangle with 
Korean problems. As the US suffered serious economic and political set backs from its 
involvement in the Vietnam War, the ROK was unable to retaliate against North Korean 
aggression in January 1968. Despite its repeated efforts to secure American military involvement 
in the Korean Peninsula, Seoul was unable to affect or change American policy. Whether South 
Korean leaders wanted to or not, they had to find new ways to maintain national stability and 
support their regime while preventing North Korean threats. 
 
(3) Unstable ground of  South Korea‘s anticommunism stance 
 
Due to the reduced willingness and ability of  the US to intervene directly on the part 
                                                          
66 Telegram from the embassy in Korea to the Department of  State, May 2nd1968, 0700Z, Memos Vol. VI, Country 
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of  ROK security, Park sought to draw upon old virtues of  patriotism for national self-defence. 
After the Korean Crisis in 1968, Park often broached the possibility of  another war in Korea to 
the Korean public and pronounced that South Koreans themselves had to save their fatherland 
if  that situation arose.68 With noticeably less US support, his Northern and foreign policies 
could not have attained their goals. Seoul‘s existing foreign policies appeared ineffectual 
considering Washington‘s attitude during the Korean Crisis. The ROK could no longer expect 
direct intervention from the US or any tangible support from the United Nations as in the 
1950s.69 This meant that the ROK had little chance of  resolving a problem without considerable 
military power of  its own. Therefore, the modernisation of  ROK forces was initiated in 1968.70  
Despite its ongoing hardship in the national security sphere, the Park administration 
ever questioned its Northern policy in 1968. The North Korean military provocations in January 
worsened the inter-Korean relations and boosted the anticommunist sentiment in South Korea. 
Seoul believed that it could maintain its policy of  confrontation towards the north through the 
expansion of  armaments and existing US forces in South Korea. In addition to the 
modernisation of  military forces, the government prolonged the compulsory military service 
period and established the reserve forces system. Since the Korean War, Korean men were 
required to serve in the army for 36 months.71 This time was moderately reduced to 30 months 
in1962. As of  1968, it was again increased by 6 months, resulting in a 36 month total.72 
Additionally, the discharged soldiers were mobilised as Reserve Forces by the Act of  Korean 
Reserve Forces whose main purpose was to stop guerrilla actions in case of  attack.73 With 
strong support from the major party in the National Assembly, the act was passed and legislated 
by the National Assembly on April 1st 1968. Along with the modernisation of  ROK forces, the 
reserve forces system was designed to support South Korea‘s military competition with North 
Korea. Both approaches contributed to reduce the American burden in South Korea‘s national 
security and thus reflect the major change in ROK‘s foreign policy.  
This simple decision caused the crack between the Park regime and his citizens. At first 
glance, the above policies seemed to be the rational product of  new diplomatic and military 
strategies which Seoul was supposed to adopt in the given situation. The reduced US burden of  
                                                          
68 ―North Korea‘s provocation incident in 1968,‖1968 Class Number 2662. 729.55, Diplomatic Archive, Republic 
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69 Ibid. 
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ROK national defence was now carried by South Korean people. The problem was that Park‘s 
decision undermined his public popularity. Coupled with his authoritarian rule, the new military 
service rule was often criticised by young citizens who had to serve in the military and learned 
the value of  democracy. The new national defence strategies clearly reflected a heightened sense 
of  hostility towards North Korea and placed burdens on the population, which became a 
political target of  minority parties before the presidential election in 1971. In June 1968, only 
two months after the foundation of  the national Reserve Forces, several opposition parties 
championed the abolishment of  the military service rule. 74  This move undermined the 
credibility of  the Park regime which had apparently failed to alarm the South Korean public of  
the North Korean threat. Increasingly, the citizens thought Korea did not have to be an 
exception to détente. That is, many voters would be willing to support presidential candidates 
who tried to apply détente on the Korean Peninsula. 
Nevertheless, Park did not change his mind. He was soon able to prove the importance 
of  his new military policy thanks to North Korean aggression. In October and November 1968, 
120 North Korean guerrillas infiltrated into South Korea and killed about 20 South Koreans 
including civilians, police and soldiers.75 This military threat reduced the negative impact of  
South Korea‘s self-defence policy. The Park regime did not consider the reconciliation with the 
Communists or any liberal approach towards détente. The DPRK continued its aggression and 
the US consistently prevented South Korea‘s retaliation against North Korea in 1969.  
Considering the effectiveness of  these new strategies in terms of  their contributions to 
Northern policy, it is hard to argue that South Korean elites had found an ultimate solution to 
resolve conflicts with North Korea. To North Korea, the reinforcement of  ROK forces might 
have been another significant reason for keeping up hostilities. The new strategies which 
reflected clear hostility towards the North could have stimulated further reaction from Kim 
Ilsung and his military leaders. In spite of  the reinforcement of  ROK troops, North Korean 
guerrilla operations peaked in 1968 and 1969.76 The new strategies initiated after the Korean 
Crisis in 1968 were unsuccessful for upholding the Northern policy. This ineffectiveness 
undercut the justification of  Park‘s rule, and his political rivals started to question the utility of  
confrontational policies after 1968.   
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The regime‘s new approach in its Northern policy pushed Washington to initiate the 
withdrawal of  US forces from Korea. The US forces in Korea constituted a deterrent against 
possible North Korean aggression in the aftermath of  the Korean War. After discussing the 
withdrawal of  ROK forces from Vietnam in the late 1960s as well as the modernization of  
Korean forces in 1968, the withdrawal of  US forces from Korea was discussed as well. Therefore, 
the withdrawal of  US forces could have been a good option to reduce the financial and political 
burden on Washington. At this point, the modernization of  ROK forces justified Washington‘s 
decision to withdraw US forces from Korea. Ironically, after initiating an independent national 
defence system project, the ROK faced another security concern. As a result, the aggressive 
ROK northern policy introduced a possibility of  ROK-US conflict in the near future.  
The rift between the ROK and the US in 1968 had introduced a new phase of  Cold 
War to the Korean Peninsula and East Asia. Park‘s failure to retaliate against North Korean 
aggression damaged his Cold War strategy and weakened the American pledge in East Asian 
region. Nonetheless, Park tried to maintain the essence of  his Northern policy which still proved 
useful for his regime and South Korea‘s national security. He detailed his ideas on the Korean 
Crisis, ―We never allow the replay of  tragic errors in our history caused by compromise with 
belligerent invaders.‖77He believed that emphasis on self-reliance with respect to national defence 
as a result of  his new foreign policy could sustain his Northern policy. Yet it alone was 
insufficient to justify his rule and secure South Korea‘s safety. International détente and domestic 
opposition put into question his new strategies and hard-line policies.    
Despite the above limitations, ROK elites began to recognise the new international 
environment during the Korean Crisis of  1968. Though the elites did not amend their 
confrontational stance against the North, the crisis had made them acutely aware of  the necessity 
to initiate policy change. In other words, they tried to keep the fundamental northern policy 
unchanged by implementing new supportive domestic and diplomatic strategies. They would 
evaluate their effectiveness based on the domestic reactions towards their legislature and also 
from the mood in Washington. Especially, the challenge from opposition parties in 1968 was 
significant since he had to prepare for the next presidential election in 1971.78 For these reasons, 
the year 1968 was pivotal for both Korean and Cold War history. Its importance lies in the series 
of  events which led the ROK government to change its relations with the US and its Cold War 
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strategy. 
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Chapter II: The Peaceful ‘War’ in Korea: Détente and South Korea’s Northern Policy, 
1969- 1971 
 
In the aftermath of  the Korean Crisis in 1968, ROK president Park Chunghee reconsidered his 
confrontation policy toward Pyongyang. It relied on an American military power which was not 
able to serve for his goal, the national security of  his country. He tried to stabilise his regime that 
had been challenged by North Korean provocation and American hardship in Southeast Asia 
and US reluctance to intervene in Korea problems. Even though Washington had blocked Park‘s 
plan for counterattacks against the North, the South Korean leader secured further American aid 
for the modernization of  ROK forces and hence expected to sustain his competition with Kim 
Ilsung and own political power. Despite his efforts, however, his policy had not worked as 
effectively as he had hoped.  
There were two major threats undermining his efforts, international and domestic 
challenges toward his foreign policy and the consequence of  his long ruling term. Internationally, 
the bitter experience of  US-ROK forces being bogged down in Vietnam devastated his strategic 
ground of  anticommunism. Richard Nixon who took office as US President in 1969, decided to 
reduce American intervention in Asia and considered a diplomatic relationship with the People‘s 
Republic of  China (PRC). The Nixon Doctrine, announced at a press conference on Guam on 
25th July 1969, and subsequent changes in American strategies were among the most important 
factors pushing ROK to change its policy toward the North and its foreign policy in general. 
There was a potential fallout due to the proposed reorientation of  US strategy through increased 
cooperation with Japan, which shared the fear of  the communist threat. Although the Park 
regime tried to minimize the effect it became more difficult to maintain existing ROK 
anticommunist foreign policy. Specifically, during the ROK presidential election in 1971, Nixon 
supported South Korean oppositions who agreed with him on the need for reconciliation with 
the communist North and challenged Park‘s dictatorial rule. In a nutshell, the new American 
policy toward ROK resulted in the rise of  Kim Daejung, the archrival of  Park Chunghee.  
Coupled with American pressure, domestic resistance toward the ideological basis of  
the Park regime increasingly encouraged the liberal idea and required the South Korean 
leadership to re-consider its foreign policy. Despite Park‘s ambitious plan for improving national 
defence through the modernization of  ROK forces and reserves, the Korean public started to 
question Park‘s northern policy that seemingly cause a further deterioration in inter-Korean 
relations. DPRK did not stop its military provocation of  the South. In 1969, military conflicts 
between the two Koreas proved how ineffective Park‘s northern policy and new defence strategy 
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of  1968 was. That required tougher and lengthier military service to young South Korean citizens. 
Still, Washington kept silent on the Korean problem. Highlighting the ineffectiveness of  South 
Korean anticommunist policy in 1969 considerably damaged Park‘s popularity.  
In 1970 Kim Daejung promoted reconciliation with the Communist north and 
promised to reduce the national security burden on South Koreans. ROK‘s young voters 
enthusiastically supported Kim. Since Park Chunghee decided to prepare for the next 
presidential election in 1971, he had to reconsider his policy in order to discourage South 
Koreans from changing their allegiance in favour of  his political rivals. Disappointed with his 
relatively poor performance in the 1971 presidential election and mounting American support 
for his rival, the South Korean president eventually subscribed to the US-led détente approach in 
order to keep his post.   
Between 1969 and 1971, the Cold War mindset of  the ROK leadership was scrutinised 
by both the South Korean public and the US government. Why did Park‘s anticommunist 
strategy fail to improve the safety of  South Korea? One obvious reason was the ROK‘s military 
capabilities. According to KCIA reports, the DPRK invested heavily in the advancement of  its 
military power which as a result of  precedence the ROK‘s.1 For this reason, the ROK had to 
assure an American intervention in order to defend its territory from the communist North. As 
the US would not sufficiently guarantee ROK‘s security, Park‘s commitment to anticommunism 
was not able to enhance the security of  his state. The ROK-Japan cooperation during the early 
Nixon era was a joint effort to limit the impact of  the Nixon Doctrine on regional security. The 
political and economic aid from Tokyo encouraged Seoul to maintain its fierce competition with 
Pyongyang and the communists.2 Yet this new partnership could not replace the American 
assistance and did not last long because Japan did not possess sufficient military power to 
guarantee ROK‘s security. Consequently, the ROK-US relations in the early Nixon period 
undermined the strategic position of  Park regime and pushed South Korean elites to re-think 
their Cold War strategy.  
Along with the security issue, Park‘s authoritarian rule had damaged his public support. 
The Korean constitution did not allow him to run for a third term in office yet, in 1969, he tried 
to revise the constitution in a way that was clearly inconsistent with democratic standards. For 
institutional reasons, he faced fierce challenges from his opposition, who were insisting on the 
need to set limits to Park‘s authoritarian rule. In response, Park used undemocratic measures 
                                                          
1 Interview with Kang Induk, 15th July 2009, Institute of  Far Eastern Studies. 
2 Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999), 59- 99. 
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throughout his additional term and enraged South Korea‘s citizens.3 
For Park Chunghee and the ROK elite, the discontent of  Korean citizens in the late 
1960s and early 1970s was a paradox of  democracy. While the people wanted powerful 
leadership which could protect their life and property from the northern communist threat and 
develop the economy, they increasingly also expected the elite to grant more democratic rights. 
Pleasing the electorate on both issues equated to trying to square a circle: before 1969 Park was 
convinced that his way of  leading the country could satisfy the people‘s needs. This view was 
based on the result of  the 1967 presidential election: 
 
When I was victorious in the presidential election in 1967 with far more votes than 
four years before, I was moved since it was a proof  that my success in economic 
development has been acknowledged by my people.4 
 
In some sense, it was too risky for Park to keep a direct election system, which could 
endanger his political career in the long run. At the same time, he needed to maintain democratic 
institutions to deflect the constant criticisms of  his despotic rule. Moreover, he was convinced 
he could win the elections- as he later did. As long as he was the optimal candidate for ROK 
supreme power, there was no serious factor which could really challenge his rule or derail his 
policies. However, it was only up to his second term, he could consider the election a rite of  
passage for his presidency showing off  his successful performance in the previous term. The 
ROK constitution allowed him a second term so the Korean public did not object to his rhetoric. 
Park repeatedly explained to his people that he had to keep anticommunism and hence limit 
some political rights for the sake of  security and economic growth.5 
While most people might have been willing to acknowledge Park‘s achievements up to 
his second term in office they were definitely reluctant to accept Park‘s leadership for much 
longer after Park had announced his will to run for a third consecutive term as president in 
1969.The public could not conceive that Park‘s idea was the proper approach to advance South 
Korea‘s national interest, support its national security and economic development, at least after 
1968. They publically began to question whether Park aimed to keep his political power until 
death once he forced to pass the bill for his third-term. This authoritarian nature of  Park‘s 
                                                          
3 Ma Sangyoon, ―Anbo‘wa Minjujuyi, geurigo Bak Jeonghui‘ui gil [Security, Democracy and Park Chung Hee"s Road: 
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regime further undermined the rationale of  his aggressive stance toward North Korea and other 
communist states.6 
Park thought that the 1968 crisis would alert the South Korean people to the 
seriousness of  the North Korean threat and established his new security strategy with this idea. 
In a general sense, his idea was totally reasonable since the North Korean commandos attempted 
to kill the South Korean leader. Park attempted to reinforce South Korean security by calling in 
large amounts of  mainly US aid, extending the compulsory military service period and 
establishing the ROK reserve forces. The result differed from his expectation. His efforts had 
put additional burdens on the backs of  average citizens who were already exhausted by a lengthy 
military service and endless conflicts between the two Koreas. Against this backdrop, the 
president‘s ambition for a third term in power ran into unexpected resistance.  
The challenge from the opposition parties was deeply rooted in the discontent of  the 
electorates concerning the existing confrontational policy toward communism as well as its 
disappointment with the performance of  the country‘s democratic institutions. To demonstrate 
the competition between Park and opposition candidates, we will focus mainly on Kim Daejung. 
It was Kim who officially raised the political discussion over Park‘s Cold War strategy and his 
lenient approach to Pyongyang that really threatened Park‘s prospects for re-election in 1971.7 
Challenges from opposition groups will be addressed in chronological order. Firstly, the 
resistance against Park‘s constitutional amendment for his third term in 1969 and secondly, the 
opposition against Park for the presidential election in 1971. Regarding the first topic, the 
opposition parties repeatedly weakened the institutional foundation of  the Park regime. Needless 
to say, Park‘s constant conflicts with the opposition often undermined his ability to gain 
legislative support for passing his bills. As result, Park resorted to dictatorial measures in order to 
suppress the parties and implement his policy.8 In this sense, his anticommunist policy did not 
enjoy solid legislative support and later became a symbol of  his despotic rule. The liberal 
approach of  opposition parties questioned the effectiveness of  Park‘s Northern policy, too. As I 
have already indicated earlier, the discussion of  ROK anticommunist policy was triggered 
                                                          
6 For example, the Reserve Forces, established for anti-guerrilla operations in 1968, consist of  young men who 
already finished three years of  their military service. This system was especially unpopular to young people since 
they were mobilised without any payment and too often. The Park‘s oppositions criticised the inefficient operation 
of  the Reserve Forces. Kim Daejung, Hangdong‟haneun Yangsim [My Fight for Democracy in Korea],( Seoul: Geumundang 
Publishing, 2009), 120. 
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of  Park. For detail, see The Democratic Republic Party, The history of  Democratic Republic Party (Seoul: The 
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see Kim Daejung, Hangdong‟haneun Yangsim [My Fight for Democracy in Korea], (Seoul: Geumundang Publishing, 2009). 
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internationally by continuous North Korean provocations and a lack of  US intervention in 1969. 
Domestic political triggers included, Park‘s ineffective, aggressive policy toward Pyongyang and 
the détente mood toward East Asia which became a powerful weapon for liberals. This next 
chapter will discuss the interaction between domestic and international factors and their effect 
on South Korean politics. Specific emphasis will be given to historical events concerning 
domestic political conflicts, North Korean provocations, first inter-Korean negotiation and 
international environments between 1969 and 1971. 
 
 
(1) The Opening of  a Discussion of  South Korean Anticommunism and Authoritarianism, 
1969  
 
Two years after winning his second term as president, Park took action to run for third 
term. As the Korean constitution allows only two consecutive terms, Park was to hand over 
supreme power in 1971. Park, however, planned to hold the position another term. He was 
treading cautiously because his plan had the potential to spark fierce resistance. Yet on 10th 
January 1969, Park indicated his intention to alter the constitution during his annual message, 
 
It is not a good time to discuss (the) constitutional revision. Even if  we have to amend 
the constitution, we are not supposed to discuss the issue at this moment. It is not too 
late for us to deal with it in the end of  this year or early next year.9 
 
In 1969, Park decided to refer the issue to public opinion. Despite his cautious 
comments in his annual message, a debate erupted concerning a possible constitutional 
amendment. According to the records of  the Democratic Republic Party, the ruling party had 
already discussed the issue. On 6th January 1969 Kil Jaeho, the party‘s secretary general at that 
time, stated during an unofficial interview that, 
 
We, the Democratic Republic Party, are carefully reviewing the constitutional amendment 
issue in order to supplement the defect of  present constitution which has been 
detected by the enforcement of  it.10 
                                                          
9 ―Park‘s annual message on 10th January, 1969,‖ The electronic library of  president Park Chunghee, 
http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr. 
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The next day, Kil Jaeho and other members of  the party elite announced the details of  
their discussion to the members of  Democratic Republican Party (DRP). The most important topic 
was definitely the Park‘s quest for a third consecutive term as president.11 Despite the power 
game within the ruling party, Park successfully mobilised the legislative branch of  his 
government, the DRP, to endorse his quest for a third term.  
In comparison, threats originating from within his own party were much easier to deal 
with than challenges from opposition groups that were more complex to address. While Park 
could silence the reactionaries inside his own party through promises for promotion and the 
assignment of  posts in the next government, this conciliation option did not present itself  where 
representatives from other parties were concerned.  
The ROK president had the authority to appoint cabinet ministers and other high 
ranking government officials. For this reason, the party in power usually dominates the executive 
branch of  government as well. Hence the opposition was in no position to force Park to 
compromise since he, through his party, dominated ROK politics in a comprehensive manner.12 
Yet it is noteworthy that this institutional threat was not significant to Park up to 1967 at least. In 
1967, Park won his second presidency with significant turnout and was satisfied with his 
popularity.13 
Park was successful in convincing ROK citizens that he was the best choice as ROK 
president up to his second re-election. His strict anticommunist rhetoric strongly appealed to 
South Koreans who had lost their properties and family members during the Korean War. As the 
military and economic power of  the communist North was stronger than that of  the Capitalist 
South by the time Park entered office, his aggressive approach towards the DPRK resounded 
with the electorate. In addition, his economic policies had been extremely successful. The South 
Korean per capita GDP had increased by 42% during his First Five-Year Plan for Economic 
Development (1963- 1967).14 No matter how people criticised his political cruelty and despotic 
rule, they rarely criticised Park‘s economic strategies.15Compared to his predecessors, president 
                                                          
11 The Democratic Republic Party, op. cit., 499- 501. 
12 Cho Kabje, op. cit., vol. 10, 23. 
13 Cho Kabje, op. cit., vol. 9, 36. 
14  ―Principal Indicators on National Account (1953- 1970),‖ Statistic Korea, 
http://kosis.kr/feature/feature_0102List.jsp?menuId=all&mode=listAll. 
15 For this reason, Park often named ‗developmental dictator‘. For instance, Lee Byeongcheon indicates that Park‘s 
developmental dictatorship shaped the modernity of  ROK. In his book, he claims that Park prioritized the 
economic development over welfare and democracy. For detail see Lee Byeongcheon, Developmental Dictatorship and 
The Park Chung-Hee Era: The Shaping of  Modernity in the Republic of  Korea (Seoul: Changbi, 2003). 
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Syngman Rhee and premier Jang Myeon16, both of  whom did not make significant achievements 
for developing the economy, Park proved a capable architect who effectively reconstructed a 
modern post-war economy in South Korea. Thanks to his strong commitment to 
anticommunism and support for the US in Vietnam, Washington provided financial aid to Seoul 
for its role in the Vietnam War and helped the South Korean elites develop South Korean 
economy. In short, the popular ideological base and stellar economic performance of  Park 
administration in 1960s never allowed opposition parties a realistic chance for taking away his 
second term. 
Park, however, could not prevent the strong resistance from the oppositions to his 
ambition for a third term by pointing out his past achievements alone. With the 1971 presidential 
election ahead, the opposition parties questioned whether the Park regime‘s indisputable 
economic success of  the past could guarantee a similar performance in the future. They also 
rejected the idea, that Park was the only one who could ensure sustainable economic 
development. In addition, as a consequence to Park‘s economic policy framework, the 
development gap between urban and rural areas had widened. Secondly, they argued that Park‘s 
efforts to secure a third term in office subverted the country‘s democratic institution. In other 
words, the oppositions thought that Park did not qualify for three consecutive terms as president, 
believing his economic successes could have been achieved by another leader. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, the opposition attacked Park‘s Cold War strategy and its effectiveness in securing the 
ROK.17 In 1968 and 1969, despite the new military arrangements of  the Park regime, North 
Korean provocations increased both in frequency and insolence. It was against this background, 
that opposition groups began to challenge Park and his party‘s efforts for constitutional 
amendment. Among these issues, the prevailing Northern and foreign policies became the bone 
of  contention between the Park administration and its opponents. This was largely due to the 
threat from Pyongyang and the indifference of  Washington toward South Korean security.  
On 15th April 1969, a US Navy Lockheed, EC-121M Warning Star was shot down by the 
DPRK Air Force over the East Korean Sea. All 31 Americans on board died in the crash. The 
response of  Nixon administration towards this incident was not so much different from that of  
the Johnson administration towards the USS Pueblo crisis one year earlier. It decided not to 
retaliate against North Korea.18 By doing this the US undermined Park‘s Cold War rhetoric 
                                                          
16From April 1960 to May 1961, ROK adopted British parliamentary system. Under this institution, the prime 
position was premier (or prime minister) not president. 
17 Kim Daejung, op. cit., 105- 106. 
18 Memorandum to Thomas L. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, John, H. Holdridge, 
INR/EAP Files, Department of State, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.  
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based largely on American sponsorship. As already discussed in the first chapter, the ROK 
president kept his strict anticommunist policy even though the White House refused to intervene 
in Korean issues. The president calculated that Kim Ilsung would not provoke South Korea if  he 
declared his will to reinforce military power in the South. The South Korean leadership, however, 
misunderstood Kim‘s strategy. The North Korean premier who already enjoyed his victory over 
Lyndon Johnson in 1968 for the Pueblo incident was convinced that Washington would not 
intervene in Korea unless the situation in Vietnam changed.  
On 18th April, Park told William J. Porter, US ambassador to ROK, in a telephone 
conversation of his firm belief that similar incidents would happen again as soon as the DPRK 
saw an opportunity.19As in 1968, Washington did not take any military action in retaliation to the 
North Korean provocation, turning down Park‘s explicit request.20 Clearly, along with the cases 
of  Blue House raid and abduction of  the USS Pueblo in 1968, this incident confirmed 
Washington‘s reluctance to intervene in the Korean conflict. The new US administration was not 
willing to support Park‘s policy of  confrontation even before Richard Nixon announced his 
doctrine in July 1969. As a result, Park Chunghee suffered wavering confidence in his Northern 
policy.  
Park complained to Porter about the lack of  supports from Washington, ―I do not 
think that even though we took partial countermeasures against North Korean provocation, 
USSR and PRC would interfere in this case. Anyway, my opinion is different to that of  the US on 
this issue.‖21Regarding this, Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor of  the Nixon the 
administration, recalled that the muted American response to the EC-121 incident had inspired 
enemies and demoralised allies.22 In fact, after the attack on the EC-121 was followed by what 
the South Korean public interpreted as indifference toward ROK security on the part of  their 
American allies. Placards were posted on US army facilities which read ―North Korea 2 to US 
0‖.23 This inter-Korean and international situation inspired Park‘s opponents who criticise his 
ineffective Northern policy. Among those critics, Kim Daejung of  the New Democratic Party 
(Sinmindang) was most prominent and was able to use the point for his presidential campaign.24 
The reason why this relatively young politician, aged 45, became influential in South 
                                                          
19 Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, 18th April 1969, Korea,Vol. I, to 9–69, 
Far East, Country Files NSC Files, Box 540, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives.  
20 Memorandum From Secretary of Defence Laird to President Nixon, EC–121 Shootdown, General Materials--
EC–121 Shootdown Korea, Box 438, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives. 
21 ―The summary of  talks between Park and the United States ambassador Porter (invitation) (1969. 4. 18)‖, 
Number: Unknown, File number: 01, ―The incident of  shooting down US scout, EC-121, 1969. 4. 15”, 1969, Class 
Number: 729.55,Diplomatic Archives, Republic of  Korea. 
22 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, (New York: Little, Brown, 1979), 320-321. 
23 Victor Cha, op. cit., 416.  
24 The party was the coalition of  conservative and liberal minor parties in ROK. 
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Korean politics was his clear understanding of  inter-Korean politics and Park‘s strategy for his 
rule. Kim pointed out the president‘s mistake in his approach toward Pyongyang and his real 
intention. The ROK president justified his despotic rule by pointing out the need for a 
determined leader who can defend his country from the communist threat. However, his 
hostility towards Kim Ilsung without reliable American military support jeopardized the ROK‘s 
safety in 1969. Kim Daejung condemned Park‘s policy on the grounds that it did not serve 
ROK‘s security interests, and only served to helped Park cement his power. Clearly, Kim argued 
that ROK should adapt itself  to the new world order.25 He quickly accepted the new American 
policy while Park continued to resist. As the 1971 elections that we will review in the third part 
of  this chapter have demonstrated, Park‘s rhetoric effectively alienated large parts of  the ROK 
electorate.  
Facing both the North Korean threat and American indifference to it, the ROK 
attempted to improve its relationship with Japan. The Japanese leadership also felt that the 
Nixon administration did not consider East Asian regional security seriously. Before 1969, Japan 
had been indifferent to the Korean issue. For instance, during the Korean Crisis of  1968, Japan 
had kept a neutral position. The Japanese press had even blamed Park‘s hostile attitude towards 
North as the ultimate cause for North Korean provocations. The ROK government expressed 
disappointment at these views.26 According to Victor Cha, the enigma of  the shared history 
between the two allies undermined their partnership against the communists. South Koreans 
condemned what they perceived to be Japanese efforts to re-colonize Korea through the 
economic field, while Japanese harboured a strong distaste of  South Korea who, they felt, 
demanded an absurd amount of  money as compensation for Japanese atrocities committed in 
Korea under imperial rule.27 Moreover, Tokyo did not consider Pyongyang‘s threat as seriously 
as Seoul did. The first targets of  the DPRK were definitely going to be South Korea or the US, 
not Japan. During the Korean Crisis in 1968, the ROK government argued that the North 
Korean threat is linked to the international communist campaign. Yet its ally, Japan disagreed. 
For Tokyo, the inter-Korean conflict was a ‗matter between the two Koreas‘ rather than one 
between the capitalist and communist camps. In this sense, it was totally unnecessary for Japan to 
provoke Pyongyang. Tokyo refused to cooperate with the Park regime which often bragged 
about being a shield for Japan.28 The prevailing attitude was that unless Japan directly faced a 
                                                          
25 Kim Daejung, op. cit., 104- 105. 
26“North Korea‘s provocation incident in 1968,‖ Class Number 2664. 729.55, 1968, Diplomatic Archive, Republic of  
Korea. 
27 Victor Cha, op. cit., 44- 45. 
28Victor Cha, op. cit., 41- 43. 
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communist threat, it was the best to remain silent on the matter of  the Korean conflict. After 
Nixon entered the White House, however, Japan finally accepted the South Korean mindset.  
Japan started to sense a serious threat to its security due to American responses after 
the crisis. Washington kept silent regarding the consecutive provocations from North in late 
1968 and early 1969. In April 1969, Sato Eisaku, the Prime Minister of  Japan from1964 to1972, 
criticized the North Korean attack of  the EC-121 and urged the US to resume reconnaissance 
operations at the perimeter of  Japanese territory in spite of  the domestic resistance against his 
intervention in the conflict between US and North Korea.29 Japan had strong doubts about the 
US commitment towards Japanese security. In this sense, the ROK and Japan shared a sense of  
insecurity and thus started to cooperate for improving regional security. The joint efforts of  the 
two nations could be summarized in following themes; the negotiation concerning the return of  
Okinawa to Japan; its relationship with Korean security; and inter-governmental affairs.30 
Due to its importance for the security of  Japan, the problem of  Okinawa‘s reversion 
was one of  the most important issues in Japanese politics until the archipelago was returned to 
Japan on 15th May 1972. Okinawa consists of  hundreds of  Islands, which extends southwest 
from Kyushu to Taiwan. During the 19th century, Japan annexed the islands. Later because of  its 
strategic importance, the US administration occupied them after WW II. Since then, the islands 
were essential for US operations. During Korean War, the headquarters of  the UN forces were 
located in Okinawa. Moreover, it provided logistical support to the US campaign in Vietnam. In 
this sense, the islands were of  great importance for Asian security.31  
The US and Japanese governments kicked off  negotiations on the terms of  Okinawa‘s 
reversion in 1969. The most important issue was whether or not Japan agreed to keep US forces 
and nuclear weapons stationed in Okinawa after the reversion.32 The timing of  the discussion 
was very sensitive: the continuous conflicts between the US and North Korea on the Korean 
Peninsula and America‘s lukewarm attitude towards the North Korean threat brought about a 
security risk to Japan.33 In this situation, the reversion of  Okinawa would increase the level of  
                                                          
29 Japan Times, 14- 16th April 1969. 
30 Victor Cha, op. cit., 72- 76. Regarding the ROK-Japan cooperation during Nixon era, please refer Cho Yanghyun, 
―Détente Cheje Jeonhwangi‘eui Hanil‘gwangye [The Korea-Japan Relationship within the Structural Change of  the 
Cold War System in East Asia: Focusing on the Case of  Okinawa Reversion and the U. S. Troop Withdrawal from 
Korea].‖ International Regional Research 20 (2011): 62- 63, See also Yun Dukmin, ―Miil Okinawa 
Banhwanhyeobsang‘gwa Hangook‘woegyo [Korean Response to U.S. -Japanese Negotiation of  Okinawa Reversion: 
ROK-US-Japan Policy for Korean Security Issues in Relation to Okinawa Reversion]. Korean Journal of  
International Relations, Vol. 31, (1992): 123. 
31 Victor Cha, op. cit., 72. 
32 H. T. R. Havens, Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965–1975. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press., 1987), 120. 
33 Yun Dukmin, op. cit., 122- 123. 
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insecurity of  Japan. The issue was also sensitive to South Korea. For the ROK, the control shift 
of  the islands from the US to Japan would be a second impact followed by the reduction of  US 
forces in Korea. Such combination of  plans would completely abrogate Park‘s defence 
programme.34Furthermore, Washington‘s two main allies in East Asia thought that the reversion 
of  the islands could result in the total withdrawal of  American forces from Asia.35With their 
shared concern for national security, Seoul and Tokyo started their political cooperation. 
In April 1969, the ROK Ministry of  Foreign Affairs requested the Japanese ambassador 
to report on the progress of  the negation on the Okinawa reversion issue between the US and 
Japan and to give the Japanese right for prior consultation after the reversion of  islands through 
his letter.36 In reply to the South Korean government, the Sato administration indicated that it 
fully recognised the ROK‘s interests in Okinawa issue.37 Before Park‘s visit to the US in August 
of  the same year, both nations repeatedly affirmed their common interests in Okinawa. As 
Victor Cha has indicated, this cooperation could be accomplished by through close 
communication between the two East Asian allies. Interestingly, while the Okinawa reversion 
issue only affected Japan and the US; Japan allowed the ROK to enter the discussion.38 For 
instance, Kiichi Aichi, the Japanese Minister of  Foreign Affairs, soothed Korean anxiety by 
confirming that even if  Okinawa were returned to Japan, its strategic value would not decrease.39 
For the ROK, such a cooperative mindset on the part of  the Japanese government was a positive 
signal that would help the ROK reduce the security risk.40 The Park regime interpreted such a 
‗détente‟ mood between the two hostile allies as an exceptional diplomatic success.41 
Meanwhile, the Nixon administration eventually announced its official policy toward its 
allies in East Asia and triggered the discussion on ROK‘s policy toward the communism. On 25th 
July 1969, Nixon stated that the US expected Asian nations to be increasingly self-sufficient in 
terms of their defence capabilities.42Park feared a reduction of American military support despite 
Nixon emphasizing that the US had no intention of abandoning South Korea. Coupled with the 
                                                          
34 Victor Cha, op. cit., 72- 76. 
35 Yun Dukmin, op. cit., 124. 
36 Japan Times, 16 Apr. 1969. 
160 Japan Times, 10-12 June 1969. 
38 Victor Cha, op. cit, 67,On the other hand, Yun Dukmin argues that this is not a ‗yield‘ but a ‗realistic choice‘ of  
Sato regime because it had to consider the situation of  Korea. Yun Dukmin, op. cit., 122. 
39 For detail of  Aichi‘s interview, see Japan Times, 29th Aug. 1969; Tokyo Kyodo, 29th Aug. 1969, in FBIS, 29 Aug. 
1969, 2- 3. 
40 Victor Cha, op. cit, 67. 
41 ―The 3rd annual ROK-Japan joint ministerial conference,‖ 1969, Class Number 723.1JA, Diplomatic Archive, 
Republic of  Korea. 
42 Richard Nixon:"Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen," July 25, 1969.Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
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American indifference to the incident in April of the same year, the Nixon Doctrine thoroughly 
weakened the ideological grounds of Park regime. No matter how Nixon emphasized that the 
USA does not abandon ROK, Park was afraid of that Nixon would reduce US military supports 
for ROK. Keeping this in his mind, Park visited San Francisco for talks in August 1969 not long 
after Nixon had announced his doctrine. During the meeting, Nixon made his best efforts not to 
trigger Park‘s sense of insecurity. Yet the core of his idea was clear, ―Washington is well aware of 
the North Korean threat. However, South Korea must be defended by South Koreans 
themselves.‖43 
After listening to Nixon‘s words carefully, Park revealed his real aim for his visit. 
 
Now I could grasp the core of the new American [doctrine], the so called Nixon 
Doctrine, and it is true that many Asian people have relied too much on 
America since WW II. I think that it is [more] reasonable that these people are 
independent. Yet ‗some of them‘ worry about the [new] policy since it could 
mean that the US abandons Asia.44 
 
The US president may well have considered that Park was referring to ROK as the one 
of those who worried the US policy. Park wanted Nixon‘s guarantee for keeping US forces in 
Korea and an exception to the Nixon Doctrine for ROK. The US president was also aware that 
if  ROK forces were to be withdrawn from Vietnam, US forces would have a greater burden 
there. If  he did not placate the stubborn South Korean leader, then this could soon become a 
reality. For this reason, Nixon tried to appease Park by stating, ―The US will not withdraw its 
forces from Korea.‖45 
Despite Nixon‘s guarantee on Park‘s most important priority, the South Korean president 
then quickly moved onto the Okinawa issue. He requested Nixon‘s guarantee that Washington 
would not reduce the level of  US force in Okinawa upon its reversion. Apparently, the 
cooperation with the Sato administration had encouraged him to do so. However, Park omitted 
the contribution of  Sato and his cabinet to South Korean security. He even complained that 
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Republic of  Korea. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. Park believed that Nixon would not withdraw US troops from South Korea because of  the South Korean 
troops in Vietnam. Shin Wookhee and Kim Youngho, ―Jeonhwangi‘eui Dongmaeng: Détente Siki‘eui 
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Japan did not consider ROK‘s security interests.46 Park said,  
 
At present, some countries are sharing excessive burdens beyond their ability and vice 
versa. The Republic of Korea and Japan are good examples. Korea is not only divided 
but also is a developing country. Japan, despite its strong economy, is hardly carrying its 
share of the burdens in Asia. The Japanese are even trying to refuse to provide military 
bases in Okinawa when it is returned to Japan, thus hindering the unity of Asia. Several 
Asian countries as well as the people of ROK are dissatisfied with this Japanese posture. 
I do not have the details on the bilateral negotiations for the return of Okinawa to 
Japan, but I believe that if the island is to be reverted to Japan, the Japanese share of the 
burdens in Asia must be increased first, before Okinawa is actually returned.47 
 
There is no evidence to support the claim that the Japanese prime minister had worked 
against South Korean interest. It was Park‘s aim to exaggerate the security risk and importance 
of  Okinawa for South Korean safety. Nixon generally accepted Park‘s standpoint regarding the 
Okinawa plan. In contrast to the troop reduction programme in Korea, the Okinawa reversion 
was addressed only in the context of  Japanese financial contributions to an East Asian security 
framework. The South Korean president stated that if  Sato was willing to keep US forces in 
place and helped to cover related expenses, Washington would not need to withdraw its forces 
from Okinawa. This did not oppose Nixon‘s policy. Nixon response was positive,  
 
For a long time I have thought that Japan should play a much more significant role 
than the present in its defence and collective economic activity. Some progress has 
been made in the economic aspect. As you are aware, Prime Minister Satois coming 
here in November, and we should make every effort to have him survive politically. 
Free Korea is very important to Free Japan. Japan spends only about one percent of 
its GNP in its defence, which I believe is too small.48 
 
Upon returning to Korea, Park quelled fears by confirming in his homecoming 
                                                          
 
47 ―The President and President Park,‖ Korea Memorandum of Conversation, San Francisco, California, August 21, 
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interview that, ―There is no change in US policy toward Korea.‖49 However, it took only about a 
month before he realized that Nixon‘s promise for the station of  US troops in South Korea had 
been empty words.50In June 1969, a month before the Nixon doctrine was formally announced, 
Secretary of  Defence Melvin R. Laird confided to the House Appropriation Committee the 
administration‘s intent on reducing America‘s military commitment to ROK. When these 
comments were revealed in early October 1969, they greatly disappointed Park who felt 
betrayed.51 Once again, the US government tried to appease the Park regime through the US 
ambassador to the ROK, William Porter, who reported that ―Laird‘s comment manifested the 
fundamental standpoint of  the US that the primary responsibility on the reduction of  the US 
army and defence of  the concerned nation are also applied to the US army in South Korea. (…) 
We considered that there is no such a concrete plan on the reduction of  the US army in South 
Korea now.‖52 However, on 24th November 1969, Nixon officially launched a withdrawal plan. 
Washington denied that its plan was in progress. The intent of this may have been to minimize 
the resistance from ROK until its plan was well underway. When South Korean ambassador to 
US telephoned Assistant Secretary Green regarding Secretary Laird‘s comments on troop 
withdrawals and spoke also with Deputy Assistant Secretary Brown on 21st January, the US 
Department of Defence assured Kim that: 
 
There won‘t be any immediate U.S. troop withdrawals. Rather he (Laird) was 
emphasizing the importance of additional MAP [Military Assistant Programme] for 
modernization of ROK forces. The US government does not have any proposal 
regarding troop withdrawal to make at this time. It always consults with ROK 
government on matters of  that degree of  importance and it would certainly do so 
before taking any step to reduce U.S. force level.53 
 
Park did understand Nixon‘s true intentions. Despite the euphemisms used by the US 
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president, it was clear that the ROK would not become an exception to Nixon Doctrine. Rather, 
it could be the model of  the doctrine alongside with Vietnam. Clearly, Washington‘s promise, 
―No consulting, no withdrawal!‖ did not ring true to Park. Needless to say, Nixon launched a 
withdrawal plan without consulting Park. Unfortunately for Park, there was no plan B. No matter 
how much the US president promised a military assistance programme for the modernization of  
ROK forces, Park was not willing to approve the reduction of  US forces stationed in Korea. 
While the modernisation of  South Korean forces took a long time, Park had to guarantee the 
security of  his citizens immediately in order to run for his third term. In a nutshell, the 
withdrawal of  US forces from Korea would have undermined his confrontational Northern 
policy which, for the most part, rested on the deterrent effect of  American forces stationed in 
Korea. For this reason, Park attempted to delay or at least reschedule the American withdrawal. 
Nonetheless, he did not change his Cold War mindset but prepared to minimize the fallout from 
a potential US pullout through establishing a new partnership with Tokyo.  
In contrast to his negotiation with Nixon over the US troops in South Korea, Park‘s 
diplomatic efforts on the Okinawa issue were met with success in November 1969 when Nixon 
and Sato had a summit meeting in Washington. The Japanese prime minister and the US 
president agreed to accomplish the reversion in1972. Basically, due to Japanese distaste of  
nuclear weapons, both parties also agreed to withdraw American nuclear weapons from the area 
before the reversion.54 During their meeting, both leaders frequently mentioned the situation in 
Korea. The two summits produced two important agreements that affected the ROK. The first 
one was the so-called the Korean Clause,  
 
The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the continuing tension over the 
Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of  
the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of  the ROK was essential to 
Japan's own security.55 
 
The second clause, as Victor Cha indicated, is related to the Japanese recognition that US  
forces in Okinawa play an essential role in regional security.56 
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The Prime Minister was of  the view that, in the light of  such recognition on the part 
of  the Japanese government, the return of  the administrative rights over Okinawa in 
the manner agreed above should not hinder the effective discharge of  the international 
obligations assumed by the United States for the defence of  countries in the Far East 
including Japan. The President replied that he share the Prime Minister's view.57 
 
During a press conference one day after the meeting, the ROK Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs remarked that the ROK government was satisfied with the outcome of  the US-Japan 
summit meeting in which both allies had considered Korean interests in the Okinawa issue.58 
Since Japan had decided to accommodate the ROK‘s security interests, the negative impact of  
the drawback of  US forces in Korea could be partially offset. Moreover, thanks to political 
amelioration, Japan provided economic assistances to Park for his new economic development 
plan.59 In other words, Park had managed to fill the void that was created by the withdrawal of  
US forces with Japanese diplomatic and economic support. Even before Nixon officially 
confirmed his withdrawal plan of US armed forces in early 1970, Park had successfully 
minimised the impact of Nixon‘s policy on South Korean security and his rule through reliance 
on Japanese support. 
However, it was immediately clear that the ‗vacuum‘ could not be completely filled by 
Japan alone. Due to its constitutional limits on rearmament, Japan did not possess enough armed 
forces to fight communists. Furthermore, Park was not completely satisfied with the result of  
the Nixon-Sato summit meeting. In his meeting with Kanayama Masahide, Japanese ambassador 
to ROK, the ROK president said that he was sorry to hear that Washington would withdraw its 
nuclear weapons before returning Okinawa to Japan.60 Clearly, despite his diplomatic efforts, the 
basis of  Park‘s anticommunist policy had been gradually undermined. 
In domestic politics, Park strongly pushed the DRP to pass the bill for his third term 
candidacy in next presidential election. Despite the best efforts and strong resistance from 
opponents, the party used corruptive measures and improper procedure to pass the bill.61 After 
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the bill was passed in the National Assembly, the constitutional amendments were decided 
through referendum. On 21st October 1969, Park proclaimed the decision and his will to run 
again for office. The DRP publicized the affirmative vote to the international press.62 Kim 
Daejung clearly pointed out the undemocratic and corruptive rule as the dark sides of  the Park 
regime which were commonly hidden behind his stellar economic performance. Park‘s efforts for 
his third term highlighted these dark sides and increasingly alienated South Korean citizens.63 
Students held demonstrations against the Park regime in the streets. While a few conservative 
groups, such as the ROK Association of  Veteran, supported Park, the general public and press 
criticized their president even after the bill was passed.64 
Along with America‘s new Cold War strategy, the anti- Park sentiment in South Korea 
severely undermined the foundation for his anticommunist policy. Even though the policy was 
the rational result of  ROK‘s reaction toward North Korean aggression, it became the major 
target of  opposition groups because the main justification of  his third-term was that ROK still 
needed bold leadership to face the North Korean threat.65 Preparing his campaign for the ROK 
presidency in 1970, Kim started to argue that Park‘s anticommunist policy was designed to 
excuse his undemocratic rule.66 
In summary, the Nixon Doctrine and Park‘s undemocratic efforts for his third-term in 
1969 started to destabilize the foundation of  Park‘s anticommunist policy. Although the 
president was able to amend the constitution, he lost public support due to the opposition‘s 
resistance to the undemocratic process that lead to the amendments. Washington‘s lack of  
conviction and enthusiasm toward the North Korean provocation and the Nixon Doctrine also 
weakened his justification for the extension of  his rule. Park had limited success reducing the 
impact through diplomatic relations with Tokyo. However, the challenge from the opposition 
became much stronger and undermined the rationale of  Park‘s anticommunist policy in light of  
his endeavour to extend his term through undemocratic measures. In 1970, the South Korean 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ruling party changed the venue for the vote in the National Assembly to another location so as to exclude members 
of  the opposition, a procedure that was improper as well as illegal. In addition, Kim Daejung did not accept the 
outcome of  the referendum or the vote in the National Assembly. Kim condemned the Park regime for mobilising 
public servants in the referendum. The young politician argued that opposition groups never had a fair chance to 
frustrate Park‘s ambition due to such undemocratic and corruptive practices of  ROK executives. In fact, apart from 
the referendum itself, there exists no clear evidence that a majority of  the electorates was in favour of  the bill that 
won their president an additional term in office. For Park, Kim Daejung was a thorn in his side. In Kim‘s memoirs, 
here called that since 1967 Park had attempted to prevent him from being elected as a member in National 
Assembly and promoted in New Democratic Party.  
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leader found it even more difficult to maintain his policy after Richard Nixon officially 
announced his pullout plan, and Kim Daejung established common practical ground with Nixon. 
 
 
(2) The Decision on a Reduction of  US Troops and the Presidential Campaign of  1970 
 
On 20th March 1970, Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 48, which 
ordered the withdrawal of  one army division from the ROK. The Nixon administration drafted a 
preliminary plan for the withdrawal of  twenty thousand US soldiers from Korea by the end of  
the fiscal year, 1971, and directed the US ambassador to Seoul to consult with Park as soon as 
possible about the practical arrangements.67 On 27th March, Porter met Park and officially 
reported the pullout plan. Subsequent reports document Park appearing to be frightened and 
exclaiming ―profound shock.‖68 It should be considered that Park might have exaggerated the 
seriousness of  the report in order to delay the timing of  the plan.  
Annoyed by Park‘s over-reaction, Nixon drafted a response that emphasised America‘s 
continued commitment to South Korean in the event of  an armed aggression from the North. 
Significantly, Nixon stated that while he was authorising the withdrawal of some US forces, he 
was not proposing a total withdrawal. In addition, he promised further military aid for the 
modernisation of the ROK‘s armed forces between 1971and 1975.69Simply put, Nixon was 
effectively saying ―you are over-reacting, calm down, here is something to make you happy.‖In 
spite of this, Park still maintained a hard-line opposition to the American proposal.  
One of  the reasons why the South Korean leader tried to keep the US forces in Korea 
was US conciliatory policy toward People‘s Republic of  China. In March 1969 the long-term 
conflicts between Beijing and Moscow had reached its peak with the Sino-Soviet border conflict. 
For Nixon whose first priority was to reduce tensions in Asia, the split between the two leading 
communist powers offered a great opportunity. The president and his staff generally agreed that 
they had to improve American‘s relationship with PRC without antagonising the Soviet 
                                                          
67 Without any doubt, as we discussed above, Nixon administration frequently revealed its plan to Park through 
various routes, and therefore the official report was not that surprising to Park. See National Security Decision 
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Union.70As such, Kissinger proposed the modification of existing travel and trade restrictions on 
PRC.71 
However, the PRC did not respond directly to Washington‘s appeasing gesture. As 
Nixon and Kissinger expected, PRC was still cautious about its relationship with the US. Yet 
based on Zhou Enlai‘s talks with Kim Ilsung during his visit to Pyongyang in April 1970, we can 
assume that Nixon‘s approach was not meaningless to Beijing. The most important aim of  
Zhou‘s visit to North Korea was to mend relations with Asian neighbours in order to prevent the 
excessive rise of  Soviet influence. During his meeting with North Korean elites, Zhou made a 
critical remark on the Taiwanese Clause approved at the meeting between Nixon-Sato on 
Okinawa Reversion.72 For this, as South Korean sources described, Zhou did not make any 
exceptional comment on the US. On the other hand, he aggressively expressed condemnation 
for the Japanese regime. He accused Japan of  insulting the ―one PRC‖ policy of  the Chinese 
people.73 
Regarding Zhou‘s visit to Pyongyang, South Korea worried about Nixon‘s new 
conciliatory policy toward the PRC because of  Chinese hostility toward the US allies in East Asia, 
South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. According to ROK Ministry of  Foreign Affairs analysis of  this 
DPRK-PRC meeting, the three US allies in East Asia perceived this Chinese aggressive attitude 
toward them as the most serious threat ever.74 Without American commitment for their security, 
PRC could break down the balance of  power in the region. This international challenge further 
compelled Park to maintain his hard-line opposition to the pullout of US forces from South 
Korea. Yet despite his efforts, Washington did not change its plan. 
In 1971 the US government decided on the timing of  the troop reduction. Park 
eventually decided to ask for unreasonable amounts of  US military aid for ROK forces in order 
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to delay or discourage the reduction of  US forces in South Korea.75 When Park met with 
Ambassador Porter and General John Michaelis, the US commander in Korea in early August 
1970, he reminded them of  his request for reconsideration of  the withdrawal decision and stated 
that he would not negotiate the reduction of  US forces without the commitment of  a 
‗satisfactory level of  compensation‘ for the modernization of  South Korean forces. 76 
Negotiations with Park stalled at this point because the assistance Park had requested was 
beyond the authority of  Porter and Michaelis to grant. However, the US government decided to 
accept Park‘s request if  he agreed to the withdrawal of  US troops. On 24th August Washington 
dispatched Vice President Spiro Agnew to Seoul on official ‗authority‘ to discuss the program 
and the amount of  aid with Park.77 
Because of  Nixon‘s determined attitude for US troop reduction, Park already expected 
that he could not delay or cancel the plan without significant change in the Korean Peninsula. 
The foundation for Park‘s anticommunist policy was destabilised by Nixon‘s plan for the 
reduction of  US forces in ROK. In this situation, Park needed to re-emphasise the tension in the 
Korean Peninsula.78 His announcement on 15th August 1970 reflects his calculation. In his 
statement, he demanded that the DPRK should abandon its present strategy for unification 
under the banner of  Communism through violent revolution. In addition, he stated that if  the 
North accepted his request, he would suggest a dramatic solution for the elimination of  the 
artificial barrier separating the two Korean states.79 Yet he also expressed his aggressive idea 
about North Korea: he stated that he wanted to ask Kim Ilsung to participate in good faith in 
creative competition to decide which one is better for its people, democracy or despotic 
communism.80   
As Ma Sangyoon has argued, his announcement was aimed at Washington and the 
South Korean public rather than Pyongyang.81  First and foremost, his announcement was made 
before the Park-Agnew meeting.82 He tried to prevent Nixon‘s plan by emphasising the North 
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Korean threat.83 And if  Washington concluded the negotiation over US troop reduction in the 
end of  August, it seriously damages Park‘s popularity as well as his policy. His military 
background benefited his long-term rule because ROK citizens wanted a strong and charismatic 
leader who could protect them from the North Korean regime. Park had successfully projected 
this image that contributed to his political career as effectively as his strong performance in 
terms of  economic development. The South Korean president needed to show his initiative in 
the inter-Korean competition and to prevent political upheaval after Agnew concluded the 
withdrawal scheme.84 Park might have tried to hide the chaotic situation in ROK politics behind 
its Communist policy including his offensive offer to Pyongyang. He did not make any 
comments on the US withdrawal from South Korea or other damaging news about ROK security. 
The South Korean president just boasted that his country was safe.  
Moreover, the president drew a clear line on his Northern policy. The ROK president 
wanted to remind the population of  the ‗reality‘ of  Korean affairs. In not so few words he stated 
in a public address ―We, South Koreans, love peace and want to reduce the tension on the 
Korean Peninsula, but the North Korean puppets share the same goal.‖85 He stated his 
suggestion was valid only under the precondition that North Korea stopped its provocative 
actions. The problem was that Pyongyang had already ‗stopped‘ its military operation in order to 
promote the American withdrawal from South Korea.86Nevertheless, the ROK government did 
not take any significant action to promote the inter-Korean exchanges after Park‘s statement. The 
South Korean leader still expected that the hostilities between the two Koreas would continue 
unabated and did nothing for promote inter-Korean exchanges in practice.87 
For the Park regime, the meeting with Agnew presented a final chance to delay or 
cancel the plan for pullout even though it was expected that the US would conclude the 
negotiations for withdrawal in this meeting. In his second meeting with US vice president, Park 
said that he had no objection to a pullout of 20,000 troops out of the total of 63,000 soldiers. 
This was provided that the ROK military equipment was modernized, its national defence 
capability strengthened, and that there would be no further reductions of the remaining US 
forces until the modernization programme was complete.88 Agnew rejected Park‘s proposal, 
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reiterating the American position that, ―The US will implement the plan as scheduled. Yet there 
will be no additional reduction of  US forces in South Korea unless a serious problem occurs and 
the US will not additionally reduce the US army presence in South Korea until long after the 
1971election at least.‖89 However, he was well aware that the aggressive ROK leader would not 
accept Nixon‘s proposal unless both sides settled on an appropriate measure of compensation. 
Through three sessions of  negotiation, the two countries agreed to continue discussion on (a) 
the modernization of  South Korean forces, (b) long-term military support, and (c) a US 
guarantee that it would not remove more than twenty thousand US soldiers from South Korea.90 
Almost immediately after Agnew‘s visit, the Park administration received clear signals 
that the United States would not keep its promises. According to Kim Jeongryeom, Park‘s Chief  
Presidential Secretary, only days after the talks Agnew revoked his promise to the Koreans at a 
press conference in Taiwan, stating: ―When the modernization of  South Korean forces is 
completed, perhaps within five years, the US army in the ROK will completely withdraw from 
South Korea.‖ 91  His comment, that completely contradicted his pledge during the talks, 
perplexed the ROK.92After receiving the report about Agnew‘s comments, Park reportedly 
remained silent for a while before saying, ―The self-reliance of  national defence is the only way 
for our survival. We must quickly get out of  the situation in which we fluctuate between hopes 
and fears of  US policy…‖93 Clearly, the Nixon Doctrine continued to undermine Park‘s 
anticommunist policy.  
In this situation, South Korean opposition groups pressured the ROK government for 
its anticommunist policy. Unlike Park, Kim Daejung directly supported Nixon‘s idea and 
advocated the reconciliation with Pyongyang without any preconditions. Kim was eventually 
nominated as presidential candidate for New Democracy Party in September 1970 and immediately 
launched his election campaign. During his nation-wide tour, he promised voters a major shift in 
the country‘s Northern and foreign policies. Much to the dismay of  the Park administration, 
Kim‘s campaign was met with great enthusiasm on the part of  the electorate. The DRP recorded, 
―Kim allured many citizens to his side and provoked the controversy over the national security 
of  Korea. The party in power convened emergency meetings in order to establish 
countermeasures regarding Kim Daejung‘s campaign.‖94 During a press interview on 16th  
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October  1970, Kim promised the abolition of  the Homeland Reserve Forces Law established 
in 1968. This was the imposition of  a collective security system on the Korean Peninsula 
supported by four great powers including the United States, Japan, the USSR, and PRC (so called 
―four-power pact‖). He also promised the promotion of  inter-Korean exchanges. All these 
campaign pledges essentially rejected the basic idea on which the Park regime had built its power. 
This being a confrontational policy stance towards the DPRK combined with strict 
anticommunist policy.95  
Kim‘s promises touched Park‘s sore spots. First of  all, the Reserve Forces, established 
for anti-guerrilla operations in 1968, consisted of  young men who had already finished three 
years of  their military service. This system was especially unpopular to young people since they 
were mobilised often and without pay.96 Secondly, despite Park‘s efforts to improve national 
security, the tension between the two Korean states had not been alleviated. In fact, the 
establishment of  the Reserve Forces and the military modernization did nothing to stop the 
DPRK‘s military provocations. Kim argued that the national security of  South Korea could not 
be accomplished by means of  anticommunist policy or military reinforcements. He believed the 
situation required a series of  nonaggression treaties with communist countries and the 
promotion of  exchanges with the DPRK instead. Thanks to the participation of  the four major 
powers and improved relations with the communist North, Kim insisted, the two Koreas would 
be reunified peacefully some day.97 It stands beyond a doubt that he was able to build political 
ties with Nixon through his campaign in 1970. Nixon started to take an interest in Kim in late 
1970 and invited his potential and ‗desirable‘ partner to Washington in early 1971. 
Facing Kim‘s determined challenge, Park was put on the defensive. Unfortunately for 
Park his realistic ideas where not welcomed by a South Korean population who, in 1970, yearned 
for détente and was disappointed with Park‘s authoritarian rule. Due to the deep scars of  the 
Korean War had inflicted, Park did not pay much attention to the prospect of  a reunification of  
Korea in the 1960s. He focused on reconstruction of  economy and the advancement of  national 
security instead. The problem was that this realistic approach did not promise anything further 
once those goals are attained. Park was a little indifferent toward the nationalistic ideas of  the 
Korean people. In contrast to his competitor, Kim Daejung, Park never demonstrated a roadmap 
for reunification until 1970.98 He was firmly committed to defending his country against the 
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communists and publicly declared his hostility toward Pyongyang. His counterpart in North 
Korea acted in the same way toward the capitalists and Seoul. Since the separation of  Korea 
became more and more significant, inter-Korean military or political conflicts was unavoidable. 
However, as the international environment changed, the balance of  power between South and 
North Korea started to shift. The war in Vietnam dealt a severe blow to American politics, 
economy, and even its commitment to the ROK. 99Park‘s anticommunist policy did not succeed 
in shoring up national security because Washington refused to intervene on behalf  of  Seoul. 
Kim Daejung was well aware of  this Achilles‘ heel. Park‘s inefficient anticommunist 
policy and dictatorship would be where Kim focused his attack. The young and determined 
challenger denounced Park for his ineffective policies and accused him of  creating implementing 
them with the sole purpose of  ensuring his grip on power.100Following Park‘s own logic, Kim 
argued that the South Korean leader was not willing to reduce the hostility between Seoul and 
Pyongyang and did so to maintain his dictatorship.101The contender aroused suspicion on the 
president and his motives. This question increasingly undermined Park‘s public credibility. 
In short, Nixon‘s new Asian policy deeply undermined Park‘s long-term efforts for 
national security and his aggressive policy towards the North. The reduction of  US troops in the 
ROK resulted in a chaotic period of  ROK politics in which the leaders had to consider many 
possible alternatives for ROK national security. The Sino-Soviet conflict also elevated the level 
of  insecurity in the ROK since the US was trying to take advantage of  the situation by 
improving its relationship with the PRC. Kim Daejung‘s liberal ideas supported American 
policies and hence further pushed Park to change his policy. Against this backdrop, Park decided 
to revise his policy in order to better respond to the various domestic and international 
challenges targeting his regime.  
The international and domestic pressure on his policy encouraged him to develop a 
preliminary reunification policy. In August 1970, Park suggested talks to Kim Ilsung on inter-
Korean exchange in a rather hostile and unclear manner. The rationale behind this was simple. 
Park was actually reluctant to talk with Pyongyang but tried to conceal his difficulties in 
managing ROK-US relations and anticommunist policy with this surprising request. Thanks to 
its ambiguous nature, the draft provided Park with considerable flexibility for future policy. Even 
if  he had to introduce liberal policies toward the DPRK, he could have justified this by saying 
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that his regime was willing to change its attitude toward the DPRK for the better future of  all 
Korean people. Furthermore, he could have also returned to the confrontational policy at any 
time claiming he would talk with the DPRK only fit stopped all military action against the South. 
Through this vague terminology, the Park regime reduced the impact of  possible inter-Korean 
negotiations.  
Despite Park‘s equivocal rhetoric, it is worth noting that he officially proposed a 
reunification plan. Of  course this did not imply that he actually intended to reunify the Korean 
Peninsula through warm-hearted talks with Kim Ilsung. He did not want his new idea to become 
a new concrete policy. However, because of  pressure from Washington and opposition groups, 
which limited his ability to mobilise ROK and US forces, Park had to consider peace propaganda 
rather than direct military conflict. In this context, he started to consider changing the mode of  
competition between the two Koreas from sabre rattling to economic and diplomatic power in 
which Park had a strong confidence.102 Park finally made his decision on the new strategy in 
1971. Two important events took place in that year, the presidential election (April) and the inter-
Korean dialogue (August), each demonstrated how and why the Park regime made fundamental 
changes in its policy toward the DPRK.  
 
(3) The Presidential Election and First Inter-Korean Talks in 1971 
 
Park could not be sure of  his victory in the 1971 presidential elections due to American 
pressure. Because of  Park‘s resistance to Nixon‘s policy Washington clearly wanted a new and 
cooperative partner to run the ROK rather than the stubborn and aggressive incumbent. The 
White House had already found its preferred partner, Kim Daejung, who had made himself  a 
name for his liberal view on North Korea and his flexible foreign policy perspectives. Since the 
start of  Kim‘s presidential campaign in September 1970, Nixon was paying close attention to the 
performance of  this young and charismatic candidate. Despite the CIA‘s pessimistic report of  
Kim‘s election prospects, Nixon invited him to Washington to encourage him.103 Park was 
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extremely nervous about this invitation. Yet he did not publicly reveal his anxiety since he was 
reluctant to officially recognise Kim Daejung as his strongest opponent fearing that this would 
prove beneficial to Kim‘s campaign. Nevertheless, US source clearly indicate Park‘s fear of  
Nixon‘s attitude. On 27th January 1971, the ROK Prime Minister, Baek Doojin, visited the US 
embassy and complained about Kim‘s visit to the US. The US ambassador reported, 
 
Luncheon with Prime Minister today was almost entirely taken up by his recital of ROK 
government fears that Kim Daejung will see important people in the United States. He 
said that there are many rumours in Seoul that the Americans were paying for Kim 
Daejung‘s trip and were pledging to support him. He reached peak of this remarkable 
statement by urging me to issue a public statement to effect that the U.S. is absolutely 
neutral in matter of ROK elections ―despite rumours that we are supporting opposition.‖ 
 
We would make appropriate appointments for Mr. Kim as we do for other ROK 
Assemblymen who visit U.S.‖ He said, ―We should guarantee that Kim did not see 
―important people,‖ that Kim is only ordinary Assemblyman. I inquired why ROK 
government feels so intensely worried about Kim‘s trip. Was it because govt. feared that 
Kim would receive great publicity here? Only time Baek Doojin laughed during 
interview was at that point. He said ―That will never happen.‖104 
 
This clearly demonstrates how nervous Park was about Nixon‘s endorsement of  Kim. 
Specifically, Kim‘s liberal views concerning future relations with North Korea and communist 
countries were in line with the Nixon Doctrine. In spite of  Park‘s complaints, Kim already left 
for the US on 25th January 1971. Even though Nixon did not meet Kim personally (The ROK 
presidential candidate later remarked that it was ―Nixon‘s political consideration‖ for him since 
Park would be angry if  Nixon himself  has a meeting with Kim). 105 Instead, he met the senior 
government officials and congressional leaders, such as Marshall Green, the Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; William P. Rogers, Secretary of  State as well as former 
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vice president Hubert Humphrey, and Senator Edward Kennedy. In all these talks, Kim 
discussed the present state of  Korean politics and the upcoming elections.106According to 
American sources, judging from the response of  the Park regime, and based on Kim‘s memoirs, 
it appears clear that Nixon favoured Kim to be his new partner in Korea. As officials in 
Washington were pessimistic of  Kim‘s chances, Nixon was not prepared to meet Kim or support 
him publicly since this would have alienated Park who was likely to stay in office.107  
Despite American support for Kim, Park was not isolated. Tokyo wanted the present 
ROK president to keep his post. This was considered to be in its best national interest. As 
indicated, Japan shared the sense of  insecurity after Nixon had declared his doctrine. 
Consequently the Japanese government sided with Park due to their common interests. It 
decided to keep US forces in Okinawa after its reversion to Japan. Moreover, the Sato 
government supported Park‘s third term of  presidency. Kawajima Shojiro, vice head of  the 
Liberal Democratic Party, the party in power at the time, announced that the long-term tenure of  
the Park regime was important for stable politics in the ROK.108 Tokyo also provided an 
enormous amount of  economic aid to the Park regime, including loans for the Pohang steel mill 
project. Japan provided a loan of  123 million US dollars to South Korea for construction and 
operation of  this large scale industrial project. Thanks to the project, ROK became one of  the 
world‘s leading steel suppliers.109 As Victor Cha has argued, through political and economic 
support, Japan had become an essential partner of  the Park administration and had thus made a 
significant contribution to Park‘s victory in the 1971 presidential election.110 
However, the political and economic cooperation was not a ‗free lunch‘. The Sato 
regime expected Park to make a contribution for Japanese security. In contrast to Washington, 
Tokyo did not want the liberal Kim Daejung to become its new partner. Kim Jeongryeom, the 
Chief  Presidential Secretary, even said that it [the acquisition of  Japanese aid for the Pohang steel 
mill and other projects] was the basis of  our fast-growing economy at that time.111 His words 
summarized the impact of  Japanese support in 1971 quite well. For Kim Daejung, the close 
relationship of  Park and Sato was a major concern during his campaign. He recalled:  
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Japan kept supporting Park. […] Although many countries refused to provide aid for 
the project of  Pohang steel mill because the project appeared not to be beneficial in 
an economic sense, Japan supported it not for economic but for political 
considerations. The project made our people believe that ROK is becoming one of  
the developed countries in the world. [Japan] presented one million votes to Park 
through this project.112 
 
In this sense, the South Korean presidential election of  1971 was not only a big event 
for South Korea, but also an important international issue for which the US and Japan both 
showed great concern. However, there was a big difference between Washington and Tokyo. 
Park was more likely to be elected than Kim, Washington was not able to support Kim publicly 
at the expense of  its relationship with Park. According to CIA reports to Nixon, despite the 
widespread favourable reaction to Kim‘s opening campaign speeches, his prospects for victory in 
April 1971 appeared ―marginal at best.‖ 113  The reason is clear, Kim‘s party, the NDP, was 
poorly organized due to uneasy coalition arrangements between liberals and conservatives. 
Moreover, the party was short of  funds. Park‘s economic development policies during his rule 
had been successful. Moreover, he was able to mobilise intelligent agents and bureaucrats to 
launch a dirty election campaign.114For such reasons, Washington was not able to directly support 
Kim. In contrast to the US, Japan was in confidence with Park‘s chances at the ROK presidency 
and hence able to provide political supports to him without any hesitation. The election outcome 
did not come as a surprise to most observers. Park was re-elected as president with 6.3 million 
votes. The difference of  votes between Park and Kim was about 0.1 millions. In some sense, 
Japan won the game against Washington. Yet it is important to note that Park did not think he 
had overwhelmed Kim but was nervous because of  Nixon‘s hostility towards him. In fact, he was 
angry with the result.115 
 
In contrast to Kim Daejung, my people treated me terribly. Clearly, democracy has a 
weakness. In the case of  [South] Korea, it is possible that some strange guy can be 
                                                          
112 Kim Daejung, op. cit., 130. 
113 Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President‘s Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, Washington, December 23, 1970, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70, Far East, Country Files, 
Box 542, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives. 
114 Dirty campaign consists of  physical violence by political thugs, KCIA blackmail to supporters of  other candidate, 
groundless criticism and etc.―Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence And Research,‖ Washington, 
December 28, 1970,POL 15–1 KOR S, Central Files 1970–73, RG 59, National Archives. 
115 Cho Kabje, op. cit., 116- 117. The number of  votes for Kim was about 5.4 millions. 
  
81 
 
elected if  there is some political upheaval. If  so, I am wondering whether this nation 
can consistently maintain a strong liberal democracy. I am seriously worried about the 
upcoming election results. As you know, we spent a lot of  money! Our party [DRP] 
sent such a great amount of  money to each district. But why is the difference just like 
this!?116 
 
For this episode, Kim Jongpil, one of  Park‘s closest subordinates, recalled,117 
 
The reason why the difference [between Park and Kim] was only 0.95 million is that 
the citizens doubted Park‘s intention with the constitutional amendment and were 
worried that Park would do something [i.e. run for fourth term] if  they gave many 
votes to Park.118 
 
Despite his defeat in the election, Kim Daejung taught Park an important lesson during 
and after the election campaign. 119  In international political terms, the 1971 election re-
confirmed the American influence on ROK politics. Park realized that Nixon‘s preference for 
Kim had shifted many votes away from him to his rival. This Nixon-Kim alliance could be 
potential threat to his next term. No doubt, US troops in Korea and American support in 
general were still essential for the ROK both in security and economic terms. In short, Park had 
to re-consider his relations with Nixon and accept Nixon‘s policy agenda in order to keep the 
remaining US troops on Korean soil and continue to receive American aid. Clearly, Tokyo‘s 
support for Park Chunghee during his presidential campaign was decisive for his victory. 
However, Park now had to make a realistic decision for his and the ROK‘s future. Sato could not 
provide any military forces to him the way Nixon did. Furthermore, since Nixon did not want 
Park to win the election, he would try to undermine Park‘s political foundation in order to have a 
new and more cooperative partner. Considering their relationship, the US government would 
quickly commence the total withdrawal of  US troops from Korea and cut aid to the Park 
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government. 
Regarding the issue of  the withdrawal of  US troops, the détente mood between 
Washington and Beijing heightened the level of  the ROK‘s insecurity. On 15th July 1971, Nixon 
announced his plan to visit PRC in February 1972. Park was very nervous about the upcoming 
talks between the US and PRC and worried whether or not PRC would insist on the complete 
pullout of  US forces from Korea.120 In his graduation ceremony message at the National 
Defence Graduate School, the ROK president remarked that the situation of  Korea‘s neighbours 
seems to be ―peaceful at first glance‖ but we must be well aware that ―there is still tension in the 
Korean peninsula.‖121Yet Park had to accept the new realities and even Sato, his Japanese 
counterpart, was unsettled by Nixon‘s announcement. According to William P. Rogers, US 
Secretary of  State, the Japanese prime minister revealed his concern about Sino-US talks in 1972 
through his ambassador to Washington. He would have considered that the ROK-Japan alliance 
could not stand up to PRC.122 Like Tokyo, Seoul was unable to ignore the reconciliation between 
Washington and Beijing which supported Pyongyang. It would have been dangerous if  Nixon 
abandoned the ROK for the sake of  a harmonious relationship with the PRC. Beyond doubt, the 
US influence on Korea was still enormous and hence Park had to change his attitude toward 
Nixon. In order to keep US forces in the ROK and win Nixon‘s support for his regime, Park 
announced an important decision which demonstrated the changes in his Northern and foreign 
policy only a few months after the election. 
After Nixon announced his visit to the PRC, Park proposed a conference between the 
two Korean states through the Korean National Red Cross on 12th August 1971. The Park 
regime‘s peaceful approach toward the DPRK was underpinned by a mood of  détente 
encouraged by the US and PRC‘s rapprochement. Kim Daejung was furious with Park for his 
two faced behaviour. During the campaign period, Park had condemned Kim as pro-
communist.123Nonetheless, the president, who presented himself  as the model anti-communist, 
was apparently simply plagiarizing Kim‘s idea. Park had learned from Kim how a peaceful stance 
can ensure good relations with Nixon, a lesson he applied after the election. 
Considering his previous hard-line policy, Park‘s announcement in August 1971 was 
astonishing. But considering his draft for a new Northern policy, announced on 15th August 1970, 
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this was neither impossible nor unexpected. Park‘s remarks about possible changes in his policy 
toward the DPRK enabled the regime to respond to a fast-changing international environment 
without hurting the conservative support. At this point, it is hard to claim that Park just copied 
the essence of  Kim‘s idea. The real aim of  the new policy was not the peaceful reunification of  
Korea, at least in the beginning. By yielding, Park tried to prevent the total withdrawal of  US 
forces and discourage Nixon from looking for a new partner in South Korea. He supported 
Nixon‘s East Asian policy by engaging in talks with the DPRK.  
However the South Korean president did not stop criticising Kim Ilsung regime. 
Furthermore, his government had a negative opinion about the DPRK‘s 1970 peace strategy. 
According to reports from the ROK Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, the DPRK had reframed from 
acts of  serious provocation, such as seen in 1968 and 1969, in order to manipulate Nixon‘s 
decision making. The ROK elites considered that Kim Ilsung hoped to relieve Nixon‘s anxiety 
and encourage him to push for the total retreat of  US forces from the ROK.124 In a nutshell, the 
South Korean leadership was still cautious in its new approach to North Korea. It was concerned 
that Pyongyang would suddenly attack the South once Seoul and Washington dismissed the 
possibility of  another war in Korea. 
It was Park who officially proposed inter-Korean talks to Kim. However, this does not 
mean that the ROK took the initiative for improving the inter-Korean relationship as Park had 
proudly claimed. Like Seoul, Pyongyang was also supposed to adapt itself  to the new 
international political realities established by Washington and Beijing. For the Chinese, the Kim 
Ilsung‘s regime was an important client that could play a decisive role in its conflict with Moscow. 
PRC often discussed sensitive political issues with the DPRK and did not ignore North Korean 
interests. In short, the impact of  Sino-US rapprochement was less serious for the DPRK than 
for the ROK. PRC improved its relationship with the US without antagonizing the DPRK. 
According to Don Oberdorfer, Kim Ilsung was in Beijing when Henry Kissinger visited PRC in 
July 1971. The Chinese government reported every detail of  the Zhou-Kissinger meeting to its 
North Korean guest.125 Moreover, Beijing appreciated Kim Ilsung‘s consideration over its 
compromise with the US and provided considerable military aid to Pyongyang.126 In this sense, 
Kim Ilsung was willing to support PRC. Even before Kissinger‘s secret visit to PRC, Pyongyang 
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continuously requested ‗direct talks‘ with Seoul.127 During his speech for honouring Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian head of  state on 6th August 1971, Kim announced that he 
would like to engage in talks with the ROK.128 Kim Ilsung expected more Chinese aid as a result 
of  Sino-US talks, while Park was struggling to keep American support.129  
Park did not overlook this North Korean movement and Sino-US reconciliation. As the 
détente mood in East Asia encouraged Washington to withdraw its forces from South, the inter-
Korean talks may have provided decisive justification for the withdrawal. The ROK government 
considered that North Korea had more powerful forces than the south, and the US forces 
stationed in the ROK compensated for this imbalance between the two Koreas.130 Therefore, 
the DPRK was the more dominant part in the bilateral contest and could have been far stronger 
than the ROK if  the US pulled out of  South Korea. For this reason, the South responded with 
caution to DPRK‘s peaceful approach.131 
The first inter-Korean dialogue did not involve the southern and northern Korean 
governments but took place between the Red Cross organizations of  Southern and northern 
Korea. This was Park‘s trick to reduce the risk of  a situation that may encourage the withdrawal 
of  US forces. Park did not propose direct talks between the two regimes in order to block any 
sensitive political discussion. The Red Cross was selected as representative for this reason. 
Through the Red Cross, Park could show his willingness to accommodate the détente in the 
region without engaging in serious political deals with Pyongyang. Clearly, the ROK president 
was not prepared for talks with the DRPK premier. The South Korean ‗Red Cross delegate‘ was 
Jung Hong Jin, who was in reality the deputy director of  the international affairs bureau of  the 
South Korean Central Intelligence Agency. DPRK followed the same approach. Kim Duk Hyun, 
the North Korean ‗Red Cross delegate‘ was actually a senior official of  the Workers Party 
Organization and Guidance Department, the DPRK‘s control mechanism.132 On 20th August, 
the two ‗Red Cross‘ representatives met in Panmunjeom, which lay at the centre of  the Joint 
Security Area. As both sides had totally different motives for the meeting, the historical talks did 
not make any progress for developing the relations between the two brothers.  
From the get go of  this meeting between the two Koreas, ROK immediately backed the 
continued presence of  American forces in South Korea. It is noteworthy that the ROK had 
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dispatched Hahm Pyongchoon, Special Assistant to the President for Political Affairs, to 
Washington in order to highlight the need for a continued US military presence in ROK during 
inter-Korean Red Cross talks. One interesting point is that Hahm did not exaggerate the threat 
from PRC toward the ROK as other South Korean elites had done before. Rather, he stated that 
PRC would not want the US to withdraw its forces from the ROK due to a potential threat from 
Japan.133 His rhetoric was definitely lacking any sense of  logic since there was absolutely no 
likelihood of  Japanese armed aggression against PRC at that time. In addition, even Zhou Enlai, 
premier of  PRC, requested Henry Kissinger to withdraw the American forces from Korea 
during their initial meeting in July.134 Yet Washington clearly understood what the ROK official 
meant. Despite his euphemism, Hahm‘s idea was clear, ―Do not withdraw your forces from our 
land!‖ In addition, Park continuously asked Nixon to keep the military support for South Korea 
through the US embassy in Seoul, too.135 But the US did not make any change in its military plan 
in ROK. 
Park finally changed his mind and opted for a more aggressive strategy. On 20th 
November, after nine rounds of  fruitless meetings, the South Korean delegate suddenly 
proposed direct high-level talks with his Northern counterpart.136 This radical approach marked 
a significant departure from ROK‘s cautious approach in the past and came as a surprise, making 
it difficult to assess its real intent. Park might have considered that the Red Cross meetings that 
continued for two months were not enough to persuade Nixon trust him. As the American 
documents indicated, Seoul was extremely sensitive to Nixon‘s visit to PRC. The South Korean 
leader was afraid of  that PRC and the US would discuss American military support for 
ROK.137For this reason, Park aimed to impress Nixon before his visit to Beijing.  
The White House had not made any changes to its Korean policy yet, it was pleased 
with South Korea‘s support for the Sino-US relations and encouraged Blue House to have more 
close contact with Pyongyang. In Nixon‘s letter to Park dated 29th November 1971, the US 
president praised Park‘s effort and promised that his talks with PRC would not affect ROK-US 
relations.138However, it was apparent that he was not entirely satisfied with the Red Cross Talks 
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which did not produce any political agreement between the two Koreas. He pushed Park to 
develop the talks further and have a more meaningful exchange with Kim Ilsung.139 Interestingly, 
Park had already proposed inter-governmental talks as Nixon had hoped. It seemed that the 
ROK government did not actually change its policy until Nixon‘s letter was sent to Park. It is not 
hard to imagine a bitter smile on Park‘s face since he had anticipated Nixon‘s position.    
Before entering the inter-governmental talks, the South Korean elites decided to tighten 
their control over South Korea. Park was well aware of  the side effects of  liberal strategy. The 
inter-Korean dialogue had originally been suggested by Kim Daejung and hence improved Kim‘s 
position in the next round of  presidential elections. Moreover, Park‘s military background and 
his hostile attitude toward the North in the past made him look awkward in this period of  
détente. As Park had titled himself  the ‗only one who can match Kim Ilsung‘, ironically, the 
hostility between two Koreas was essential for his rule. Therefore, Park had to keep the South 
Korean public reminded of  North Korea‘s real face before entering the inter-governmental talks. 
 
(4) Peace and Tension  
 
On 6th December 1971, Park declared the state of  national emergency and started to 
emphasize the dangers of  North Korean threats although there had not been any significant 
provocation from the North. Through a variety ways, the Park regime scared the ROK public. 
For instance, movie theatres had to show footage of  the training sessions of  North Korean 
forces before the main movie. Park made a declaration that can be summarized as; strengthen 
security; each individual is called upon to fulfil his part in the security plan whether Homeland 
Reserve drills, military training or reserve training; the press should refrain from printing 
provocative or irresponsible articles; the people should be infused with a new appreciation of  the 
security situation rather than be lulled into a feeling of  peace-mindedness and security.140 
South Koreans were perplexed by Park‘s sudden change in tone, since their government 
had just made a gesture of  détente toward the North. As a result, they were quite sceptical of  the 
seriousness of  a potential conflict with the north. On the same day that Park proclaimed a 
national emergency situation, Kim Daejung was in Japan receiving treatment after being injured 
in a traffic accident.141 He was surprised by the radical attitude of  the ROK president but was 
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soon able to grasp his real intentions. Kim returned home immediately and tried to inform the 
public of  what he saw as the Park regime‘s true motives. 
 
North Korea does not attack the South. This [the declaration] is political propaganda 
for Park‘s dictatorship. At present, the North cannot initiate a war against the South 
and have no plan for it. It [the declaration] is totally opposite to the facts and is false.142 
 
Kim tried to provide his idea through the South Korean press. However despite Kim‘s effort the 
press could not convey his idea to the public properly because the ROK government had 
prohibited any behaviour of  agitation pursuant on Park‘s order.143 There was no South Korean 
press organisation which dared to publicize his idea.  
The Park regime worried about the impact of  its recent step on its relationship with 
Washington. For this reason, four days before declaring the national state of  emergency, the 
ROK government held talks with Philip C. Habib, who had succeeded William J. Porter as US 
ambassador to Seoul in 1971. Like his predecessor, Habib had a difficult time attempting to 
bridge the gap between Washington and Seoul because Park had already decided to commence 
his plan for national emergency. However, the Park regime might have considered that it was 
okay if  it explains to Nixon its real intent behind this the radical decision. The one who took on 
this irksome task was the director of  the KCIA, Lee Hurak. Habib was told that Park was 
planning to make a statement sometime during the first week of  December in which he would 
declare an emergency situation. Lee, who expected Habib to disagree with this decision, added 
hastily that this would not be an emergency declaration in a legal sense as provided for in the 
constitution. He also said that it was intended to be an exhortative declaration to ―awaken‖ the 
people and make them realize there were things that needed to be done to ensure the security of  
Korea. Park definitely exaggerated the security crisis without any substantial fact. Lee did not 
forget to add his positive opinion on the inter-Korean talks that were supposed to ease Nixon‘s 
concerns about Park‘s behaviour. In his report to the White House, Habib stated that the 
recently imposed emergency measures were meant to project a strong position vis-à-vis the 
North in anticipation of  coming negotiations just as Lee and ROK government expected. 
However, Habib also emphasized that the current situation in Korea was not as serious as Park 
indicated.144 
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Washington understood Park wanted to prevent the impact of  a sudden change to his 
northern policy. The White House considered that the South Korean leader was trying to tighten 
his control over the ROK. It was because of  the internal situation, where he saw stability 
threatened by a combination of factors including the problem of his presidential succession, the 
loss of cohesion as the nation‘s fear of North Korean hostility and hence diminishment of his 
strong anti-communist ideology, and the declining US support.145 The US decided to warn Seoul 
anyway. Nixon conveyed his idea to Park in a letter. Washington confirmed that there was no 
danger of  imminent conflict on the Korean Peninsula. 
Another interesting point in the letter is that Nixon declined Park‘s invitation for 
summit talks in Korea on his way to PRC in February 1972.146 The US president might not have 
wanted to let Park enter his historical mission and make another unnecessary request that could 
affect Sino-American bilateral affairs. Simply, Washington was not happy with Park‘s recent 
emphasis on anticommunism. Nonetheless, it did not show any strong antipathy toward the 
South Korean movement because Park promoted the inter-Korean talks on the other hand that 
did encourage the détente mood in the East Asia before Nixon‘s visit to Beijing in the next year.  
Why did the Park regime pursue such two-faced strategies? The answer could be 
drawn from the impact of  the Nixon Doctrine on the political foundation of  Park regime. As we 
have discussed earlier, Kim Daejung gained American support thanks to his liberal perspectives 
toward North Korea and other communist countries. Even though he lost the 1971 election, 
Kim was supposed to run again in the next election. After all, Park had promised, during his 
1971 campaign that he would not seek another term in office.147 Yet the biggest problem was 
that there was no one in his party, the Democratic Republic Party, who stood a chance to beat Kim 
Daejung other than Park himself.148 Accordingly, Park might have worried about the political 
retaliation of  Kim Daejung who was likely to take supreme power at some point in the future.149 
In this situation, Park had to take a special measure in order to prove his value not just to Nixon 
but also to the South Korean public. Nevertheless, he did not think that the dialogue between 
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the two Koreas would result in the end of  Korean War as Kim Daejung argued.150  
For Park Chunghee, the inter-Korean talks were another mode of  war. The direct talks 
were held in Pyongyang and Seoul, which implied that the North Korean delegate could 
compare the different levels of  economic development in South and North Korea. According to 
Kang Induk, the former head of  the KCIA who visited North Korea in 1972, Park believed that 
South Korea‘s economy had grown significantly since 1969 and was in far better shape than the 
North‘s. As such, South Koreans made a point of  showing off  Seoul‘s achievements to the 
North Korean delegates. Simply, the high level talks were not the platform of  reconciliation 
between the two Koreas. But Park was concerned that the South Korean public regard the 
dialogue as the step towards reunification.151 
The Nixon administration might not have considered Park‘s concerns seriously. 
Washington did nothing but comment negatively on Park‘s decision. This was probably because 
Nixon did not want to discourage Park who at least did what the US president wanted, namely 
promote the détente trend in the region. As a result, Nixon‘s lukewarm response to the 
declaration of  national emergency let him know that the US would not punish him even if  he 
made a further move. Nixon‘s carelessness made it possible for Park to establish his lifetime 
tenure in 1972. 
In short, Park Chunghee was reluctant to change his foreign and Northern policy but 
was pushed to do so in this period. Domestic and international factors including a political 
challenge toward Park‘s undemocratic politics, American reluctance to intervene in Korean 
conflicts, the détente mood between Washington and Beijing, and the practical ties between 
South Korean oppositions and Washington increasingly deteriorated South Korea‘s commitment 
to anticommunism. As this asymmetrical alliance implicated, Washington reduced its level of  
protection for South Korea from its communist threat once it found the opportunity to freeze 
the Cold War. In the beginning of  1970s, the United States considered South Korean demand 
for its national security more than necessary becoming trapped in the Korean conflict.152 Seoul 
continuously attempted to demonstrate its strategic importance to American in East Asian 
strategy but failed to maintain the same level of  American support. 
While in bilateral negotiation with Nixon, the Park regime also attempted to minimize 
the influence of  new US policy with Japanese economic and political support who also felt the 
sense of  insecurity because of  changes to American policy. Clearly, the diplomatic ties between 
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the two East Asian allies of  Washington helped Park remain in power and keep his 
anticommunist policy. But Nixon‘s plan to withdraw US forces from South Korea and support 
for Kim Daejung forced Park‘s ROK to join the détente more towards. Park initially suggested a 
preliminary draft of  a liberal policy to the North in 1970 and developed it into an official policy 
in 1971.  
In the second half  of  1971, Park finally materialised his new policy toward 
Communism yet maintained hostility toward it. ROK had Red Cross Talks with DPRK and even 
promoted high level talks in Pyongyang and Seoul. This dramatic political action relieved both 
Nixon and South Korean citizen. Officially, the focus of  ROK‘s Northern policy moved from 
confrontation to reconciliation. However Park never allowed the South Korean public to regard 
his new Northern policy as fundamentally changed in the nature. He was well aware of  his own 
weakness. The South Korean people would not support the authoritarian regime if  there was no 
threat from North Korea. Hence the South Korean government never stopped its criticism on 
its ‗evil‘ counterpart in the North while making an effort for direct inter-governmental talks in 
1972 and even declared a state of  national emergency in December 1971. Despite Park‘s 
authoritarian action, Washington did not keep him in check effectively because of  his support 
for Sino-US talks in 1972 and due to the weak influence South Korean domestic politics had on 
détente trend in the East Asia on which Nixon and Kissinger put a heavy emphasis in their 
foreign policy. The Red Cross Talks and the promotion of  high level talks between the two 
Koreas let Park to reduce American antipathy toward him and tighten his control over South 
Korean politics. Park quickly joined the new world order and effectively utilised it in the interests 
of  South Korean security and his own power. Brawling with Nixon in 1969 and 1970, the South 
Korean leader finally learned how to secure American support. He dramatically moved forward 
to détente and established his power and stability in 1972. As Don Oberdorfer and Kim Daejung 
have argued, the president sought to gain political benefits from his talks with Kim Ilsung.153  
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Chapter III: Détente in Korea and the Restoration of Anticommunism, 1972- 1974 
 
In the last chapter, we reviewed how, after the ROK presidential election in 1971, the 
ROK government arranged its dialogue with its northern counterpart, and Richard Nixon 
announced his visit to China. Clearly enough, Seoul could not ignore the implications of  
reconciliation between Washington and Beijing—the latter was, after all, Pyongyang‘s closest ally. 
Faced with the dangerous possibility of  Nixon marginalizing South Korea in the interests of  
Sino-American relations, and in order to prevent the total withdrawal of  American troops from 
Korea - and additionally to catch the trend of  détente in the East Asia - Blue House made an 
important decision: South Korea started to talk with North Korea and thus made an important 
contribution to Nixon‘s new policy in 1971.154 However, their decades-old mutual hostility since 
the Korean War in the 1950s ensured that the two Koreas never regarded their talks as a 
platform for mutual peace. Rather, the talks were the key to a ‗peaceful war‘. The narrative of  
South Korea‘s policy towards the North in 1971 is thus the story of  a tenuous balancing act 
between a semblance of  détente and the maintenance of  the traditional security imperatives of  
the Cold War, both in order to legitimise its anticommunist regime, and to secure the support of  
the USA. 
First of  all, this chapter will examine how the Park regime altered its policy toward the 
North in response to the demands of  the Nixon administration, and will further discuss the 
nature and limitations of  the policy with regards to the hostile approach of  the regime toward 
Pyongyang, and Communists, during its talks with North Korea in the early half  of  1972. The 
presence of  US troops in South Korea, the American sponsorship for Seoul, and mutual 
mistrust between the North and South largely limited the development of  inter-Korean relations 
throughout the high-level talks: Kim Ilsung managed the peace negotiations to facilitate the 
pullout of  US forces from South Korea, something that Park Chunghee never wanted to discuss 
with Kim. Before and during negotiations with North Korea, the South Korean leader repeatedly 
requested of  Washington to suspend the US troops withdrawal schedule. The ROK internal idea 
about talks in Pyongyang and Seoul, and the joint communiqué of  both South and North in 
1972, only confirmed the gap between South and North Korea in their Cold War strategy. Park 
had neither any idea of  how to negotiate with Pyongyang on the topic of  US military forces in 
his country, nor did he have a lenient and liberal view toward Communists. In Park‘s realistic view, 
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based on the North Korean military provocations, the reconciliation between East and West did 
not necessarily bring peace to the Korean peninsula. 155  Clearly, based on North Korean 
provocations until 1969, the Blue House concluded that North Korea was stronger than the 
South in terms of  military power and relatively autonomous from the influence of  its two 
patrons, Moscow and Beijing.156 Hence the South Korean elites were reluctant to accept North 
Korean terms that excluded any foreign power from Korea.  
Secondly, the ideological ground of  the Park regime limited the reconciliation with 
Pyongyang. It was too risky for the Park regime, whose long-term reign benefited from South 
Korean antipathy toward the communists, to maintain friendly relations with North Korea.157 
The introduction of  the liberal policy toward the Communist South Korean security undermined 
Park‘s Cold War rhetoric that firmly supported his long-term authoritarian rule. The public 
believed that the inter-Korean talks were the road to peace, and expected more political freedom 
in the country. Consequently, Park may have believed that new inter-Korean relations might 
encourage his rival, Kim Daejung, who originally proposed the liberal policy. For this reason, he 
had to keep ties with Pyongyang for the benefit of  American sponsorship of  South Korea, while 
maintaining his external anticommunist presentation, in order to retain political power. Ma 
Sangyun argued that Park, therefore, worried about the retreat of  US troops from South Korea, 
and needed to limit the liberal voice in his land.158 
The paradox of  Park‘s policy regarding the communists pushed him to eliminate both 
the international and domestic pressure on his post by the Yusin (Restoration) reform in October 
1972. The Yusin constitution allowed Park to get rid of  major obstacles to his lifetime tenure, and 
political challenges, to implement his policy. The new findings in the US archives indicate that 
the drastic change in the political institution of  the ROK was the result of  Park‘s efforts for 
maintaining his rule, rather than the external threat of  the North Korean peace propaganda and  
Sino-US diplomacy.159 Through various channels during the talks, Park said that Pyongyang must 
not invade the South in the near future.160 According to Park Chunghee biographer Cho Kabje, 
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Park planned the Yusin Reform while talking with Kim Ilsung in order to unify the national 
opinion for Northern policy.161 His analysis implies that the ROK leadership utilised the 
dialogue and Sino-US rapprochement for its own rule. Lee Jongseok suggests that Park 
exaggerated the North Korean threat during the inter-Korean negotiations, throughout his 
lifetime tenure.162 Certainly, the ROK leader could maintain the inter-Korean negotiations 
without any concern for the liberal resistance, and hence could keep both his post and US 
support. South Korean scholars generally criticised the rationale of  Park regime for his 
authoritarian rule, and recent findings in South Korean and US archives support their thought.   
This authoritarian and conservative reform of  the Park regime attenuated the American 
pressure on the South Korean reconciliation with the Communists. Washington regarded this as 
an indirect challenge from Park. Without any doubt, his rationale for this new institution was that 
the Sino-US reconciliation and North Korean threat undermined South Korean security. In other 
words, he tried to say that Nixon was responsible for this undemocratic decision. Moreover, the 
South Korean president did not consult with Nixon about this reform but only ‗informed‘ him a 
couple of  weeks before the D-day. The US officially complained to Park in a disappointed tone, 
but could not reject his decision.163 Clearly, because Park abolished a direct election for 
presidency, Nixon could not press the South Korean leader through his support for specific 
presidential candidates, as he had in 1971. Moreover, as Shin Jongdae indicated, Washington did 
not ignore that Park contributed to the Sino-US reconciliation with his unwillingness to negotiate 
with Kim Ilsung. Consequently, the White House did not make any significant action against 
Park‘s sudden attack. 164  The over-reaction of  the Park regime toward the East-West 
reconciliation deteriorated Nixon‘s efforts for détente in East Asia. Henry Kissinger and the East 
Asian specialists in Washington advised that Nixon should change his South Korea policy in 
order to prevent further unexpected actions from Park, which could undermine the American 
relations with the Communists.  Consequently, the American concern for its relations with 
Seoul led the White House to stop the withdrawal of  US troops from South Korea.165 
Just when Park seemed to be able to keep his negotiation with the DPRK without 
sinking his anticommunist rhetoric and the appearance of  a US retreat, North Korea decided to 
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stop talking with South Korea, which dimmed its military superiority. The North resumed its 
military provocation against capitalists after it found out that the US would not retreat from 
South Korea, and it could not implant its revolutionary idea within the South, as the military 
regime was in control with a firm grip. The DPRK announced the end of  the dialogue once the 
KCIA abducted Kim Daejung in 1973. Nevertheless, the Park regime tried to maintain an inter-
Korean contact, which would not deteriorate national security any longer. In June 1973, the Blue 
House announced that it would recognise the DPRK, and allow it join the United Nations if  it 
accepts the principles for peaceful reunification of  Korea.166 Yet the generous offer of  South 
Korea was totally ignored by Pyongyang, which lost its interest in the negotiations with Seoul. 
The détente in Korea quickly ended with bitter conflicts in 1974.  
While South Korea resumed its competition with North, its relations with Japan and the 
US in 1973 and 74 were largely deteriorated, too. The abduction of  Kim Daejung by the KCIA 
on Japanese territory - and the assassination attempt in the National Theatre in Seoul committed 
by Moon Sekwang, a North Korean resident living in Japan - identified the gap between the 
ROK and Japan in their policy toward Communists in this period. The KCIA arrested Kim 
Daejung for his organization of  the anti- Yusin movement in Japan. Facing Japanese protest for 
this brutal action, the Park regime argued that Kim deserved to be punished for his anti- 
government activities. Regarding Moon‘s assassination attempt against Park in 1974, Seoul 
condemned Tokyo for its careless management of  North Korean residents in Japan. Because 
Tokyo made significant development of  its diplomacy with the Soviets and the PRC in 1973 and 
‗74, it had an explicit antipathy toward the excessive anticommunist policy of  the Park regime, 
which posed a threat to Japanese security. 
 Furthering Seoul‘s estrangement from Washington, Kim Daejung‘s abduction adversely 
affected South Korean relations with US officials who tried to save Kim from death. The White 
House had a difficult task to curb its aggressive client from breaking the détente mood in the 
East Asia, while Blue House was increasingly losing credit from its patron, who did not take the 
new inter-Korean competition seriously.  
This setback in ROK-US relations can be confirmed in South Korea‘s approach to 
diplomacy during the first oil shock in 1973. The Blue House tried to improve its relationship 
with the Arabic nations who refused to supply oil to the ROK due to its close ties with US and 
Israel. Seemingly, ROK was a good ally of  USA due to its long -term commitment in Vietnam. 
However, the ROK government declared that it did not support Israel, and was no longer a 
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client state to the US for securing its oil supplies from the Middle East.167 Officially, Seoul did 
not make any changes to its American diplomatic policy, but its approach toward Arab states 
during the first oil shock was an astonishing departure.  
However, the isolation of  Park Chunghee from his closest allies did not last long. South 
Korea restored its relations with Washington as détente in East Asia was declined. The advent of  
the Ford administration, due to Nixon‘s resignation following the Watergate scandal in 1974, was 
a watershed moment in the restoration of  ROK-US relations and resumption of  the Cold War in 
Asia. The Ford administration focused on the stability of  its East Asian ally, as it was having 
difficulty progressing its diplomatic relationships with China and USSR. With the American 
support and a new inter-Korean rivalry, South Korea prepared to enter the second phase of  Cold 
War against its northern brother. 
 
 
(1)Unwilling détente: Nixon‘s visit to China and the inter-governmental dialogue between two 
Koreas 
 
While promoting direct talks with the North Korean government, President Park 
Chunghee did not forget to highlight his anticommunism policy. Commencing his third term, 
Park stated that North Korea was stronger than the South, and still had ambition to reunify the 
Korean Peninsula under the Communist‘s banner. On 11th January 1972, during a beginning-of-
year press conference, he said, ―Thanks to our first and second 5-year economic development 
plan, we became superior to the North Korean puppet regime in terms of  economy, culture, and 
other fields except military.‖168He praised his own achievement during his prior terms and 
reminded the ROK public that he was still the optimal leader who could keep the ROK away 
from the evil North Korean Communists. He continuously emphasised North Korean military 
power, ―I cannot but accept that North Korea is stronger than us. For the last decade, the North 
Korean puppet regime only focused on military forces and is far stronger than us at present.‖169 
He added that he had to declare a state of  emergency the year before because of  this North 
Korean threat, and boasted that he demanded Nixon not mention the Korean issue during his 
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visit to China, which he promised to do.170 
His words were inconsistent with reality.  His government was working on inter-
governmental talks with Pyongyang, and North Korea had refrained from violent provocation 
toward ROK during negotiations.171 To no one‘s surprise, Park firmly controlled the information 
and revealed only what he wanted ROK citizens to know. Even worse, Nixon‘s personal letter 
assuring that no agreements will be made in Beijing regarding Korea does not indicate that 
Nixon was seriously worried about a North Korean threat.172 Further, according to Philip C. 
Habib, ambassador to Korea from September 1971, Nixon rejected an invitation by Park to visit 
Seoul on his way to Beijing in February. Seemingly, if  Nixon had shared Park‘s concerns on the 
Communist threat he would have accepted the invitation. In lieu of  a visit, he sent a letter 
responding to the points raised by the ROK president.173 Habib was advised the following by 
the White House:  
 
We are aware of ROKG need for some public demonstration of our concern for 
protection of Korea‘s interests, as well as Park‘s problem of ‗face.‘ Accordingly, in 
delivering a letter to President Park one may say that we will understand if he desires to 
let the press know that he has received a personal letter of assurance from the 
President stating that no agreements will be made in Peking regarding Korea.174 
 
Park tried to call public attention to the North Korean threat and prevent any 
participation of  his rivals in inter-Korean contacts. Park‘s speech could have misled the ROK 
public to believe that the US president had seriously considered the Communist threat on South 
Korea. But this appeared exaggerated, according to the letter to Habib above. As Wu Seungji 
argued, Park worried about trends of  détente in the East Asian and Pacific region because the 
reconciliation between the US and the PRC could undermine anticommunism in South Korea, 
the foundation of  national security and his own political power.175 As such, the South Korean 
leader never regarded a détente mood as a real peace, and was consistently emphasising the real 
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face of  the North Korean Communists. For this reason, he did not publicise his diplomatic 
efforts for the inter-governmental talks between the two Koreas. 
The South Korean leader was annoyed with his ally, Nixon, who continuously 
destabilised South Korea‘s foundation for its national security. He criticized Nixon‘s visit to 
China, while at the same time continued following Nixon‘s policy. On 22th Feb 1972, one day 
after the US president‘s arrival in China, during a dinner with the Blue House correspondents, 
Park bitterly said, ―90 percent of  the purpose of  Nixon‘s visit to China was his re-election. 
Nixon‘s low posture diplomacy toward the PRC is not a desirable thing. How long can we trust 
the US?‖ 176 However, despite Park‘s antagonism toward the Sino-American reconciliation, 
nothing changed. Nixon‘s historic arrival into Beijing on the 21st of  February, made the front 
page of  South Korean newspapers on the same day. South Korean journalists were excited with 
the hot news. A number of  buoyant expressions such as, ‗historic occasion,‘ ‗historic handshakes,‘ 
and ‗peaceful exchange,‘ were plastered all over the front pages.177 
Nonetheless, the Park regime did not stop condemning North Korea. On 15th March,  
about three weeks after a Panmunjeom meeting of  Red Cross delegates of  the two Koreas, 
which happened on the same day as Nixon‘s arrival to China - and of  which Victor Cha indicated, 
―The regional détente trend extended to Korea‖178-ROK‘s Foreign Minister, Kim Yongsik, 
presented a statement listing North Korea‘s violations of  the armistice agreement: 
 
        Since 1953 when the armistice was signed, the north Korean Communists have 
violated the provisions of  the agreement as many as 10.921 times.179 Recently they are 
again creating a grave problem in this area by committing most serious and clear 
violations of  the agreement under the cover of  the mood of  international détente. It 
has been revealed that, during the past several months, they have clandestinely built in 
the demilitarized zone 225 guard posts and brought in field artilleries, armed regulars.     
This is not only the most serious violation of  the armistice agreement but also a  
grave threat to peace (…).180 
 
The statement above was hostile, and contradicted Seoul‘s effort to talk with Pyongyang 
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at that time. However, evidently Park did not really want to stop talking with North Korea, since 
Jung Hong Jin, the South Korean Red Cross delegate, secretly entered North Korea in order to 
discuss the KCIA director‘s visit to North Korea on 28thMarch. Despite ROKG‘s criticism on 
North Korean aggression two weeks prior, Jung talked with North Korean officials about 
upcoming inter-governmental talks in Pyongyang without any serious problems.181 
These efforts clearly illustrate Park‘s secret promotion of  the détente mood in the 
Korean Peninsula while keeping his Cold War rhetoric in public. Shin Jongdae explained that 
ROK‘s friendly approach toward the DPRK had two different purposes: to establish national 
security, and to meet the demands of  the people of  the ROK for a peaceful reunification.182 To 
accomplish this, first Park had to accept the US policy in order to keep American aid for South 
Korea‘s security. If  he had refused to join the trend of  détente, his relationship with Nixon 
would have drastically deteriorated. Park might have expected that Nixon would cut the 
American budget for its aid to the ROK armed forces, or withdraw all US forces from the ROK 
unless he made a friendly gesture towards the Communists, and hence support Washington. 
Additionally, South Korea needed more time to modernise its military forces.183 Therefore, for 
security reasons, he had to follow Nixon‘s policy.  
Secondly, he needed to meet the Korean people‘s demands on the reunification issue 
to some extent. Park could not ignore the influence of  nationalism on his popularity since Kim 
Daejung threatened Park‘s presidency with his reunification plans during the presidential 
campaign in 1971.184 
On the other hand, the radical change in the ―Northern policy‖ could damage the 
Park regime, as well. Clearly, the authoritarian regime could not legitimise itself  without a 
programme against the Communist threat. The military background and anticommunist spirit of  
the Park regime appealed to the ROK electorates so far, who generally were conservative as an 
effect of  the Korean War.185 Yet these two virtues of  his became insignificant after the détente 
mood had dominated the Korean peninsula. The Park regime needed to prove why he still was 
essential for the fatherland, through continuous emphasis on North Korean aggressions. In 
addition, for the KCIA and high-ranking officials, the core class of  the Park regime, the hard-line 
approach was not an option, but a requirement.  Under the banner of  anticommunism, they 
committed numerous political crimes from illegal access to personal information acquired by 
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kidnapping and torture of  people who challenged them.186Needless to say, Kim Daejung would 
have eliminated these people if  he had won the next presidential election. And as the president 
worried, no one could challenge Kim Daejung except Park himself.187 Hence the regime had to 
make every justification for the extension of  Park‘s tenure. In other words, they already intended 
to use the first exchanges between the two Korean governments to back their domestic 
politics.188 The aggressive approach of  the Blue House during inter-Korean negotiations, and 
KCIA‘s initiative in the process, confirmed the regime‘s fear of  a post-Park period.189 In short, 
the Park regime needed to keep American and domestic supports without tainting its 
anticommunist reputation. 
With those sensitive intentions in mind, the ROK representatives visited Pyongyang in 
early May. The man in charge of  this exchange in the South was Lee Hurak, the director of  
KCIA.190 The most confidential organization of  the Park administration, the KCIA, controlled 
information about inter-Korean affairs during the talks, and managed the ROK‘s negotiation 
with its counterpart in the DPRKG. In this context, it was natural for Park to choose Lee Hurak 
as his deputy for inter-Korean talks in Pyongyang. Before entering North Korea, the KCIA 
director met Park on the 2nd of  May and said that he had contacted the CIA in Seoul and would 
bring potassium cyanide [in order to commit suicide for the ultimate exit] to the North. Shortly 
after that, the two Koreas opened a hotline between Seoul and Pyongyang.191 At present, the 
ROK government has not declassified the documents about Lee‘s visit to Pyongyang, but the 
American resources provide some information on this historic meeting, corroborating the dual 
concerns of  the Park regime discussed enunciated previously. According to the American record, 
the KCIA director requested American support for South Korea before his visit to the enemy 
camp: 
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Yi [Lee] said he thought his government would welcome strong U.S. 
Government support should his visit become known publicly, either 
through a communiqué or through leaks. U.S. support would help 
counter-domestic criticism in South Korea, as well as improve Seoul‘s 
position in dealing with Pyongyang.192 
 
It seems clear enough that Washington had no reason to oppose inter-Korean détente, 
and the reason why Lee requested ‗U.S support‘ from the White House was not because 
Washington was obstructing such a Korean dialogue. In fact, Washington welcomed South 
Korea‘s decision.193 It was rather, if  it was anything of  importance, a statement of  the Seoul‘s 
perception of  a quid pro quo; indirectly demanding some political concession from the Americans 
for its erstwhile service to the cause of  East Asian détente. In concrete terms, what Park wanted 
and attempted to achieve, was the prevention of  any further discussion on the withdrawal of  US 
troops from South Korea that would undermine the South Korean position in dealing with the 
North.     
On the 2nd of  May, Lee and his aides entered North Korea. According to his briefing to 
Habib on the 10th of  May, right after his return, the KCIA director first had two meetings and a 
dinner with Kim Ilsung‘s younger brother and the First Vice-Premier of  the DPRK, Kim 
Youngju.194 Two days later, the historic meeting between the North Korean leader and the 
director of  the southern KCIA began. It seems the conversation began with much mutual praise, 
as the second-most powerful figure in the South began by praising Kim‘s achievements, while the 
North Korean Premier responded with much admiration for President Park and KCIA Director 
Lee — Lee in fact recollects that Kim called him ‗a very bold person‘ and ‗a hero‘ who came to 
the opposite camp on his own.195 
The record of  this remarkable talk was kept by Lee‘s aide and was not disclosed for 
seventeen years. Yet the KCIA director reported the details of  his talk with the North Korean 
premier to Habib. Therefore, the United States already knew about the content and substance of  
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the two Korean summits even before Lee officially disclosed his records. Thanks to both ROK 
and US resources, we can compare and double-check the so-called ‗secret‘ record of  Lee with his 
report to the US Ambassador, allowing us an insight into the American viewpoint toward the 
first inter-governmental exchanges in Korea, and the real intentions of  the Park regime for the 
meeting in Pyongyang. The following is an extract from the talks between Kim and Lee in 
Pyongyang, 
 
Lee: President Park Chunghee and I believe unification should be achieved by ourselves  
without interference of  the four powers [the United States, China, Japan, the Soviet  
Union] … We are never frontmen of  the United States or Japan. We believe we should  
resolve our issues by ourselves… 
Kim: Our position is to oppose reliance on external forces on the issue of  unification.  
This is where I agree with Park Chunghee… 
Lee: I‘d like to tell you that President Park is a person who detests foreign interference  
most. 
Kim: That being so, we are already making progress to solve the issue. Let us exclude  
foreign forces. Let‘s not fight. Let‘s unite as a nation. Let‘s not take issue with  
Communism or capitalism… 
Lee: A nation with 40- 50 million people is a powerful country. [The population of  the  
South in 1972 was 32 million; that of  the North 14 million.] One hundred years ago we  
yielded to big powers because we were weak. In the future the big powers will yield to us. 
I‘d like to make it clear to you, the big powers only provide lip service to our hope for  
unification. But in their hearts, they don‘t want our unification. 
Kim: Big powers and imperialism prefer to divide a nation into several nations. 196   
 
Both sides seemingly shared an antipathy to their respective superpower patrons. And the 
conversation, it seems, developed along the lines of  a discussion on the unification of  Korea. In 
addition to this commonality in feelings toward their respective patrons, they talked about the 
Blue House raid in 1968. Kim apologised for the incident and said he did not know of  the plan 
in advance. He argued that the ―leftist chauvinists‖ within the North Korean structure did it 
without his approval. Regarding the Pueblo incident, Kim explained that the capture of  an 
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American spy ship was ―happenstance and was not planned.‖197 Kim blamed some daredevil 
factions in North Korea whom he could not effectively control, and denied his association with 
them consistently. Even though Lee did not believe that this was true (as he said to the American 
ambassador to Seoul afterwards), this did not hurt Lee‘s positive impression of  Kim: The KCIA 
director argued, ―Kim‘s admission of the fact of the assassination attempt—Pyongyang had 
consistently denied it—and his disassociating himself from it now are quite significant and add to 
the credibility of his interests in détente with the Park Government.‖198 
Excited with this historical meeting with the North Korean leader, the Director of  the 
KCIA came back to Seoul and reported his mission first to Park,, and then later to the US 
Ambassador, on 10th May.199 Lee evaluated his trip positively but said that the DPRK Premier 
and he himself  had neither reached any important conclusions nor settled any problems. 
Certainly, Lee did not mention his and Kim‘s bitter criticism of  the four powers (including the 
US) to Habib.200Instead of  these words, Lee said that Kim Ilsung and he had discussed 
‗American and Japanese roles in Korea.‘ Habib sent his report to Washington after his meeting 
with the KCIA Director. In his report, he said that Lee‘s secret trip to Pyongyang was 
successful.201To sum up the situation - although there were minor differences between Lee‘s 
record and his report to the US Ambassador - such as the deliberate omissions of  critical 
comments on US - the KCIA Director provided almost every point that he had learned from 
Pyongyang to the US. Considering that the ROK government did not consult with the US 
government properly for many other important problems - perhaps most prominently on the 
Vietnam War issue - this is very significant. Simply speaking, Park seemed to have learned how to 
work with Nixon. Park possibly regarded the whole situation as a necessary means to call and 
secure Nixon‘s attention to the ROK by promoting détente in the East Asia in secret, without 
causing domestic agitation. 
However, Park did not consider that Lee‘s negotiation with Kim had been successful. In 
fact, it seems that he regretted his decision to dispatch Lee Hurak to this mission to the North. 
For the South Korean President, his KCIA director—who had boasted of  his successful meeting 
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with Kim in excitement—looked silly and naïve, unaware that he had been outwitted by Kim 
Ilsung. During his meeting with the North Korean leader, Lee Hurak had accepted the three 
principles for Korean national reunification as „independence, peace, and national unity,‟ without any 
consultation with the Blue House.202 Among these three concepts of  national reunification, 
„peace‟ was the only one that Park had directly proposed to North Korea in 1971. In other words, 
Lee‘s decision was arbitrary and, in fact, meant far more progress than Park had intended for. 
Park had not sought any real or deep impact from the inter-Korean talks; certainly not on South 
Korean politics. The result of  the first high-level contact between the two Koreas was thus 
disappointing to Park, and hence it was criticism of  Lee‘s carelessness and his thinly veiled 
ambitions for the next presidency that came to dominate the Park regime‘s assessment of  the 
talks. Among these critics, it was Park‘s long-term aide, Kim Seongjin, who indicated that Lee 
had volunteered for this dangerous mission due to his ambitions to run for office in the next 
elections.203 
Surprisingly, even inside of  KCIA, critics existed. According to Kang Induk, who had 
accompanied Lee to the DPRK: 
 
The most serious problem of  these three principles was ‗independence‘, 
which was mentioned even before ‗peace.‘ What does this mean? 
Without any doubt, the North wanted to drive out American forces 
from the South. Without ‗peace‘ in the Korean Peninsula, 
‗independence‘ would be beneficial to North Korea, [who were] 
stronger than the ROK in military terms.204 
 
Park generally agreed with these critics.205 He also considered that Kim Ilsung wanted 
Nixon to withdraw the US troops from Korea, and utilized his peace propaganda for this 
purpose. Kang tried to revise the joint communiqué agreed upon between Lee and Kim Ilsung.  
 
Peace must have been placed first. If  peace is guaranteed, then the US forces  
could withdraw to its own country. However, the order of  principles, Korean  
national reunification, independence, and peace, was already agreed, and it was 
impossible to revise it. Even in Park‘s written instruction to Lee for his meeting 
with North Korean elites, ―The reunification of  our nation must be realised in 
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‗peaceful‘ manner through political dialogues‖ was suggested only.206 
 
       The South Korean leadership did not have any idea to exclude Washington from the 
Korean problem and was deeply disappointed with the agreement between the KCIA director 
and North Korean Premier. Although Park did not reject the North Korean idea of  independence 
for national reunification, in order to keep the détente mood between the two Koreas, he had no 
intention of  materializing the principle that rationalises the retreat of  US forces from his 
territory.207  
Lee remained a deputy of  Park for the high-level negotiation with Pyongyang, but his 
authority was clearly limited afterwards.208 Simply, he just followed Park‘s direction and hence 
became very cautious with his approach to North Korean officials.  This significant gap 
between Park and Lee was not discussed in many famous works probably because their authors 
did not know of  the conflict inside the ROK government, particularly on the sensitive inter-
Korean agenda. Those works directly or indirectly indicated that Park was willing to accept 
North Korean terms because Park had delegated his authority to his KCIA director. Yet this is 
not true: Lee made an arbitrary decision that Park rejected. This split was revealed by high-
ranking officials working in the Park regime about three decades later during 2000s.209Kang‘s 
testimony and the newly published South Korean books reject the previous interpretation of  
first inter-Korean contact, which simply concluded that it was successful and smooth.210 
While waiting for the North Korean delegates‘ visit to Seoul, Park received Nixon‘s 
letter. As Park had hoped, the US President appeared highly impressed by the ROK-DPRK 
meeting.211 He extolled Park‘s effort to reduce the Cold War tensions in the East Asian and the 
Pacific region and promised to support such actions. In his letter, the US President also 
mentioned his visit to Moscow and explained that he would affirm America‘s strong ties with the 
ROK as he did before visiting Beijing.212It thus seemed that Park had achieved his first goal of 
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his new Northern policy, gaining the security of Nixon‘s support.  
However, the South Korean leader could not be relieved yet.  While encouraging Park 
to talk with Kim Ilsung, Nixon mentioned his intention for further reduction of US troops in the 
ROK.213 As such, there was a clear gap between the US intentions and the desires of the ROK 
president.  Park considered that the détente in East Asia would not last long. His simple logic 
was that North Korea would invade the South as soon as the last US troops had returned to 
their own country.  Nixon, however, believed that the ROK was safe as long as Washington 
had a good relationship with Pyongyang‘s two patrons, Moscow and Beijing. Since the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between Washington and Moscow was successfully ended on 26th 
May 1972, the US president had a strong confidence in his foreign policy.214 And in his letter to 
Park, he reminded Park that everything goes well even though he did not mention the SALT.215   
As Park saw it, the actual problem was that Nixon made no effort to reassure him.  As 
indicated, he had rejected Park‘s invitation to Seoul in February before his visit to Beijing.  
Moreover, Nixon‘s deceptive manner during the negotiations over the reductions programme for 
US forces in 1969-70 had also destabilised Park‘s trust in Washington.216 Consequently, Nixon‘s 
comments on the further withdrawal of American armed forces only had the effect of worsening 
Park‘s distrust towards his erstwhile superpower patron.  As a result, the South Korean leader 
became even more cautious in his subsequent negotiations with Kim Ilsung. 
On the 31st of May, North Korean delegates secretly visited the Blue House and met 
Park. The head of the delegation was Park Sungchol, the Second Vice-Premier of the DPRK. 
Information on this meeting has been revealed by two different sources: the first one, again, is 
Lee Hurak‘s report to Habib. The second is the testimony of the ROK politicians who attended 
the meeting. Lee‘s report from the US records contains details of meetings, including the 
minutes of this inter-Korean meeting. Conversely, the ROK politicians‘ testimony focused on 
the general atmosphere of the meeting and Park Chunghee‘s assessment of the North Korean 
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delegates. Although Lee‘s testimony for this meeting, which was kept by the US government, 
would be the most important source, his report seemed biased to some extent, in order to 
highlight his achievement. Because of this bias, there is a clear difference between the two 
sources for the perceived role of Lee.  Due to his vacation immediately after the inter-Korean 
dialogue on the 31st of May, Lee‘s report to the American embassy was delayed until the 13th of 
June.217 
Lee‘s report in June sounded similar to the one in May: he emphasized his role in inter-
Korean negotiation. Lee reported that he thought that the most important result of the last 
meeting was the establishment of an ―agreed coordinating committee,‖ which he did not 
describe further. Regarding the committee, he said that even though the North Koreans officially 
proposed its establishment, this was resulted from his own initiative in suggesting a means of 
coordinating inter-Korean relations during his earlier visit to the North.218 However, according 
to other officials attending the meeting along with Park Chunghee and Lee Hurak, Lee‘s 
initiatives made during the meeting were not mentioned at all.219As discussed above, it is possible 
that the role of KCIA director was limited after his talks with Kim Ilsung. 
Nonetheless, Lee‘s assessment about the North Korean delegates was generally 
coinciding with the others‘ records. Park and Lee called the North Korean representatives 
‗robots,‘ firmly controlled by Kim Ilsung. Park Sungchol, the Second North Korean Vice-
Premier, just read out what was written in his notebook and refused to deliver his own ideas to 
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the South Korean President. Moreover, when Park proposed a cocktail to the North Korean, he 
also refused it, saying ―Because I recently took medicine…‖220 The KCIA director concluded 
that Park Sungchol had even less authority than Kim Youngju, the First Deputy-Premier of 
DPRK and Kim Ilsung‘s younger brother. Lee also considered that he and Kim Youngju could 
issue a joint communiqué after the next meeting. Habib urged Lee to make the facts of these 
meetings and their developments public as soon as possible, since the director‘s visit to 
Pyongyang had already leaked out, which was not desirable.221 However, Seoul was cautious not 
to reveal its secret meeting with Pyongyang.222 
Meanwhile, in the North, Kim Ilsung had considered that the secret talks should be 
publicized because the inter-Korean contact could cause agitation or, at least, encourage the 
liberal voices in the South, as well as an American retreat from South Korean soil.  Surprisingly 
to South Korean elites, Kim thus proposed a four-phase troop reduction for the Korean 
Peninsula to Washington through an interview with Selig Harrison of the Washington Post.223 The 
core of his idea was simple, to reduce the UN and US forces in South Korea. Yet his tone was 
not aggressive. He tried to persuade Washington, seemingly in line with the Zeitgeist of détente 
in Korea. Washington interpreted this surprising demarche as a form of pressure on Park who 
had not wanted to publicize the inter-Korean talks.224 
Perhaps what is more surprising is that the South Korean media did not introduce this 
shocking news at that time. Instead they sported headlines about the ROK-US security 
consultative meeting and its results; all of this was still focused on, even as the South Korean 
government prepared to announce its joint communiqué with the North. Ironically, the ROK 
press highlighted that this security meeting concluded that North Korean peace propaganda was 
fake and dangerous.225 The reason why the ROK press did not introduce Kim Ilsung‘s interview 
with Harrison is not clear; yet it is possible that the ROK government and/or KCIA censored 
and banned the news in South Korean media right after the Washington Post issued Harrison‘s 
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interview with Kim. This argument is plausible, but the problem is that the ROK issued a joint 
communiqué with DPRK about a week later. The true intention and reason why the ROK media 
did not introduce the ‗scoop‘ is unclear so far. However, it is possible that the South Korean 
elites kept silent for a while in order to have time to discuss it further, once the joint 
communiqué had been announced. In any event, the agreements between South and North 
Korea were not revealed beyond ROK government inner circles. Even Kim Daejung did not 
expect that the two Koreas would make such an advance in their relationship. In this situation, 
the Park regime considered that it was safer to censor Kim Ilsung‘s interview at the moment.226 
On the 4th of July, the Park regime finally announced the joint communiqué with North 
Korea. The three principles, „independence, peace, and national unity,‟—as already discussed—had 
already been agreed on during the Kim-Lee meeting in early May. In addition, the two Koreas 
agreed to refrain from criticising one another, nor to use military forces against each other. 
Furthermore, they also agreed to promote more exchanges between Seoul and Pyongyang. Park 
did not think that Kim Ilsung could, or would, keep all of these agreements.227 To be sure, he 
did not trust his counterpart in Pyongyang at all, and did not take these series of contacts 
seriously. According to Park‘s long time aide, Kim Seongjin, Park said to him, ‗I have no 
intention at all [to meet Kim Ilsung]. Why should I meet the fellow?‘228Nonetheless, these 
agreements were not useless to the ROK President. Kang Induk, in charge of inter-Korean talks 
(at the Government working-level), recalled that ‗some parts of the communiqué were not 
satisfactory, but both sides [the South and North] considered that this joint communiqué could 
be useful, [so we signed it].‘ It seems the ROK was indeed afraid of the North Korean military 
forces which were overwhelmingly superior to the South‘s, or at least according to KCIA reports. 
Park thus needed a peaceful approach in order to gain time to modernise the ROK armed 
forces.229Moreover, as highlighted previously, the main priority of the ROK‘s Northern Policy 
was to keep US forces in Korea, and this made it imperative for the ROK to support Nixon‘s 
policy. Therefore, despite its hostility toward Pyongyang, Seoul had a clear motivation to change 
its Northern policy. 
The DPRK, however, considered the negotiation an opportunity to dismantle the South 
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Korean leadership. Kang also provided an explanation for North Korean motives, ‗North Korea 
calculated that it would be easy to establish the united front of anti-America and anti-
government in the South once the two Koreas agree to the three principles of reunification.‘230 
This idea was supported by Communist sources. In a confidential presentation to the East 
German Politbüro, North Korean ambassador to East Germany, Lee Changsu, enunciated that 
North Korea would make South Korea free from American and Japanese influence.231 The Blue 
House was not careless, however. It already knew North Korea‘s intentions over talks between 
the two Koreas. The Park regime did not stop criticising DPRK even during the negotiation 
period, in order to prevent the rise of liberals. And this two-faced strategy did work even before 
the 4th of July. Meanwhile, the most influential politician among the opposition parties and 
liberals, Kim Daejung, did not do anything during the negotiations.232 Park successfully excluded 
Kim from the table of inter-Korean talk. The former candidate for ROK presidency, Kim 
Daejung, condemned the two faces of the president while being please that this fact proved his 
insight:  
 
 (…) It [the sudden and dramatic changes in Northern policy] proves that he  
[Park Chunghee] can make a complete about-face without any hesitation in  
order to protect himself. (…) This communiqué, however, was welcomed in general.  
I thought that [we] must welcome this joint communiqué with enthusiasm. (…)  
I was deeply touched that my idea became materialized.233 
 
As Kim recalled, the inter-Korean contact made Park popular right after the 
announcement of the joint communiqué. Soon Park enjoyed the result of its liberal approach on 
the ROK with new public support for his decision. As the ROK newspaper vividly testified, 
―Many people were excited with the astonishing news and even pleased with it. About ten 
million ROK citizens had left their family members and relatives in the North. This news 
relieved the broken heart of theirs.‖234 Regarding his competition with Kim Daejung, Park 
intended to gain more popularity from the liberal idea of the joint communiqué. But in the long 
run, he still needed the Cold War rhetoric, rather than the détente mood.235 Even with the new 
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ROK Constitution, which allowed him his third term, Park was not supposed to run another 
campaign for the presidency. He needed a special reason in order to extend his tenure. In that 
sense, the inter-Korean contact made him popular for a while, but was not a good enough 
reason to justify an additional term.  
More seriously, the publication of the joint communiqué undermined the very 
foundation of the authoritarian regime, i.e., its anticommunism and/or anti-Northern attitudes. 
In terms of Cold War rhetoric, the Park regime lost its ideological colour due to its pragmatic 
and non-ideological decisions. Both liberal and conservative politicians criticized it, and the 
liberal opposition led by Kim Daejung, the left wing in the New Democratic Party, publicly 
lamented that the government did not consult the ROK citizens with such an important decision, 
and boasted Kim‘s insight for the inter-Korean relations. Simultaneously, the conservative 
oppositions, such as the right wing in the NDP, condemned South Korean government‘s 
exchange with the Communists who dispatched guerrillas to South Korea just few years prior – 
an ironic criticism for the model anticommunist.236 
However, Park could not stop the inter-Korean contact mainly because of his relations 
with Nixon. What he could only do was minimize the impact of his new Communist policy. The 
elites of the Park administration tried to hold its ideological basis. Park continuously emphasized 
the Communist threat during his negotiations with Kim Ilsung.237 This discordance in his words 
and actions increasingly made him seem awkward for both the Left and Right wings of South 
Korea. However, the North Korean aggressions toward the capitalists, immediately after the 
joint communiqué was announced, helped the South Korean leader to overcome the ideological 
dilemma and enabled his return to the original position of anticommunism.  
On the 4th of July, the North Korean leadership had argued that, ‗since the DPRK-
ROK had announced a joint communiqué, American imperialists should not interfere in our 
national affairs and [should] withdraw its invasion forces without delay.‘238 Kim Ilsung‘s threat 
did not work at all and was counter-productive. The Park regime did not accept this, and even 
the White House re-considered its withdrawal programme for US forces from South Korea due 
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to the seemingly aggressive attitude of the North Korean leadership.239 Even South Korean 
citizens found it difficult to trust DPRK when they saw that North Korean Red Cross delegates, 
who visited Seoul in September, repeated ‗Our Chosen [North Korea] Labour Party‘, ‗We 
Communists‘, and ‗Dear great leader Kim Ilsung.‘240 South Korean press criticized the North 
Korean attitude and even argued that the ROK had to consider a Korean national reunification 
more cautiously.241 Ironically, this overbearing North Korean manner only reinforced Park‘s, 
―war with talks,‖ rhetoric for inter-Korean talks. The president sought to extend his tenure based 
on this unstable peace in South Korea.  
The narrative of  South Korea‘s policy towards the North in the first half  of  1972 is 
thus the story of  a tenuous balancing act between a semblance of  détente, and the maintenance 
of  the traditional security imperatives of  the Cold War, both in order to legitimise its 
anticommunist regime, and to secure the support of  the USA. It is clear that the new American 
policy, reconciliation with the PRC, was the major driving force of the Korean dialogue in 1972. 
In terms of a global Cold War, dominated by the United States and the two Communist giants, 
this first diplomatic contact of the Koreas was a part of larger movement in Sino-US and Soviet-
US negotiations. And partially, the growth of democratic movement in South Korea promoted 
the détente mood, as well.  
However, the Park regime did not regard the inter-Korean talks as the path to the end 
of the Cold War and a peaceful reunification of Korea, due to its mistrust of Kim Ilsung. 
Furthermore, the South Korean elites believed that such a lenient approach to Pyongyang could 
undermine the ideological basis for its rule, anticommunism. In fact, it is highly doubtful that 
South and North Korea really tried to talk about their common future. As Pyongyang did, Seoul 
did not recognise the counterpart as a potential partner. The South Korean leadership just paid 
attention to the talk itself, that is, the impact of this fake-détente action on the ROK-US and the 
ROK domestic politics. Both South and North Korea wanted to win the proverbial battle rather 
than make compromises or make a peace agreement, hence they could not narrow the gap 
through this series of talks. Through the dialogues, Seoul aimed to simultaneously appease the 
US desire for détente and keep American forces on its territory, while Pyongyang wanted to ease 
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Nixon‘s mind and drive out the US troops from South Korea. Without a doubt, the talks, or the 
so-called battle itself, rested on America‘s decision regarding its troops in the ROK.  The North 
Korean aggressive posture after July 1972 increasingly ruined the optimism of the Americans. 
The hostility between Seoul and Pyongyang further encouraged Park to ‗upgrade‘ his 
authoritarian rule and re-arm the South Korean public with anticommunism ideology in order to 
sustain the dialogue with mutual mistrust. 
 
(2) Yusin Reform: the setback in South Korean liberal policy 
 
On the 17th of October 1972, three months after the announcement of the ROK-
DPRK joint communiqué, the Park regime suddenly announced the Yusin reform.242 That same 
day, the ROK president declared a national emergency and made the following special measures:   
 
        First, the National Assembly shall be dissolved, and the activities of all political parties 
        and other political activities shall be suspended. Secondly, the Extraordinary State  
Council (hereafter ESC) will undertake the functions of the National Assembly. 
Thirdly, the ESC shall announce the draft amendments to the present Constitution 
with the view of peaceful unification of the nation.243 
 
Along with these emergent measures, on the 27th of October, the President, Park 
Chunghee, made constitutional changes. The essence of these changes is the indirect presidential 
election through the National Conference for Unification, which had the following three 
functions: (a) the election of the President, (b) to deliberate and decide the method for the 
reunification of Korea, and (c) to confirm appointed members of the National Assembly, who 
will be nominated by the President.244 These functions of the NCU served only Park and 
eliminated any chance for other presidential candidates, since any political activity of a political 
party within/for the Conference was not permitted. That is, the NCU only could nominate Park 
Chunghee for the ROK presidency in practice. This sudden action puzzled the US leaders as well 
as South Korean citizens, both of whom had found no reason for another coup by Park.  
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Regarding his action, Park remarked upon the unstable situation of South Korea. He 
indicated that there were too many different voices in the South in contrast to the North, and 
this division of public opinion would encourage Communist revolution attempts in the ROK. 
He argued that the new and ‗strict‘ institution would resolve the conflict in ROK politics over 
the inter-Korean dialogue and frustrate the North Korean ambition for revolution inside of 
South Korea under the banner of Communism.245 Despite his complex rhetoric, the essence of 
reform was simple, to allow lifetime tenure to the ROK president, and to get rid of all 
institutional checks against him in order to keep talking with Pyongyang. Although Park could 
extend his tenure with this reform, it appeared that he really believed that this was essential for 
further negotiation with Kim Ilsung.246 Philip Habib, the US ambassador to Seoul, reported to 
the US State Department that Park‘s action was preparation for the future inter-Korean relations 
in a new international environment and criticising it as ‗unnecessary‘ action.247 
The ROK leadership considered that democracy was not efficient for national interests. 
Shin Jongdae pointed this out, arguing that the South Korean president only thought about the 
efficiency of the institution for the mobilisation of national power, and ignored the idea and 
value of democracy.248 Simply, for Park, the democratic system was vulnerable to Communist 
propaganda. And, as North Korea intended, the joint communiqué of two Koreas encouraged 
domestic challenges toward the Park regime.249 Although the challenges from both conservative 
and liberal oppositions were not strong enough to repel Park - due to public support for the new 
policy and Park‘s contribution to it - the president considered that these challenges would 
threaten his post in the near future.250 For his main purposes, to maintain his post, Park had just 
two choices: to keep talking with Kim Ilsung and make the oppositions silent, or to stop 
negotiating with Pyongyang and hence prevent further challenges toward his rule. Park chose the 
first option because of the positive result of the Korean talks, e.g. the cease of North Korean 
military action against the South.251 
More importantly, in the international perspective, the South Korean leader attempted 
to keep American support for his country through this reform. He indicated that the Sino-US 
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reconciliation is the other reason for the institutional change.252 Park argued that the American 
rapprochement with China and the reduction of its troops in South Korea mounted the threat 
from the outside. And he dictated that South Korea should be re-structured for this national 
crisis. In the draft of the presidential proclamation for Yusin, the ROK president criticised that 
Sino-US relations in East Asia threatened South Korean security.253 Even though this direct 
condemnation of US policy was deleted due to American request, Park did mention that the 
détente mood among the great powers was fake, and the reason why he introduced a drastic 
institutional change. 
 
[…]There is now taking place a significant change in the balance of power among the 
big powers around the Korean peninsula. I think that this change may, directly or 
indirectly, bring forth a dangerous effect on the security of our country, because it 
might result in transforming the existing order in Asia as a whole and also threaten to 
affect adversely the security systems which have so far served as the effective backbone 
for maintaining the peace in this region.254 
 
This sounded like Washington had abandoned Seoul. The South Korean leader knew 
that Nixon was cautious in his diplomatic relations with Mao Zedong, and his drastic reform 
comprising criticism on Sino-US relations would irritate the US president. In that sense, the 
reform was blackmail from Park to Nixon. The South Korean leader wanted to make clear that 
he could do anything that adversely affected the Sino-US bilateral affairs if Nixon worked against 
South Korean interests, e.g. the withdrawal of US troops.255 Without the sponsorship of 
Washington, he would stop the inter-Korean talks, leading to the end of negotiations that 
ultimately would have a negative affect the US-Sino relations. The leader was assured that the 
White House would not reject his decision because of his role in the East-West reconciliation, an 
assumption that is supported by the American response to the South Korean national emergency 
in 1971 discussed in the previous chapter.256Basically, the Nixon administration was reluctant to 
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interfere in ROK domestic politics, and reserved itself to only making a negative comment on 
the overreaction of Park at the time.257 In short, Nixon aimed to keep American support for 
South Korea without significant deterioration in ROK-US bilateral relations.   
Park‘s criticism on US politics aimed to secure American support for South Korean 
security, but also revealed his strong antipathy toward détente.258 Clearly, nobody was able to 
guarantee that Nixon‘s liberal approach toward Beijing and Moscow would bring peace to the 
East Asia and Pacific region. In Park‘s sense, détente was another mode of Cold War. And he 
argued that South Korea must be organized as a military nation in order to win this odd form of 
war.259 The KCIA director agreed with Park. Lee Hurak who designed the Yusin institution said, 
 
        As I was in charge of inter-Korean talks, I could see our weakness [political challenges  
from oppositions]. Whenever I talked with North Koreans, they always mentioned  
that there are so many different ideas about [Korean] reunification method. When we  
had talks with North Korea, I never dreamt of Yusin. But I thought that we will be in  
trouble if there are too many different voices about reunification in South Korea.  
Hence I talked to my president, ―With this institution, it is difficult to talk with  
Pyongyang. We have to unify our public opinion.‖ …260 
 
Lee remembered that he suggested this to Park at the end of August, less than two 
months before Yusin Reform, and played a decisive role in its coming into effect261 Simply, the 
Park regime argued that the opposition leaders, especially Kim Daejung, hamstrung its efforts 
both for peaceful reunification and national security. In addition, the elites blamed Washington 
of abandoning South Korea in this critical situation. In Park‘s logic, the authoritarian and 
anticommunist reform was an essential task for South Korea‘s peace.262 However, ironically, this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ROK ministry of  foreign affairs, op. cit., 293- 298. 
In some sense, however, it is more exact to say that Washington was not able to check Park because of its domestic 
affairs: the timing of Yusin was did not fit into Nixon‘s busy schedule for him to be able to deal with this 
international issue seriously. The United States president was preparing the United States presidential election in 
November 1972. The ROK leader carefully managed his ‗coup‘ against Washington and chose the date of the D-day 
carefully: just three weeks before the Yusin announcement, Philippine president Fernando Marcos did establish a 
strict and authoritarian institution, and the Nixon administration did nothing. For this see Don Oberdorfer, op. cit., 
38. 
257 ―US Response to Korean Constitutional Revision,‖1972. 10.23, POL 15-3 KOR S 1-1-70, Box 2426, RG59, 
National Archives. 
258 Ma Sangyoon and Park Wongon, ―Détentegi‘eui Hanmi Galdeung: Nixon, Carter‘wa Park Chunghee [ROK-US 
Split in Détente Period: Nixon, Carter, and Park Chunghee].‖ Yeoksa bipyeong 86 (2009):. 123-4. 
259 Park Chunghee, op. cit., 247- 278. 
260 ―Lee Hurak Interview,‖ Shindonga, October 1987. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Park Chunghee, op. cit., 247- 278. 
  
116 
 
justification for Yusin was rejected by another KCIA official, Kang: 
 
         Did Park and Lee really initiate Yusin for ROK national security? 
         Definitely not! The institutional change was only for their power. They tried to keep  
their own power [through the new institution]. It was nothing but despotic measure  
which totally destroyed the South Korean democracy but worked for the Park  
regime.263 
 
Kang‘s testimony was astonishing.  KCIA was the core department of the new 
institution, and he was one of the important KCIA officials who managed North Korean affairs. 
In other words, he himself was responsible for this ‗despotic‘ measure, but did not justify his 
past in the way that Lee and Park did. It would be in part because the ROK is not currently 
under Park‘s rule any longer, so that he could frankly confess the fault of the Park regime 
without any political pressure. This is a very cynical criticism that undermines Park and Lee‘s 
justification for keeping the national security state in place.264Definitely, the North Korean threat 
was not a proper excuse for Park‘s authoritarian reform, made during the peak of détente in 
Korea.  
Furthermore, the other evidence negated Park‘s North Korean rhetoric for his reform.  
During his tea party with the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of 
Korea (UNCURK), Park asserted that Kim Ilsung gave up his ambition to conquer South Korea 
with military power.265 Secondly, in contrast to its rationale for Yusin, the ROK did its best to 
maintain contact with the DPRK. Apart from Park‘s real intention, his drastic movement could 
stimulate Kim Ilsung. Surprisingly, according to American sources, the South Korean 
government might have reported the details of Yusin reform to North Korea before 17th October. 
This intelligence report was supported by North Korean reaction. Pyongyang did not issue any 
serious criticism on Park‘s drastic action.266Additionally, the two Koreas had scheduled Red 
Cross talks in November. In this context, the North Korean threat was not as serious as the 
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South Korean elites highlighted. The decisive cause of Yusin, therefore, was neither the American 
policy nor the Communist threat. It was the aspiration of the Park regime for more a powerful 
and legitimated rule.267 The regime attempted to be free from any risk - from its own country 
(divided political parties, disoriented citizens), Communists, and even Washington, through the 
reform and inter-Korean talks. 
Due to its deep impact on South Korean politics and society, Yusin has often been seen 
as the result of inter-Korean exchanges and American abandonment. It is not correct at all to 
regard it as just a by-product of any new Northern policy of Seoul and Washington, nor as a 
domestic event. The reform was the origin of the South Korean conflict with the US and Japan 
in the mid- and late 1970s, and new competition between the South and the North. The strong 
anticommunist nature of the new Park regime resulted in a setback in its relations with allies, 
which increased contact with Communists. First, it undermined the US influence on ROK 
politics and interests in South Korea.268 In 1971, Nixon supported Kim Daejung during the 
ROK presidential campaign, which was a decisive factor pushing Park to talk with Kim Ilsung. 
As the general election was abolished by the new constitution, Washington could not control 
Seoul with its support for specific candidates, and the White House could not stop this reform 
due to inter-Korean talks that were a part of Sino-US diplomacy. 
Despite South Korea‘s dependence on American military power, Washington had a 
difficult time managing its client state.269Clearly, Nixon became more reluctant to converse with 
Park, and almost excluded South Korea from his main diplomatic partner list. He felt betrayed 
by his partner in Seoul. In September 1972, Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor, 
proposed a US-ROK summit meeting to Nixon, to discuss the Korean reunification issue and 
the presence of ROK troops in Vietnam until 1974 in order to develop the partnership between 
the two allies. The proposed date of summit talks was either before or after the US presidential 
election in November 1972.270 Yet it appeared that Nixon rejected Kissinger‘s proposal after 
                                                          
267 Ma Sangyoon, op.cit., 174. 
268 Hong Seokryul, Nixon Doctrine‟gwa Park Chunghee Yusincheje [Nixon Doctrine and Park Chunghee‟s Yusin institution]. 
(Seoul: Seohaemunjib, 2006), 81; Don Oberdorfer, op. cit., 41. 
269 For the studies discussing this international challenge to ROK politics in early 1970s, refer to: Bae Geungchan, 
1970nyeondae Jeonbangiui Gookjehwangeyong Byeonhwa‟wa Nambukgwangye [International Situation Changes and Relationship 
between the Two Koreas in First Half  of  1970s ], (Seoul: Baeksan Seodang company, 1999); Ma Sangyun, ―Anbo‘wa 
Minjujuyi, geurigo Bak Jeonghui‘ui gil [Security, Democracy and Park Chung Hee‖s Road: The Origins of  the 
Yushin System Revisited].” International Politics Collection of  Treatises 43 (2003); Shin Jongdae, ―Yusin‘cheje 
suribwonin‘e gwanhan jaejomyeong: Bukhanyoin‘ui yeonghyang‘ga dongwon‘eul jungsimeuro [The Renewed 
Discussion on the Causes of  Establishment of  Yusin Institution: Focusing on the impact of  North Korea factor 
and mobilization of  that].‖ Social Science Research, 13 (2004). 
270 Memorandum From the President‘s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,14 
September 1972, CO 78-2 Republic of Korea (South) 1969- 70, Box 48, White House Central Files, Nixon 
Presidential Materials, National Archives.  
  
118 
 
Park established his authoritarian rule and made his antagonism toward detente in October.  
Secondly, the reform undermined the ideological ground of Seoul and its two major 
allies. As discussed above, Park blamed both close Japanese and American relations with the 
Communists in the draft of the presidential proclamation of the new institution.271 Simply put, 
the Park regime described the present ROK as an isolated democratic country, which was 
fighting against the evil Communists on its own. Consequently, after reviewing the draft of Yusin 
Constitution before its announcement, both Japan and the US were upset with this sudden attack 
from Park and requested the ROK delete language critical of them.272 
South Korea had already prepared for this situation, so that it could easily manage the 
resistance from US and Japan without any hesitation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared 
answers to expected questions from US and/or oppositions officials that provided the rationale 
for institutional changes in the international context.273 Yet both Washington and Tokyo did not 
have any intention of following Park‘s hard-line anticommunism movement at this point. But 
because the reform was established by ROK national referendum, Nixon decided to keep silent 
about Yusin.274  
 The ROK fear and hostility toward the communists, well reflected by its reform, soured 
its relationship with Japan. In contrast to South Korea, which rejected the détente mood in East 
Asia, the Japanese government interpreted Nixon‘s visit to the PRC and the USSR as an 
opportunity to normalize its relationship with the communists. On 29th September 1972, Tokyo 
and Beijing signed a joint statement establishing diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC. 
According to Victor Cha, these developments made the South Korean commitment to Japanese 
defence unnecessary. Even further, its partnership with the ROK, an aggressive anticommunist 
country, was not helpful to its national security at that moment.275 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Japan‘s close ties with the ROK and Taiwan 
offended North Korea and the PRC. Japan was fully aware of those feelings and therefore 
limited its confrontational policy toward the North only to encourage Beijing and Moscow. 
Technically, its cooperation with the Park regime until the end of 1971 was the last resort for its 
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own security when the US tried to end its commitment to the safeguarding of East Asia.276 Later, 
Tanaka Kakuei succeeded Sato Eisaku, who actively worked for the Japanese partnership with 
the ROK and Taiwan in July 1972. The new PM started to talk with mainland China - an action 
that annoyed the ROK. The South Korean argued, ―Sino-Japan normalization would pave the 
path to Japanese-North Korean diplomatic and economic ties.‖277 As such, the ideological ties 
between Seoul and Tokyo became weak. 
Documents from the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs support this idea. The South 
Korean government considered that Japan tried to have a relationship with both South and 
North Korea in order to reduce tension with the communists and seek economic benefits by 
exporting goods to North Korea. A South Korean analysis of the Japanese ‗realpolitik‘ turned 
out to be extremely hostile. These documents did not hide its antagonism toward Japan‘s 
opportunistic behaviour in 1972. 278  However, this was the only the beginning of the 
deterioration of the ROK-Japanese relations, and in 1973 and 74, the relations between two East 
Asian allies became worst since they formed their alliance. 
Regarding the inter-Korean relations discussed above, Pyongyang intended to 
encourage the split in ROK politics through its talks with Seoul. The Yusin institution, which 
eliminated all potential threats to Park‘s rule in South Korean domestic politics, deprived the 
DPRK of one of its most important goals in its exchange with the ROK: destabilisation of the 
Park regime. Ironically, Park‘s efforts toward national security eliminated the interests the North 
Korean delegation favoured in the peace talks, and ultimately opened the new phase of military 
competition on the Korean Peninsula.279  
 In his interview with foreign journalists, Kim Ilsung clearly indicated the prerequisites 
for the Korean reunification. He said that the US imperialists had to return to their country, and 
the two Koreas should promote their political freedom. He criticized the deployment of US 
forces in South Korea, and asked the South to allow the progressive and liberal people to join 
the inter-Korean talks.280 However, in contrast to Kim‘s hope, the inter-Korean dialogue 
produced entirely different results. The constitutional change which legitimated Park‘s 
dictatorship clearly affected the North Korean idea about its peace approach toward Seoul, since 
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Pyongyang‘s aim - to promote the challenge of oppositions toward Park Chunghee - emerged as 
impossible due to Yusin reform.281 Furthermore, this drastic action checked Nixon‘s policy and 
prevented the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, which Pyongyang had always wished 
for.282 As a result, DPRK started to question the benefit from inter-Korean contact. 
Nonetheless, the DPRK did not make an instant change in its strategy toward South 
Korea, since it benefited from the by-product of the inter-Korean talks as well. As the South 
Korean elites indicated, Kim Ilsung sought to gain legitimacy for his regime from other countries 
using the inter-Korean exchanges.283 Washington also expected that many countries in the UN 
would recognise the DPRK due to the inter-Korean talks.284 Even though the ROK did not yet 
recognise North Korea as a sovereign state, the international society considered DPRK a 
legitimated state due to the inter-Korean political exchanges, which clearly recognised two 
Koreas on the Korean Peninsula.285  
The role of the DPRK in the détente between the two Communist giants, the PRC and 
USSR, along with the US through inter-Korean talks, became more prominent than before. In 
terms of international politics, Pyongyang benefited much more from the negotiations than 
Seoul did. Before the two Koreas started to talk, South Korea had relations with many more 
countries than the North. However, the inter-Korean dialogues changed this situation. Whereas 
the ROK did not make any considerable progress in diplomacy with the Communist states in 
spite of its efforts, North Korea could make a significant number of diplomatic relations with 
capitalist countries.286 For this reason, Pyongyang might have just deferred to stop inter-Korean 
talks, as they were no longer valid for its primary purpose. 
In short, the development of inter-Korean relations and the US rapprochement with 
China pushed the Park regime to re-structure the political system of South Korea. Seemingly, 
Park did believe that the ROK needed to restrict any political movement that could support Kim 
Ilsung in South Korea, while assuring his lifetime tenure with this Yusin ‗reform.‘ The drastic 
institutional re-organization, therefore, was the product of Park‘s realistic politics that met the 
new international environment and aspiration for the political power. This new institution, 
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however, strongly limited the development of liberal and progressive ideas for the inter-Korean 
relations, and hence failed to work for the Korean nationalistic aim of the reunification of Korea. 
Therefore, the Yusin reform was not merely the result of a new South Korean policy toward 
North Korea, but also the cause of a new military conflict with the DPRK. The strong 
anticommunist spirit of Park through such actions also confirmed the gap in policy toward 
communism between Seoul and its two closest allies, Washington and Tokyo, and soured their 
relations.  
 
(3) The renewal of confrontation in Korea and reconciliation with the allies, 1973- 74 
 
In 1973 and 74, despite its continuous efforts to maintain the peace behind hostility on 
the Korean Peninsula, South Korea failed to make Kim Ilsung stay at the table. Pyongyang 
increasingly lost its interests in the dialogue, which only restrained its military measures, and did 
not make any change in the balance of the two Koreas. Specifically, Kim was deeply 
disappointed with Nixon‘s decision to leave the US troops in the ROK, and Park‘s domination 
of South Korean politics. Indeed, along with the US decision, the suppression on the liberal 
politician, Kim Daejung, was North Korea‘s primary reason to end the Korean talks. The ROK 
was forced to return its confrontational policy toward the DPRK after Pyongyang unilaterally 
stopped the dialogue. Besides, the ROK faced serious setbacks in its diplomacy after its new 
authoritarian institution strongly rejected the common idea of its two allies, Japan and the US, 
about détente. It is noteworthy that the two powers were still in the détente mood with the 
communists in 1973 while Seoul returned to the Cold War. The discrepancy between the South 
and its two allies was well demonstrated by their reaction toward KCIA‘s abduction of Kim 
Daejung from Japan. The Blue House was condemned by its two allies for that political crime 
and its ‗misperception,‘ in the international environment.  
However, the second North Korean campaign against the South, the American 
hardship in Southeast Asia, and limitation in its negotiations with Moscow and Beijing 
increasingly encouraged the reunion of the three allies. Coupled with their disappointing progress 
in the diplomatic discussion with the PRC and the USSR, the North Korean threat led Japan and 
the US to reconcile with the ROK. Gerald R. Ford, who replaced Nixon in August 1974, gave 
his best effort to keep the stability of his East Asian allies and helped in the settlement of the 
dispute between the ROK and Japan in the Cold War rhetoric. In spite of the widespread 
hostility toward the despotic South Korean president in the US Congress, the new US leader 
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visited South Korea and revived the partnership against communists.287 The years of 1973 and 
74 marked the transitional period in which the ROK conflicted with its allies due to their 
discrepancy in the Cold War strategy, and so they adjusted their ideas in order to meet their 
common security interests. The ROK quickly returned to its fierce battle with the Communists, 
and the other two countries slowly but surely prepared the next phase of the Cold War in this era.    
After the enforcement of the Yusin institution, Kim Daejung strongly questioned Park‘s 
draconian reform and his success in his Northern policy 1972. The democratic activist 
denounced the South Korean president that he abused South Korean people‘s aspiration for 
national reunification for his own political power.288 Despite South Korea‘s drastic change, the 
two Koreas did not halt their talks immediately. Pyongyang‘s silence even helped Park.  Some 
conservative groups, such as the Korea Veteran Association (KVA), extolled Park‘s conservative 
reform as a valiant endeavour for the Korean nation. The South Korean press had a similar 
response; one newspaper introduced the KVA‘s support for Park and even called Yusin „the 
reform orienting a peaceful reunification.‘289 Kim Daejung lamented the death of the ROK 
democracy as well as such an optimism widely spread in the ROK public. 
 
This opinion [the positive viewpoint of the South Koreans toward Yusin] was clearly 
introduced in the newspapers. This was the most painful situation to me. It appeared 
that I had isolated myself [from ROK society]. Yet I expressed my belief that the Park 
regime‘s aim is not to establish national reunification but to prolong its rule. And he 
[Park] is just using the national justification [reunification] for this. And my belief was 
proved true.290 
 
As Kim argued, Park‘s reform was not helpful for the national unity of Korea at all. In 
fact, the two Koreas had not produced any significant agreement since late 1972.291 Evidently, 
the series of inter-Korean meetings by the South-North Adjusting Committee ended with a huge 
gap between two brothers in the process for reunification. Unlike Lee Hurak who strongly 
advocated the necessity of political exchanges between the governments, Park limited the 
exchanges between the two Koreas on the civil level, e.g. the activities for reunion of separated 
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families in South and North Korea.292 Coupled with the American decision to end the pullout 
plan, the cautious approach of stability in the ROK eliminated North Korean interests in the 
exchanges. In this situation, for Pyongyang, which wanted to divide the South Korean society, 
Kim‘s resistance toward Park was a very important reason to maintain its contact with Seoul, 
since the liberal and democratic activist encouraged the domestic resistance against the Park 
regime.   
       Both in Japan and the US, Kim Daejung was actively working with Japanese leftists and 
condemned Park‘s draconian rule. Kim argued that Tokyo and Washington would have to stop 
their support for Seoul in order to revive South Korean democracy. He met Dr. Jerome A. 
Cohen, the first American academic to visit the DPRK in 1972, and asked Cohen to urge the 
White House to stop providing aid to the ROK.293 Kim Daejung‘s anti-Yusin movement 
stimulated the Park regime and the KCIA. And the ROK government did not allow him to 
continue his resistance out of Korea. Not surprisingly, he was not safe even though he was in 
Japan. In 1973, the organization decided to punish Kim.       
On 24th July 1973, the KCIA spy ship, Yonggeum ho, departed from Busan for Osaka. On 
29th July, the ship arrived in Osaka. Five sailors including two KCIA agents were charged with 
abducting Kim Daejung. From Osaka, they drove to Tokyo. On 8th August, Kim was abducted 
by two unidentified assailants in the Palace hotel in Tokyo. The next day, he was loaded into the 
KCIA spy ship by the KCIA agents. The ship headed to Busan. However, the Japanese police 
identified that the Blue House was involved in this criminal act when they found a fingerprint 
left by First Secretary Kim Dongwoon, at the ROK embassy in Tokyo.294 
It was reported to Park on the same day that Kim had been kidnapped. According to 
Cho Kabje who interviewed various persons under Park Chunghee at that time, Park was 
surprised by the report. Cho argued that Park was not the one who directed the KCIA 
mission.295 It is clear that the KCIA director, Lee Hurak, was the one who had been directly 
involved in this action. Park negated his involvement.  He even assumed that Kim Daejung 
planned this incident by himself in order to slander Park. 296  However, Habib, the US 
ambassador, nullified Park‘s argument and indicated that Park ―explicitly or implicitly‖ approved 
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Lee‘s plan. In his telegram to Washington, Habib affirmed that Park was in charge of this 
terrorism. 
 
[…] The Kim case has had a corrosive effect on the Korean domestic scene and the 
image of the Park government abroad. The kidnapping itself, Kim‘s surfacing in Seoul 
and the subsequent domestic events still unfolding have heightened internal ROKG 
rivalries and are illuminating the increasingly authoritarian, coercive nature of the Park 
government, particularly its reliance on the police agencies as the essential instrument 
for the exercise of political power. […] In actual fact, the kidnapping was the act of 
the ROK CIA, certainly under the direction of Yi Hu-rak [Lee Hurak] and, probably 
with explicit or implicit approval of President Park. […]297 
 
The US ambassador was informed of Kim‘s kidnapping on 8th August as well. He 
immediately ordered his aides to find out where the victim was.  The next morning, informed 
that KCIA had seized Kim Daejung, Habib contacted the Blue House. It seems that the US 
embassy was able to prevent Kim from being murdered by the agents, as he returned to Seoul on 
13 August.298 Kim, one of the most influential rivals of Park, was back in the ROK, but under 
house arrest.  
There are many unclear points in this event, but its implications and impact are very 
clear. First and foremost, the relationship between the ROK and Japan was deteriorated further. 
The ROK government did not negate its infringement on Japanese sovereignty and delivered a 
statement of regret. However, due to South Korean hostility against Japanese relations with the 
communists and historical animosity, the ROK government did not accept the Japanese request 
to return Kim Daejung to Japan and to let Japan investigate Kim Dongwoon, the first secretary 
at the ROK embassy in Tokyo whose fingerprint was detected in the Grand Palace hotel.299 And 
the statement of regret itself was only given to Japan after its lengthy brawl with South Korea. 
The South Korean government forcefully closed Yomiuri Shinbum local offices in Seoul on 24 
August, 1973 for its report implicating the KCIA involvement in the political kidnapping. In 
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response to this, the government of Japan recalled its ambassador from Seoul for consultation.300 
According to the ROK official documents about this incident, even opposition parties expressed 
their hostility toward Japan while criticising the KCIA and the Park regime. They even blamed 
the Japanese government of not checking Kim‘s political activities against the ROK 
government.301 But the ROK leadership needed Japanese funds, and so made a compromise 
with Japan by delivering a statement of regret.302 Yet this split between the two allies completely 
nullified their efforts for mutual interests between 1969 and 1971. Without any doubt, both 
Seoul and Tokyo refused to understand each other‘s mindset. For Japanese perspective, South 
Korea just attempted to destroy the peace in East Asia.   
Washington, which bridged these two countries in the 1960s, was also concerned about 
the conflict. The US embassy reported to the White House that the Blue House utilised the 
national hostility and Cold War rhetoric toward Japan in order to restrain Japanese protest. The 
US ambassador believed that the ROK strategy worked successfully and prevented the worst 
case, the end of diplomatic relations.303 However, this does not mean that the United States 
accepted South Korea‘s aggressive approach toward communists. 
Due to this incident and the Yusin reform, Washington was further disappointed with 
Park and questioned his reliability. His political adventure increasingly irritated Washington. For 
Nixon, it was Park Chunghee who most likely could break down the peace in East Asia. 
Accordingly, the US should have checked Park‘s excessive behaviour but could not. Washington 
could not use its ultimate card to control the ROK (the withdrawal of US forces in South Korea) 
because of its decision made in April to stay. Moreover, the White House was well aware that the 
Park regime would take any action to damage the American relations with the communists if 
Nixon tried to punish Park. Due to the realistic concern of Washington, the excessive action of 
                                                          
300 ―Seoul reported mollifying Tokyo over kidnapping‖ Japan Times, 1 September. 1973; and New York Times, 1st  
September.1973.  
301 ―Kidnapping of  Kim Daejung, 1973‖ 1973- 74, Vol.4 National Assembly hearings, Class Number 701, 
Diplomatic Archives, Republic of  Korea. There is another interesting point in this discussion at the National 
Assembly. Many participants including members of  NDP criticized Kim for his anti-government activities abroad as 
he tarnished South Korean reputation. This is confusing. Why did NDP members condemn their leader? However, 
as I already indicated before, there were two different factions in this party. The party was a coalition between liberal 
and conservative minor parties in fact. The members who stood against Kim were conservatives that competed with 
Kim‘s liberal faction. Since 1972 when Kim moved to Japan, his oppositions dominated NDP. That‘s why the 
participants from the party in this discussion did not advocate Kim Daejung. Regarding the intra-party competition 
within NDP, see chapter 2 of  this thesis or Kim Daejung, Kim, Daejung, Hangdong‟haneun Yangsim [My Fight for 
Democracy in Korea], (Seoul: Geumundang Publishing, 2009).      
302 Richard Halloran, ―Tokyo and Seoul Harden Positions,‖ Japan Times, 10 October. 1973.  
303 ―The Kim Dae-jung case-an overview,‖ Secret, Cable, 10 October, 1973, Japan and the United States., 1960- 
1976, Item Number: JU01813. Department of  state, National Security Archive. Habib‘s analysis could be wrong: 
some argue that the ROK government gained approval from Japanese government in advance and even provided a 
great amount of  money to the Japanese Prime Minister, Tanaka Kakuei. If  this is the case, the Japanese government 
just pretended to push the ROK government. See Kim Hyosoon, op. cit.    
  
126 
 
Seoul was not properly checked.304 
Park was well aware of the animosity in US politics toward his aggressive behaviour 
and might have thought he could not recover his popularity in the US.305 This gap between the 
two allies was demonstrated by ROK‘s decision during the first oil crisis starting in October 1973. 
The members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries proclaimed an oil 
embargo in response to the American support to Israel.306 OAPEC stopped supplying oil to 
South Korea, an ally of US. However, Park decided to disassociate the ROK from the American 
Middle East policy and even assured Arab states that the ROK-US relationship has been soured 
in order to secure the oil supply from the Middle East.307 For this, the KCIA restricted the ROK 
press that released biased news about the Middle East War.308 This could be criticized as 
opportunistic diplomacy, but demonstrates how the ROK-US relationship had been deteriorated 
compared to the Lyndon Johnson era, when South Korea decided to dispatch its troops to 
Vietnam and had gained enthusiastic support from Washington.  
In contrast to the two allies of Seoul, Pyongyang made an extreme response to Kim‘s 
tragedy. On 28th August, the North Korean vice premier as well as Kim Ilsung‘s younger brother, 
Kim Youngju delivered a statement on North Korean television and criticized the director of the 
KCIA for his violent action. This second most powerful man in the DPRK was a co-chairman in 
the South-North Adjusting Committee together with Lee Hurak. The North Korean vice 
premier declared that he could not work with such an oppressive person.309 Yet the DPRK 
actually just wanted to stop talking with the ROK. Eventually, Park dismissed Lee from all 
official positions on 3rd December 1973, but this did not influence any change on the North 
Korean decision on 28th August.310 
It is noteworthy that Pyongyang stopped negotiations with Seoul right after the incident 
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was revealed. Some authors and the ROK government argue that KCIA‘s abduction of Kim 
merely provided a good justification to the North who wanted to stop any inter-Korean 
negotiation and return to its old confrontational policy toward the South. ROK‘s logic sounds 
reasonable. Pyongyang noticed that it could not raise any significant challenge against the Park 
regime after the ROK adopted a new institution. Therefore, the political lynchpin to democratic 
activists, the Yusin reform, might have been used by Kim Ilsung to stop his talks with Park.311 
However, this is not exact in some sense. Kim Daejung was in Japan and actively worked for 
anti-Yusin movements there. For Pyongyang, which wanted to divide the South Korean society, 
Kim‘s existence itself was a very important reason to maintain its contact with Seoul. That is, 
after Kim was abducted from Tokyo, and therefore could not challenge Park, the DPRK lost 
one of its most significant reasons to talk with the ROK. Already, Pyongyang had lost the other 
goal of its negotiations with Seoul, as Washington officially cancelled its withdrawal schedule of 
the US armed forces from South Korea.312 
However, Kim Daejung‘s persecution was not the only reason for this breakdown, even 
though Pyongyang, through this incident, had reached the limits of its patience.313 Kim Youngju 
also mentioned that Park Chunghee‘s statement on 23rd June, 1973 was not tolerable by the 
Korean people because Park intended the permanent division of Korea.314 The so called ―6.23 
declaration‖ or ―Diplomatic Policy Proclamation for Peaceful Unification of 23rd June, 1973‖ 
confirmed that the ROK government did not oppose the DPRK‘s application to join UN, and 
that the two Koreas could not intervene in each other‘s internal affairs. It means that the ROK de 
facto recognised the two Koreas on the Korean Peninsula.315 At first glance, North Korea‘s 
negative response to this realpolitik of the Blue House seems irrational.  Pyongyang could have 
created more and better chances to have diplomatic relations with other countries resulting from 
this decision. Yet, seemingly, it was South Korea‘s efforts to maintain the negotiations which did 
not make any progress in the reunification debates for Korea.  
But Park‘s idea was tricky for the following reasons: since the joint communiqué in July 
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1972, the DPRK had already established diplomatic relations with a lot of Western countries. 
Furthermore it joined the World Health Organization of the UN in May 1973 even before Park 
declared his new idea.316 In other words, the ROK‘s ‗new‘ policy toward the DPRK was only 
recognition of the existing reality. Even worse, this policy could limit Pyongyang‘s propaganda to 
the South because those two Koreas had no justification to intervene in each other‘s politics if 
they recognised each other as a legitimate sovereign entity. Moreover, the DPRK did not want to 
lose its influence in inter-Korean competition or negotiations. Pyongyang might have considered 
that it could not destabilise South Korea under Park‘s tight control after Kim Daejung was 
emasculated by KCIA in Japan.317 
The North Korean leadership was disappointed with the result of the dialogue. It 
expected that Washington would withdraw all of its forces from South Korea, but there was no 
exchange between Seoul and Washington about this issue. 318  The Nixon administration 
considered that further reduction of US forces from South Korea could break the balance 
between the two Koreas and end the peace on the Korean Peninsula.319 This pushed Pyongyang 
to return to its hostile strategy. In the second half of 1973, the DPRK resumed its military 
provocations against the ROK which reached their peak in 1974. 
After announcing the end of negotiations with the ROK, the DPRK slowly but surely 
raised the tension on the Korean Peninsula. In October 1973, the North Korean navy started to 
carry out provocative actions in the contiguous waters off the West Sea (or Yellow Sea) of the 
Korean peninsula. In December, North Korea claimed that the waters contiguous to the group 
of five islands - under the military control of the UN command, off the west coast of South 
Korea - were within its own sovereign coastal waters. Pyongyang also noticed that it would take 
―proper steps‖ against the vessels sailing to the area without its permission. Seoul was furious 
with North Korea‘s provocative actions and solidified their beliefs that the DPRK did not have 
any intention to abide by the joint communiqué of 1972.320 
Nonetheless, this did not end Park‘s efforts for the inter-Korean relations. On 16th 
November 1973, Henry Kissinger visited Seoul on his way back from China. For four and half 
hours, the US National Security Advisor explained the result of his talks with Chinese elites and 
Nixon‘s visit to Beijing in 1972. Unlike his president who maintained a bad relationship with 
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Park, Kissinger continuously attempted to calm down the aggressive South Korean president and 
assured Park an American military support for South Korea. And the National Security Advisor 
recommended the ROK president keep his negotiation with Kim Ilsung.321    
With American support, the Park regime made continuous efforts to resume the inter-
Korean dialogue. Immediately after Park-Kissinger meeting, the South requested that the North 
resume the Red Cross talks and the South-North Adjusting Committee meeting.322 In January 
1974, the ROK president even proposed a non-aggression agreement to Pyongyang during a 
beginning-of-the-year press conference.323 But these proposals were utterly ignored by the 
DPRK. On 15th February, North Korean naval vessels ambushed South Korean fishing boats in 
the West Sea. They killed the poor South Korean fishermen and abducted the survivors.324 
South Korean elites realized that their efforts were totally useless. Park Chunghee condemned 
Kim Ilsung‘s ambition and provocative actions on 23rd June 1974, one year after he made ―6.23 
Declaration.‖ He assured South Korean citizens that they must be armed with the principles of 
anticommunism.325 However, it was Park himself that resulted in the new rivalry between the 
two Koreas, and he was not able to manage the North Korean provocation properly. Since the 
Yusin institution established his own dictatorship, everything had gone bad. Kim Daejung argued 
against Park‘s rule to Japan, leading to his kidnapping. However, the nightmare had just begun. 
The most tragic event of the new inter-Korean rivalry happened only two months later, on the 
happiest Korean anniversary that celebrated Korea‘s liberation from Japanese rule.   
On 15th August 1974, Park Chunghee delivered a speech at the National Theatre of the 
ROK. At some moment, a young man ran down the aisle of the theatre and fired gunshots at the 
stage where Park, his wife, his aides, and choirs were. The president quickly ducked down behind 
a lectern on stage, which saved his life, but his wife did not. Yook Youngsoo, the ROK first lady 
and beloved one by the South Korean people for her good deeds, was shot and fatally wounded. 
She was quickly moved to the hospital but died soon after. The assassin, Moon Sekwang, was a 
Korean resident living in Japan and pretended to be a Japanese VIP invited to the 8.15 
Ceremony at the National Theatre. It appeared that he was trained and instructed to kill Park by 
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a pro-North Korean group in Japan, Jochongnyeon. According to South Korean official documents, 
Moon was a twenty-two-year-old South Korean resident of Osaka and entered the ROK with a 
fake Japanese passport. He had used a pistol stolen from an Osaka police station.326 Moon 
Sekwang‘s terrorism proved that North Korea had changed its strategy again and had resumed 
its military campaign against the South. Along with Pyongyang‘s provocation in the West Sea of 
the ROK, this event completely concluded the ―détente‖ on the Korean Peninsula.  
This incident tested the ROK-Japan-US relations once again. This second ROK-
Japanese Crisis in 1970s was far more influential on alliance politics than the first one. It 
scratched the ROK-Japanese bilateral relations, not fully recovered from the first impact in 1973. 
As it did in the last year, the Blue House questioned Japanese responsibility to anti-ROK groups 
in Japan. For the ROK, Japan was a centre of reactionaries and had to properly restrict their 
activities towards its ally. South Korea even demanded an official ―apology‖ from Japan for this 
tragic incident. Tanaka Kakuei, the Japanese prime minister, did not accept this demand.327 The 
government of Japan neither admitted its responsibility for this occasion, nor condemned the 
DPRK, since it did not want to agitate North Korea. Moreover, the Tanaka administration 
argued that the Yusin institution was the ultimate cause of this incident.328 That is, Japan focused 
on Moon himself, and his personal beliefs against Park‘s draconian rule, rather than on the one‘s 
supporting him. Hence Japan was reluctant to cooperate with the ROK to instigate and punish 
Jochongnyeon. This neutral Japanese attitude greatly annoyed Park, who had just lost his wife, and 
was furious with Kim Ilsung for pulling strings behind pro-North Korean groups in Japan.  
Park implied that the ROK would terminate diplomatic relations with Japan unless 
Tanaka accepts his demands, to apologize for this incident and monitor the North Korean 
community in Japan.329Nonetheless, Japan did not make its decision quickly because of its deep 
national pride. 330 With American arbitrations, this case was settled on 19th September. Japan 
dispatched a special envoy, Shiina Essaburo, a vice-president of the Japanese LDP, to express 
―regret‖ over the assassination attempt, rather than to ―apologise‖ for it. Shiina also provided a 
note verbale that the government of Japan would monitor anti-ROKG groups in Japan. Yet he did 
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not mention Jochongnyeon at all.331 Clearly, the Tanaka regime did resist Park‘s demands but made 
a minimum yield. However, it is noteworthy that this serious incident did not result in the end of 
the alliance, and even concluded without further deterioration of their relations. 
One interesting and important point is that both Seoul and Tokyo were reluctant to 
publicise their exchanges about Kim Daejung and Moon Sekwang incidents and closed the cases 
as quickly as possible.332Although the allies confirmed their fundamental differences in their Cold 
War mindset through the bitter experiences, both countries still reminded the benefit of their 
alliance. 333  Simply put, both Seoul and Tokyo attempted to keep their relations for the 
resumption of Cold War –which revived in Korea already- despite their mutual hatred. 
In that sense, the new rivalry on the Korean Peninsula was one of the triggers of the 
demise of the détente in the East Asia. Even though Tokyo did not agree to the ROK‘s 
argument that the détente was a fake, it was aware of the communist threat existing in the north. 
The Cold War rhetoric still remained in the Japanese mind. Clearly, Japan did not entirely trust 
its communist neighbours and recognised the role of South Korea in the East Asian security. 
Tokyo‘s fear of Beijing and Moscow was confirmed very soon. Because of Soviets‘ aggression in 
Africa, Middle East, and Eurasia and painful and slow process of Sino-US negotiation, South 
Korea‘s two major allies, the United States and Japan, recognised the frailty of detente.334 After 
Saigon collapsed in April 1975, Tokyo quickly resumed the cooperation with South Korea in 
order to prevent the aggression of the Communists.335    
In contrast to Japan, the United States changed its mindset and supported Park‘s new 
struggle against the North already in the latter half of 1974. Richard Nixon‘s resignation due to 
the Watergate scandal, and Gerald Ford‘s inauguration, mitigated Park‘s insecurities to some 
extent. In contrast to his predecessor, Nixon - as well as his successor Jimmy Carter - Ford 
maintained a good relationship with Park. Despite his short term in office, Ford spent much of 
his time trying to take care of Park and stabilizing South Korea.336  
Facing Soviet expansionism in the Third World and Chinese reluctance to process Sino-
US normalisation because of Taiwan, Washington reviewed its Cold War strategy and decided to 
strengthen the bond with South Korea.337 Before Ford visited Japan, USSR, and Korea in 
November 1974, Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, clarified the US approach toward 
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South Korea. He emphasised security over human rights issues, and the Park regime was 
satisfied with his comment and Washington‘s conciliatory gesture to Seoul.338 The new US 
president visited Seoul on 22nd November 1974 and reassured the American commitment to the 
ROK, endlessly challenged by North Korean threats throughout the year.339    
Just a week before the American president‘s visit to Seoul, on 15th November 1974, a 
nine-man Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) civil police squad from the United Nations Command 
found North Korean underground tunnels inside the southern sector of the DMZ. The squad 
came under some 300 rounds of automatic weapons fire. There were no casualties sustained, but 
this underground war further mounted the level of insecurity. The Blue House renounced the 
DPRK‘s violation of the armistice agreement and its aggressive schemes against the South.340 
Simply, the year of 1974 was full of military provocations by the North. At this moment, 
Kissinger‘s emphasis on security and Ford‘s visit to Seoul, and his personal reassurance of the 
US commitments on 22th and 23th November, encouraged South Korea. Nonetheless, because 
the Americans did not offer any tangible defence commitments in Vietnam, Ford‘s credit for his 
efforts in South Korea were limited.341  
Korea‘s very short détente ended with bitter military conflicts and terrorism. Until the 
early half of 1974, South Korea‘s drastic way back to its war against the Communists made it 
hard to gain the political supports from its allies, the US and Japan, both of which kept a decent 
relationship with the Communists. The two incidents in 1973 and 74 and South Korea‘s Middle 
East policy during the First Oil Shock clearly demonstrated the gap between the ROK and its 
two allies in their Cold War perception in this era. During the ROK-Japan conflicts over the two 
political events, they hardly narrowed their discrepancy down, mainly because of South Korea‘s 
staunch stance of anticommunism.  It quickly closed every window to all Communists once it 
faced the North Korean threat again, while Washington and Tokyo put far more emphasis on 
the PRC and the Soviets than the DPRK. Both Capitalist powers did not think that the 
aggressive policy of Pyongyang toward Seoul necessarily meant the end of détente in the region. 
As a result, South Korea continued its lonely war against ‗the Communists‘ throughout 1974. 
Despite this unidentified difference in their concept of anticommunism, however, Seoul and its 
two allies re-thought their security interests together after late 1974, when all of them observed 
the limited participation in the détente from Vietnam. In that sense, John Lewis Gaddis argued 
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that the détente froze the cold war, not end it.342 And Park believed what Gaddis maintained.  
In conclusion, during the period from 1972 to 1974, South Korea‘s relationship with 
North Korea dramatically changed. In 1972, the reunification of the two Korean nations was 
almost reached. On 4th July, Park Chunghee and Kim Ilsung surprised international onlookers, as 
well as their own citizens, with their joint communiqué that advocated a peaceful national 
reunification based on Korean initiatives. Through the communiqué, they agreed that they would 
cooperate in order to reunite Korea, and to stop threatening each other. However, in reality 
‗reunification‘ was never the goal of either camp. Mainly, they wanted to be victorious over one 
another in the ‗war without gunfire.‘ Therefore, the détente mood, which had reached its peak in 
July 1972, could not be sustained.  
Despite the gap between the two Koreas, the peace talks seemed welcomed by both 
sides. The ROK wanted to keep the US armed forces on its soil, prevent every North Korean 
military provocation, and gain time for a modernization programme of its military forces. As 
Park argued, the ROK needed more time to stand against the DPRK.343 Clearly, Park did resist 
the new American policy in 1971, but he used it for his own goal in 1972, to gain time for the 
strengthening of the economy and military forces. The DPRK was also willing to reduce the 
tension on the Korean Peninsula in order to encourage Washington to withdraw all of its forces. 
Along with this primary aim through the talks, Pyongyang also wanted to support the liberal 
voice in the South to divide South Korean politics into two extremes, the liberal and the 
conservative. Park was well aware of Kim Ilsung‘s intention, and intended to utilize the North 
Korean threat to strengthen his rule. He quickly made a serious decision in order to exclude the 
liberals, especially Kim Daejung, from inter-Korean exchanges. 
In October 1972, Park got rid of any political challenge to his rule and constituted his 
dictatorship through the institution of the Yusin constitution. Moreover, the US was reluctant to 
withdraw its forces from the ROK because North Korea requested the withdrawal from the US 
in aggressive manner after July 1972. As a result, Kim Ilsung lost a chance to attain his aims. 
Park‘s drastic reform and his own political ambition ruined North Korea‘s willingness to 
negotiate with the South. The DPRK finally decided to stop talking with the ROK when Kim 
Daejung was abducted by the KCIA in 1973. South Korea continuously requested peace talks 
toward the North, but the request was ignored. The new military competition between the two 
Koreas was inevitable. In this sense, South Korea‘s Northern policy was forced to return to its 
previous confrontational policy. Park proved his own belief that détente was a fake. But the 
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problem was that he was unable to make his allies agree because Washington and Tokyo were 
still believed in the capabilities of the détente.   
The ROK‘s diplomacy with its allies also suffered a considerable setback. The Yusin 
institution, the draconian and anticommunist measures taken to prevent any threat to the Park 
regime, resulted in a drastic deterioration of the ROK-Japan and ROK-US relations. The conflict 
between the ROK and Japan was unavoidable because of the differences between their 
recognition of détente. First of all, South Korea‘s harsh criticism on Japanese relations with 
Moscow and Beijing quickly soured the ROK-Japan relations. In addition, The Kim Daejung and 
Moon Sekwang incident incited the hostility of both nations toward each other again and almost 
broke down the relationship. Clearly, Seoul returned to Cold War quickly while Japan continued 
its diplomatic efforts to ease the tension in the East Asia.344 Yet the two allies kept their alliance 
despite their deep antagonism. Japan was not sure that détente ended the Cold War, and still 
needed its partnership with South Korea for its military power. For this reason, as Lee Wanbum 
argues, the two allies agreed to keep silent on the Kim and Moon incidents, and prevent further 
deterioration of their relations.345 Still, their common interest in the regional security worked for 
their bilateral relations and provided them the potential to recover their partnership in the post-
Vietnam era.  
For the United States, the Yusin reform and the kidnapping of Kim were indirect 
challenges to its authority as a patron of the ROK. As Park clearly indicated that the Sino-US 
negotiation was one of the main reasons of his drastic action, Washington clearly grasped Park‘s 
antagonism against US policy. 346  However, despite its deep disappointment with Seoul‘s 
outrageous reaction against US global strategy, the White House did not frustrate the South 
Korean president‘s efforts. Moreover, Nixon did nothing but rescue Kim Daejung from death in 
1973.  Washington could not check Seoul effectively due to South Korea‘s role in the East-
West reconciliation, but instead excluded Seoul from its decision making process.347 As a result, 
the Park regime rejected the American Middle East policy during the first oil shock in 1973. 
Considering the ROK-US relations in the 1950s and 60s, the split between Seoul and 
Washington in their Middle East policies reaffirmed that South Korea‘s reliance on the United 
States had decreased during the Nixon era. 
However, because of the American hardship in its diplomacy with communists and 
the war in the Southeast Asia, the Ford administration re-considered the strategic importance of 
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South Korea in late 1974, and restored the ROK-US relations. The White House started to 
return to its confrontation with communists as the Blue House did early in 1973348 However, 
Washington still needed more time to understand Park‘s true concept of anticommunism was 
merely ―anti- North Koreanism‖ and refused to provide any tangible commitment on South 
Korean ground right after its Vietnam mission was ended up with bitter failure. And both allies 
continued their discussion of anticommunism with the demise of Saigon and the development of 
a South Korean nuclear weapon in 1975. 
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Chapter IV: The Post- Vietnam Crisis and Demise of the Park regime, 1975- 1979 
 
The collapse of  South Vietnam in 1975 opened up a new phase of  the Cold War for 
Korea. The general concern of  Seoul was that South Korea could be another South Vietnam. 
According to his speech and diary entries on 30th April 1975, Park Chunghee considered that the 
defeat of  the United States and its allies in Indochina would inspire North Korea to become 
more aggressive.1 His point was correct to some extent: Pyongyang was inspired by the success 
of  Hanoi‘s Communist mission. But the victory of  North Vietnam did not result in another 
Korean War. According to Don Oberdorfer‘s interview with PRC and Soviet officials, Kim 
Ilsung visited the PRC during April 1975 and expressed his intention to capture Seoul under the 
banner of  the Red Army, just as his North Vietnamese comrades had done before. However, 
Chinese leaders rejected his idea, which they did not consider realistic. Even the Kremlin 
opposed Kim‘s new hostile Southern policy.2 In short, the victory of  North Vietnam could not 
motivate any collective action among Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang directed toward Seoul.  
Nonetheless, it was still true that the defeat of  the US in Southeast Asia undermined 
South Korea‘s position in the Cold War, and weakened the political basis of  Park Chunghee‘s 
anticommunist policy. First and foremost, the collapse of  Saigon was serious enough to 
destabilise Park‘s trust in his patron, the White House. In various media, he argued the American 
pullout from Vietnam ruined Saigon.3 The major concern of  the ROK government was 
definitely American post-Vietnam policy and its impact on South Korean security. Since 
Washington was not able to guarantee any concrete military support to ROK, Seoul tried to find 
its own solution for the inter-Korean conflict, e.g., the acquisition of  nuclear weapons. Seoul‘s 
intent to develop nuclear weapons led to irritations in the ROK-US relationship. However, 
President Gerald Ford tried hard to reassure his Korean ally of  continued US military support. 
Nevertheless, his successor, Jimmy Carter eventually pushed for the withdrawal of  US forces 
from South Korea –a move that unsettled confidence Korean leaders‘ confidence in their US 
partners after the collapse of  South Vietnam.  
Generally, the end of  the Vietnam War destabilised South Korea and deteriorated 
ROK-US relations. Seoul quickly improved relations with Tokyo - which also harboured serious 
security concerns in the post-Vietnam era - while making diplomatic efforts to stall Carter‘s 
pullout plan. According to archival documents and oral history in the ROK and the US, the 
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South Korean leader attempted to ensure the national security of  the ROK in various ways. 
Once he faced American opposition to his nuclear project, Park used the project as the card for 
negotiations with Washington, and gained Ford‘s support for his battle against Kim Ilsung in the 
DMZ.4 Furthermore, he fought Jimmy Carter in order to keep U.S ground forces in the country. 
Park succeeded in derailing Carter‘s withdrawal plan, but was forced by Washington to introduce 
more democratic ideas to his rule. This decision emboldened opposition groups to become more 
assertive, and thus further destabilised the political basis of  Park regime.5 
Coupled with the ROK-US split in the post-Vietnam period, the domestic political 
resistance deteriorated the basis of  the Park regime‘s anticommunist policy. Until 1976 the 
security concern caused by the Vietnam shock helped repel advocates of  the reconciliation with 
Pyongyang, and the restoration of  presidential elections. Yet this criticism was revived in the late 
1970s, when the regime failed to effectively address socio-economic issues, such as worker 
protests calling for improved working conditions. In the absence of  significant economic growth, 
and with a widening income gap, poor labour conditions, and high inflation, popular support for 
Park was undermined.  
The economic grievance of  workers got worse after the second oil shock struck the 
world economy in December 1978. The Park-Carter conflict over the presence of  the US Army 
in South Korea further inspired Liberals. The Yusin Institution that enabled Park to maintain his 
presidency aimed to stabilise the ROK facing the North Korean threat. But the despotic nature 
of  the Yusin regime itself  was questioned by Carter and became the most important rationale of  
a US pullout from the Korean Peninsula. In other words, the Park regime itself  became a threat 
to South Korean national security. Strengthened by their ideological link with Carter, the Liberals 
challenged the Park government, ended the dictatorship in 1979, and opened up a new 
discussion on South Korean foreign policy and its relations with Communists. 
 
 
(1) The South Korean Nuclear Crisis and Post-Vietnam Diplomatic Strategy,1975-76 
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On 1st January, 1975, Park Chunghee delivered a New Year‘s speech. The 57 year old 
president repeated his catchphrase, “Let us do our best for national security and economic 
development,‖ which he had presented annually for 12 years.6 It had become a tradition that the 
South Korean people could expect in every New Year‘s speech. As always, he said, ―We are in a 
crisis of  national security… The split in public opinion shall result in the invasion of  the North 
Korean puppet regime…‖7 Throughout this lengthy speech his point was clear: that it is neither 
a good time to return to democracy, nor talk about a peaceful reunification of  a Korean nation. 
He apparently never considered his old catchphrase would lose credibility or legitimacy. Facing 
the collapse of  Saigon, the ROK president consistently wanted to firmly ingrain his 
anticommunist ideology in the minds of  his people.  
The national security of  South Korea in the post-Vietnam era was in the forefront of  
Park‘s considerations when beginning discussions with Richard Nixon about the withdrawal of  
US forces. The priority for improving South Korean national security was the modernization of  
South Korean armed forces. This programme had been promoted with American aids, provided 
by Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon since 1968.8However, Park seemed to believe that 
another plan, a nuclear project, would be a decisive factor for ROK national security if  
Washington reduced its military engagement in East Asia. The secret discussions surrounding 
South Korean nuclear weapons started in 1972. Oh Won Cheol who took charge of  the ROK 
defence industry in the 1970s was ordered by Park in early 1972 to secure nuclear weapons 
technology.9  The ROK negotiated with Canada in order to import a CANDU (Canada 
Deuterium Uranium) reactor and an NRX (National Research Experimental Research Reactor), 
and had talked with France about reprocessing facilities beginning in 1973.  
However, Park soon found it was difficult to acquire these facilities from abroad. In 
1974, India carried out a nuclear test with NRX from Canada. This nuclear proliferation in South 
Asia adversely affected the South Korean project. The White House started to question the 
intentions behind the ROK‘s nuclear programme and tried to stop Park‘s quest, which could 
ultimately result in the proliferation of  nuclear weapons in North Korea and Japan.10And the 
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American concerns about ROK nuclear research seemed to have its effect on negotiations with 
Canada. On 6th January 1975, Allan J. MacEachen, Canadian Minister of  Foreign Affairs, sent a 
letter to Kim Dongjo, the South Korean Minister of  Foreign Affairs. The letter made it clear that 
Canada would only export CANDU under the condition that the ROK signs the NPT (Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty) and hence gives up the military use of  nuclear energy.11 On 17th 
January, Park received a cable from Kim Youngju, the ROK ambassador to Canada. Kim 
reported that [South Korea] will be able to build three to six [nuclear missiles] a year if  it 
introduced a CANDU reactor. However, he did not consider it possible, stating, ―… if  [the US] 
restricts uranium supply, it is impossible to secretly produce nuclear weapons…‖12  
Washington started to press the ROK into ratifying the NPT.13 Despite such a negative 
opinion about CANDU, the South Korean leadership decided to continue with its import, and 
sign the NPT on 19th March 1975.14 However, Park did not expect that his concession to join 
the NPT was the end of  Seoul‘s nuclear weapon programme. Furthermore, he seemed upset that 
Washington did not provide any solution for South Korean security that would be as resolute as 
he viewed his own plan would be. The ROK leadership desperately wanted American 
confirmation of  its commitment in South Korea if  they would not allow the development of  
ROK nuclear weapons. Yet, even after the fall of  Saigon, Ford did not make any clear decision 
regarding the presence of  US forces in South Korea, due mainly to the pervasive antipathy of  
the US public toward American international intervention.     
Park‘s fear of  the Communists was further intensified by the discovery of  North 
Korean tunnels in the Korea Demilitarised Zone in March 1975.15 On 28th March, at the 
graduation ceremony of  the ROK military academy, he made his thoughts about North Korea 
clear,  
 
[…] We should not look on today‘s South Vietnam and Khmer situation with 
indifference. As you well know, it was revealed that North Koreans secretly dug 
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tunnels in the many sites of  DMZ for their invasion to south after commencing talks 
with us […]16 
 
On 22nd April, it was reported to Park that Kim Ilsung had embarked on a visit to the 
PRC starting four days before on 18th April. This report from the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 
indicated that Kim had reaffirmed his hostility toward South Korea and the US during his speech 
in China.17 One day before South Vietnam‘s surrender, the ROK president announced a special 
address on national security and the current situation. Park delivered his words in a determined 
manner, ―If  North Korean puppet regime invades the South, then it will only destroy itself.‖18 
He emphasised that South Koreans are capable to repel their enemy if  they were united in such a 
goal.19 
Despite his determined and confident voice, this special statement demonstrated his 
anxiety. He could not know how the defeat of  Saigon would affect inter-Korean affairs and 
whether it would lead the two Koreas into another fraternal war. Park needed a special measure 
to save his own nation and presidency from the impact of  the Vietnam War. He decided to 
introduce a new law to ban communist and/or pro-communist actions, which, according to his 
own logic, had resulted in the defeat of  South Vietnam. On 13th May, Park released the 
Emergency Decree No. 9, the main idea of  which was intended to prevent any form of  
antigovernment activities such as demonstration, broadcasting, writing, or other forms of  
criticism against the Yusin Constitution, or the ROK government. 20 While this new rule 
demanded the prevention of  communist and/or pro-communist actions in ROK, the 
Emergency Measure also directed the police to punish anyone who criticised the Park regime, 
regardless ideological affiliation. Clearly, Park utilised the Vietnam impact to solidify his position 
and suppress any critics of  his regime with his, ―South Korea is another South Vietnam,‖ logic.21 
Coupled with his clamorous post-Vietnam actions, Park might have intended to demonstrate a 
sense of  insecurity to Washington. On 16th May through the resolution of  ROK National 
Assembly, Park urged Washington to reaffirm its pledge to defend South Korea against the 
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Communists.22 
South Korea quickly improved its relationship with Japan, which was likewise 
dissatisfied with American politics. Unlike his predecessor, Tanaka Kakuei, the new Japanese 
Premier, Miki Takeo, believed cooperation with Seoul to be essential for Japanese security, and, 
during his summit talks with President Ford in July 1975, re-confirmed the Korean clause in 
Okinawa reversion issue that defined the role of  US forces in Okinawa as the deterrent in South 
Korea as well as Japan.23 Park welcomed Miki‘s decision and resumed the ROK-Japan high-level 
exchanges for their common security.  
Washington‘s East Asian allies demanded a continued US commitment for military 
engagement in their countries.  President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were well aware of  
Seoul‘s anxiety, did not pay it much focus due to their post-Vietnam affairs, e.g. the evacuation of  
US forces from Vietnam. In fact, the US ambassador to Seoul, Richard L. Sneider, informed 
both of  Park‘s resentment toward Washington and his growing anxiety over the fate of  Saigon 
on 22nd April. He advised the White House to review its Korean policy in order to prevent a 
decline of  South Korean confidence in the US commitment. Specifically, the ambassador 
worried about the risk of  a North Korean provocation to test US resolve and ROK capabilities. 
In a long run perspective, Sneider was concerned that the US could lose its control over South 
Korea. He argued that although the ROK still depended on the US, it could no longer be 
considered a client state. Consequently, he recommended an increase in military and economic 
aids for South Korea.24 
His indication is remarkable: the American ambassador adeptly interpreted Park 
Chunghee‘s anxiety, although the South Korean president had not yet made any significant 
criticisms about Washington‘s policies. Furthermore, Sneider thought that South Korea had 
become a middle power, and could turn away from the White House to satisfy its security needs 
if  the US failed to make a credible commitment. Specifically, the Sneider paid special attention to 
the ROK‘s nuclear project, and considered that Seoul was likely to build its own missile if  
Washington lost its influence on the Blue House.25His analysis was accurate: The nervous ROK 
president eventually expressed his dissatisfaction with Washington‘s ambiguous attitude toward 
his country. In his interview with the Washington Post, he explained his idea of  American post-
Vietnam policy as if  he had known about the US ambassador‘s concerns: 
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[…] There were and still are quite a number of  Koreans doubting the commitment of  the 
United States since the fall of  Vietnam. Even without assistance, our people are 
determined to fight to the last man and not to concede an inch of  our territory [to 
North Korea]. We have the [nuclear] capability, but are not developing it and are 
honouring the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty. If  the US nuclear umbrella were to be 
removed, we have to start developing our nuclear capability to save ourselves. […]  
If  American ground troops were removed, the enemy will be inclined to make a 
miscalculation, and American promises would carry far less credibility.26 
 
In short, Park plainly indicated that he would have a nuclear weapon unless Ford 
promised an American defence commitment in South Korea.  
 
Regarding Park‘s interview, Sneider sent another cable to Washington a few days later, 
on 24th June1975 and warned of  future South Korean movements after Vietnam War: 
 
[…] Our present policy toward Korea is ill-defined and based on an outdated view of  
Korea as a client state. It does not provide a long-term conceptual approach to Korea, 
geared to its prospective middle power status. It leaves the ROK government 
uncertain what to expect from us and forces us to react to ROKG on an ad hoc basis. 
We have not for example made clear to the Koreans what the prospects are for a 
continued, long-term U.S. military presence. […] These uncertainties lead President 
Park into preparations which included internal repression and plans for the 
development of  nuclear weapons […]27 
 
Again, the ambassador had analysed the ROK-US relationship accurately. The reduction 
of  US forces in South Korea in 1971 during the Nixon era, and American pullout from Vietnam 
in 1973 forced Park to confront the US. Sneider wanted the White House to adjust its Korean 
policy based on the situation at hand. Simply put, his recommendation was, ―durable partnership 
based on a significant US force presence with indefinite tenure...‖28 His argument made sense 
and well identified the cause of  Park‘s deviation from American policy.  
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However, a major flaw of  Sneider‘s recommendations was that they ignored American 
public opinion on international policy, and its importance for Ford‘s re-election. Due to the 
Vietnam shock, the indefinite and significant presence of  US forces in South Korea was deeply 
unpopular among the American public.29 Hence, this risky idea was not viable for Ford, who was 
preparing his re-election campaign. The US president was unable to guarantee the requested 
military support for ROK. On 25th June, in his news conference, the Ford was asked by Bob 
Schieffer of  CBS news if  he would use nuclear weapons to stop North Korea from attacking the 
South. Ford did not answer the question directly: ―We have a strong deterrent force, strategically 
and tactically, and of  course, those forces will be used in a flexible way in our own national 
interest, but I do not believe it is in our national interest to discuss how or when they would be 
used under the circumstances.‖30 However, as Schieffer inquired whether he would rule out the 
use of  nuclear bomb, Ford reluctantly responded: ―I am not either confirming it or denying it. I 
am saying we have the forces and they will be used in our national interest, as they should be.‖ 31 
Some South Korean media interpreted Ford‘s comment as determination to protect the 
ROK from possible attacks by the DPRK.32 However, regarding the American original text, this 
interpretation seems too optimistic. Washington‘s obscure attitude did not have any impact on 
Park‘s direction. As Shin Wookhee has argued, such a gap between Seoul and Washington post-
Vietnam war, led Park to take more drastic measures for the security of  his country.33 
Meanwhile, with the White House delaying its policy decisions toward South Korean 
security, Park continued his negotiations with Canada and France over the purchase of  nuclear 
facilities. Allan J. MacEachen visited Seoul for the sales of  CANDU and NRX on 26th and 27th 
June. On 27th, Kim Dongjo, the ROK Minister of  Foreign Affairs and MacEachen agreed on the 
supply of  CANDU from Canada to South Korea. After South Korea had signed the NPT as 
Canada had requested, both countries signed an agreement stipulating peaceful nuclear 
development and application.34 
Despite this joint communiqué, Washington still doubted Park‘s intentions; he was still 
negotiating with France for reprocessing facilities, not necessary for ‗peaceful nuclear activities.‘35 
                                                          
29 Don Oberdorfer, op. cit., p.67. 
30 Gerald R. Ford: "The President's News Conference," 25th June, 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
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31 Ibid. 
32 Donga Ilbo, 26th June, 1975. 
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Diplomatic Archives, Republic of  Korea. 
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According to the record of  US Deputy Secretary of  State, Robert S. Ingersoll, dated 2nd July 
1975, the White House concluded that the ROK did not need the reprocessing facilities for 
economic reasons, and that the US should request South Korea to forego the introduction of  
reprocessing plants for nuclear tests. Furthermore, Ingersoll confirmed that Park‘s interview with 
the Washington Post had revealed the South Korean intention to possess its own nuclear weapon.36 
This study on South Korean intentions was delivered to Kissinger July, 24th.37 
Sneider conveyed the American objections regarding South Korea‘s acquisition of  
reprocessing capabilities for the ROK government. It is noteworthy here that the US ambassador 
did not express American concern to Park directly, since he was well acquainted with Park‘s 
stubborn attitude. Instead, Sneider often talked with ROK presidential secretary, Kim 
Jeongryeom. Moreover, he never mentioned ‗South Korean nuclear weapons‘ while talking with 
Kim. His sole request to the secretary was the end of  negotiations with France regarding the 
reprocessing plant.38 The Park regime, however, did understand his subtext. And despite 
Sneider‘s request, the Blue House kept silent and refused to provide any comment on its nuclear 
ambitions.  
Ford thusly felt it necessary to ease Park‘s anxiety in order to put an end to his nuclear 
ambitions. James Schlesinger, the US Secretary of  Defence, was dispatched to Seoul in August.  
The official purpose of  Schlesinger‘s visit, - to stop the ROK-French nuclear exchanges - was 
not revealed to the public. The South Korean press indicated that he visited Seoul for a ROK-US 
Security Consultative Meeting.39 In the view of  ROK citizen, this meeting was not unusual, as 
such meetings were held on an annual basis. And as it was commonplace for Americans to visit 
the Blue House in order to discuss ROK-US affairs, the gravity of  this meeting was easily 
masked.  
As it was the aim of  the US representatives to relieve the anxiety of  the ROK 
leadership, their attitude appeared very friendly at first. However, the meeting between President 
Park and the US Secretary of  Defence was serious indeed. Even though the Secretary did not 
mention American intelligence findings concerning the South Korean nuclear weapons 
programme, Schlesinger clearly conveyed that South Korea‘s breach of  the NPT would result in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reprocessing facilities from France. See ―Interview with Oh Woncheol,‖ Weekly Chosun, Issue 2089 (2010). Regarding 
the background of  South Korea‘s nuclear programme, see Oh Woncheol, Park Chunghee‟neun uduke gyeongje gangguk 
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36 ―Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing, Department of  State,‖ Memorandum for the Assistant President for 
National Security Affairs from Robert S. Ingersoll of  DOS, July 2, 1975, Ford Library. 
37 ―The National Security Council Memorandum on persuading Seoul,‖ Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from 
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38 Cho Kabje, op. cit., 274. 
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the collapse of  the ROK-US alliance. Without hesitation, Park replied that his country had every 
intention to meet its obligations as defined in the NPT. Park, stubborn as always, also remarked 
that he only answered the question of  the Washington Post journalist, Robert Novak, about 
ROK actions in case the US removed its nuclear umbrella. To the question, he said he had 
replied, ―Washington would not remove its nuclear umbrella from South Korea.‖40 Facing Park‘s 
confident attitude, Schlesinger did not make any negative retort. To the contrary, trying to relax 
Park during their meeting, Schlesinger said that he foresees no basic changes in the level of  US 
forces until 1977, and even if  Ford was not re-elected, the Democrats would keep up US support 
for the ROK. Despite the American efforts, however, the South Korean leadership did not 
accept the American request.41 
South Korea‘s attitude toward American pressure on its nuclear programme suggests a 
very important point for its Cold War strategy after the fall of  Saigon: Park needed to prevent 
additional reductions of  US troops from his country. In this case, he might have thought that he 
could trade his nuclear ambitions for the continued presence of  US troops and the persistence 
of  its nuclear umbrella.42 This reasoning follows a simple logic: South Korea was not capable of  
building a nuclear missile in the short run. When Park started to consider the nuclear option in 
1972, South Korea did not have a core facility to carry out such an ambitious plan. Park‘s vague 
suggestion to the Washington Post that ―we have capabilities‖, was misleading and somewhat 
exaggerated. As a matter of  fact, it would have been more accurate to say, ―We‘re trying to have 
capabilities.‖ Even until Park‘s now infamous interview with the American press in June, South 
Korean efforts to build up nuclear facilities and get hold of  essential technology were blocked by 
Washington, which had already found out about the ROK‘s nuclear ambitions in March of  the 
same year.43 At the moment of  Park-Schlesinger talks, Park did not have anything to lose: he 
could give up his slow moving nuclear project in return for Ford‘s commitment to keep US 
troops stationed in South Korea for the long term and maintain the protection of  the nuclear 
umbrella.44  
                                                          
40 ―Meeting between President Park and Secretary Schlesinger, 26 August, 1975,‖ Memorandum of  Conversation, 
Seoul, August 27, 1975, Korea 11, Box 9, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, National Security 
Adviser, Ford Library. 
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For the White House, keeping a military presence with infinite tenure in East Asia was 
greatly complicated by the Vietnam War debacle. Moreover, such a guarantee appeared too 
expensive to exchange with South Korea‘s fledging nuclear scheme. Ford did not consider any 
reduction of  US troops and/or nuclear weapons from South Korea, and might have thought that 
this was all he could do.45 However, as Sneider worried, Park began questioning the American 
commitment in South Korea. He did not criticise Ford because he was aware of  the peculiar 
situation faced by the US president. And although Park did not expect any major changes during 
Ford‘s time as president, he did worry about the intentions of  the next administration.46His sense 
of  insecurity intensified the conflict between the Blue House and the White House in 1976. In 
the long term, Park still needed a nuclear weapons programme in order to prepare for what he 
saw were the potential military consequences of  an eventual withdrawal of  US troops in the 
future.47 Thus, the Blue House pushed its nuclear project ahead.   
Park decided to ignore American ‗advice‘, in the form of  a de facto threat, and 
continued to negotiate with France. The cooperative attitude of  his French government further 
encouraged Park. In contrast to Canada, which did not want to break ranks with the US for the 
sake of  Korean security, the French government did not allow American intervention in its 
business.48 Based on Kissinger‘s order in March, the US ambassadors to Paris and Seoul 
requested the French government and their counterparts to immediately end negotiating with the 
ROK. France did not waver, declaring, ―If  South Korea cancels the cooperation programme and 
pays the cancellation penalty to France, we can accept it.‖49Obviously, South Korea would never 
want to pay the penalty and argued that the pilot reprocessing plant delivered by France would 
be used for academic purposes. Additionally, the Blue House complained that the US had not 
opposed the Japanese acquisition of  reprocessing facilities.50 In his in-depth report on South 
Korean reprocessing plans to Kissinger, Philip Habib, the former US ambassador to Seoul, 
proposed an assertive approach.51 Habib, who had experienced Park‘s Yusin reform during his 
                                                          
45 Gerald R. Ford: "The President's News Conference," 25th June, 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
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tenure in South Korea, believed that Park might do practically anything unless the US showed a 
serious opposition. Starting from December 1975, Habib warned the South Korean ambassador 
to Washington, Hahm Byeongchoon, and called upon Seoul to cancel its contract with France, 
which had already been signed. However, the ROK government rejected the American 
demands.52 
Finally, Habib was dispatched to Seoul in December. Unlike his successor as 
ambassador, Sneider, Habib was not reluctant to confront Park directly. As we discussed in the 
previous chapter, Park effectively silenced the domestic opposition, but never challenged 
American authority in South Korea. Understanding this, Habib was determined on his mission to 
Seoul. According to Sneider‘s letter to Habib, the former and the incumbent US ambassadors 
met Park on 9th December in secret talks.53Park‘s position, interestingly, had begun to waiver soon 
after his meeting with his old American friend. According to South Korean newspapers, Habib 
explained the result of  Ford‘s visit to Beijing and his Pacific Doctrine put forth on 7th 
December.54The Korean press indicated that the former ambassador had come to Seoul in order 
to convey Ford‘s commitment to South Korean security.55 However, Habib‘s role was not that of  
a messenger conveying Ford‘s new doctrine, and the article provided some hint for his role. Why 
did the Assistant Secretary of  State travel all the way to Seoul only to explain Ford‘s new (yet, old 
in practice) doctrine? This task could have been fulfilled by Sneider, the incumbent. That is, 
Philip Habib had taken over for Sneider, who had proved unable to properly manage the nuclear 
weapons issue. Based on his previous comments for ROK-US relations, it appeared that the US 
ambassador kept a soft-stance towards Park. This attitude did not inflict any change on South 
Korean politics. Therefore, the former ambassador needed to threaten Park. It is possible that 
Habib addressed possible US sanctions should Seoul press ahead with its nuclear 
plan.56Conversely, Sneider had been emphasising the benefits of  ROK-US cooperation provided 
if  South Korea cancelled its contract with France57, which did not appeal to Park. 
Soon after the Park-Habib meeting, the ROK government announced its intention to 
review the contract with France in January. The new American strategy had succeeded. Prime 
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minister, Kim Jongpil stated that ―The president Park recognised the risk in which the ROK-US 
relation is ended if  he pushed ahead with the plan…‖ 58  Clearly, to Park the American 
intervention remained the most important element of  ROK security, especially since more time 
was needed to construct an operational nuclear warhead.  
Washington felt that it had successfully stopped Park‘s ambitious plan after all, and on 
24th January, Kissinger discussed the situation with Canadian officials. Canada required the ROK 
to forgo its plan to acquire a reprocessing plant. Stated in this meeting, regarding MacEachen‘s 
comment, ―We are working with the ROK to soften them up, but I don‘t know if  we can deliver 
a knockout blow.‖59 The US Secretary of  State replied with confidence, ―I think it‘s safe to say 
we‘ve delivered the knockout blow [to South Koreans]‖60 
Nonetheless, the Blue House did not officially cancel its contract with France. On the 
one hand, the Ford administration worked hard to pass its bill for military aid for ROK in the 
Congress in order to appease Blue House.61 On the other hand, the US mounted pressure on 
Park once again in May, as the new Secretary of  Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, confirmed the 
American determination to review its support for ROK unless Park gave up his quest for a 
reprocessing plant.62 Under strong American pressure, Park was forced to abandon his nuclear 
weapons programme. The problem was timing: despite Rumsfeld‘s stern warning, the ROK elites 
did not decide when exactly the contract with France should be cancelled. Even though Ford and 
Kissinger did their best to save Park‘s face, the ROK leader was not able to let go of  his plan 
easily. In other words, he needed Washington‘s security guarantee for the ROK which Ford had 
not yet provided to Park. 
It is noteworthy that Kim Jeongryeom, the Chief  of  Presidential Secretary who 
discussed the nuclear issue with Sneider more than anyone else, did not provide any information 
about the ROK-US conflict on nuclear weapons in his memoir. Regarding the same issue, Don 
Oberdorfer has argued that the White House still had the power to counter the determined 
intentions of  the Blue House in the mid- 1970s.63 If  this is true, the ROK elites did feel helpless 
and bore hostility toward Washington. Nevertheless, Jeongryeom omitted the ROK-US split. 
The interesting point here is that he even frequently emphasised Ford‘s commitment in South 
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Korea. According to this and other testimony of  ROK veterans, the Park-Ford relationship was 
not bad at all. At least Park did not criticise Ford in the same way he condemned Nixon and 
Carter.  
In a general sense, however, the conflict between Park and Ford in late 1975 and early 
1976 was serious enough to ruin their friendship. Still, the US leader did something to close the 
gap between him and Park not long after their lengthy discussion on the ROK nuclear 
programme. On 18th August 1976, a group of  ROK and UN forces consisting of  two US army 
officers, Capt. Arthur Bonifas and Lt. Mark Barrett, entered the Joint Security Area to trim a 
poplar tree. Soon after the trimming began, a group of  North Korean soldiers appeared and 
demanded Bonifas to stop cutting the boughs of  the tree which Kim Ilsung himself  had 
supposedly planted. The US officer ignored the North Korean instructions leading the angry 
KPA (Korean People‘s army) officer, Lieutenant Park Chul, to send one of  his subordinates to 
call in reinforcements. Even as additional KPA soldiers arrived on the scene, carrying clubs and 
crowbars as weapons, Bonifas still did not stop his work. In the fight that ensued, KPA soldiers 
beat Bonifas and Barrett to death with an axe and injured South Korean and the remaining 
American soldiers.64 
According to Kim Jeongryeom, regarding American presidential election in November, 
the Blue House concluded that Pyongyang killed US soldiers in order to promote an anti-war 
mood in the US and create popular support for the withdrawal of  US troops from South 
Korea.65 The military conflict between the two Koreas in August had pushed the previous 
conflicts between Capitalist allies aside. As a result, Ford kept his word and supported Park‘s 
retaliation against the North. This finally gave Washington an opportunity to prove its 
commitment of  South Korean security and hence contributed to the end of  Seoul‘s nuclear plan 
even before Carter revived the withdrawal of  US armed forces from South Korea.  
If  this assault had really been planned by Pyongyang, as the Blue House suggested, this 
implies that Kim Ilsung had seriously misunderstood the political situation. First and foremost, 
the White House needed to spare Park a major embarrassment over the outcome of  the nuclear 
programme issue, and also consider options to repair the damaged relationship with South 
Korea. Pyongyang did not expect any serious response from Washington since the DPRK had 
never been punished by the US, and/or the ROK forces, for its provocative actions against them 
in the past. Yet this time was totally different. Even before the furious Park had offered an 
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invitation, the US ambassador and the commander of  the US Forces in Korea, Richard Stillwell, 
were ordered to visit the Blue House and discuss the incident with the Secretary of  State.66 As 
he did in 1968 and 1969, Park requested a determined response from Washington. He reminded 
Sneider and Stillwell of  the North Korean provocations in 1968-69 and declared that the North 
Korean puppets considered Washington a ‗paper tiger‘ because it did not punish Pyongyang, 
essentially ignoring Park‘s request. As the two American officials sided with the South Korean 
president on this issue, it came as no surprise that the White House accepted Park‘s call for a 
retaliatory strike.67Following, the South Korean leader became even more determined. On 
August, 19that the entrance ceremony of  military academy at Yeongcheon, Park condemned Kim 
Ilsung in a determined tone, ―There is a limit of  our patience […] Mad dogs deserve clubs.‖68 
A few days later, a joint ROK-US taskforce launched operation Paul Bunyan, an 
operation designed not for trimming the boughs of  poplar trees, but cutting them down.69 
Through this action, Park and Ford intended to show off  the overwhelming power of  the UN 
forces to Pyongyang. However, they decided to limit this action without introducing any heavy 
arms in order to prevent an escalation of  tensions.70 In the morning hours of  21st August, 
without prior notice to the DPRK, a group of  US engineers arrived on the site of  the DMZ and 
cut down the tree. A thirty-man security platoon with pistols, and sixty-four ROK Special Forces, 
all experts of  tae kwon do, observed the task and monitored the North Korean side. Needless to 
say, this small-scale action was limited to the DMZ in accordance to the Korean armistice 
agreement. Behind the scenes, the ROK and US Army, Navy and Air Force were standing by to 
provide support. In this tense moment, at 7:00 am, the engineers started to cut the poplar tree, 
the cause of  the axe murder incident, with chainsaws and axes. At that exact moment, Kim 
Jeongryeom was waiting for a report from the ROK army. Stillwell had told him that the tree 
could be cut down within five minutes. But there was no news from DMZ until 7:20 am. At that 
time, Kim was told that 150 KPA soldiers had gathered across the poplar tree. If  the North 
Koreans made any action to engage the engineers, the second Korean War or WW III could start. 
Fortunately, however, the North Koreans were just watching. At 7:55 am, the combined ROK-
US forces completed their task and even removed unauthorised North Korean guard posts. As 
the operation concluded without any interference, Kim Jeongryeom saw that Park clenched his 
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fists.71 
This show of  force may have come as a shock for Kim Ilsung, who had not 
experienced South Korea‘s revenge for his military provocation. The North Korean leadership 
did not consider the impact of  the ROK‘s nuclear project on US policy. Technically, they were 
not likely to know of  the secret negotiations between Seoul and Washington. Even though Seoul 
was forced to forgo the nuclear weapon, this agreement was sustainable only as long as the US 
provided a considerable military deterrent.72 Pyongyang had ignored the soured relationship 
between Washington and Beijing. In the Nixon era, the US was very reluctant to intervene in the 
inter-Korean conflict so as not to irritate PRC leaders.  
Yet, as Victor Cha has indicated, this détente mood did not last long: Ford did not make 
any progress in Sino-US diplomacy even though he visited Beijing in December 1975.73 His 
Pacific Doctrine, announced after his visit to China, suggests such a setback of  Sino-US relations. 
He proclaimed American determination to keep close relations with its allies in East Asia 
including Taiwan. Thus, this new US doctrine could not be welcomed by Chinese leaders. The 
latent tension between Washington and Beijing deteriorated the détente mood, along with the US 
defeat in Vietnam. If  Pyongyang had planned the brutal murder at the DMZ, its planning had 
not been sophisticated enough to foresee this change. The US president did not intend to 
provoke the PRC. But he did not ignore North Korea‘s provocative attitude either.74Additionally, 
Washington also had to take into account the particular sensitivities and requirements of  Japan, 
Taiwan, and its other allies in managing this incident. The axe murder incident was the first 
military conflict between the southern capitalists and northern communists since Ford‘s doctrine 
had entered into force. It stands beyond doubt that Washington‘s Asian partners kept a keen eye 
on the American reaction to this incident. For various reasons, the US government could not 
ignore these troubles.  
Against his will, Kim Ilsung made arrangements for Ford to relieve the anxiety of  the 
stubborn South Korean president and other Asian partners. Kim decided to calm his enemy 
down. After the military action was over, in the afternoon of  August, 21st, Kim Ilsung sent a 
message to US forces: 
                                                          
71 Kim Jeongryeom, op. cit., p. 445. 
72 This statement can be proved by historical fact: Park revived his nuclear plan after Carter urged the withdrawal of  
US armed forces from South Korea. This will be discussed in the next sub-chapter. 
73 Victor Cha, op., cit., 143. 
74 Considering the limited operation, Paul Bunyan, the United States did not want to escalate the tension more than 
it could control. In other words, Washington did not expect that PRC intervened in this conflict between DPRK and 
ROK-US unless the UN soldiers use heavy fire arms. The intention of  US revealed by Stillwell‘s rage after the 
mission was completed. The United States commander got angry when he was aware that the ROK Special forces 
armed with rifles and grenade, hidden below vehicles before the operation was launched. See ―Interview with Park 
Huido,‖ New Daily, 25 November, 2009. http://www.newdaily.co.kr/news/article.html?no=36779. 
  
152 
 
 
It was a good thing that no big incident occurred at Panmunjom for a long period. 
However, it is regretful that an incident occurred in the Joint Security Area, 
Panmunjom this time. An effort must be made so that such incidents may not recur in 
the future. For this purpose both sides should make efforts. We urge your side to 
prevent the provocation. Our side will never provoke first, but take self-defensive 
measures only when provocation occurs. This is our consistent stand.75 
  
The supreme commander of  the KPA did not apologise for the death of  the American 
official when his message was delivered to Stillwell. But the Park regime was satisfied with Kim‘s 
subdued reaction. Kim Jeongryeom called this military and diplomatic victory the first 
humiliation of  Kim Ilsung since the Korean War.76 Park was glad and rewarded the Special 
Forces generously.77 The axe murder in Panmunjom, and the subsequent Paul Bunyan operation, 
demonstrated Park‘s steadfast anticommunism attitude and illustrated continued American 
support for his policy stance, even after the collapse of  South Vietnam. Before long the Blue 
House gave up the purchase of  a reprocessing plant from France. It is not exact to say that Park 
was convinced the national security of  ROK was due to this military success. However, it is 
possible that the political support from the Ford administration facilitated him making such a 
serious decision. It is not clear when exactly South Korea signed away its nuclear weapons 
programme. However, according to a Sneider-Scowcroft meeting in White House on September 
15th, the ROK cancelled its contract with France and so informed Sneider before mid-September 
1976.78  
Considering the timing of  the ROK‘s decision, the success of  the joint ROK-US 
operation did help ROK elites give up their programme for a nuclear weapon, and nuclear 
energy was only allowed for real ‗peace purposes‘ in South Korea. Ryu Byounghyun, the director 
of  the Joint Chiefs at that time, recalled that the ROK president clearly ordered him to stop 
developing a nuclear weapon. And Park did not make any other attempt to secure plutonium, e.g. 
to import the radioactive material secretly.79Therefore, Park‘s confidence in the American 
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commitment for South Korean security had been restored. Regarding its Northern policy, the 
ROK leadership gained confidence with its military success, and maintained its hostility toward 
the DPRK. And although Park had never scored any significant victory in the inter-Korean 
conflict before 1976, along with the North Korean aggression, this triumphant atmosphere in 
South Korea further promoted anticommunism sentiment throughout the country, only 
furthering the possibility to have another détente mood on the Korean Peninsula.80   
In the aftermath of  the US‘ defeat in the Vietnam War, Seoul urgently sought to shore 
up its national security. The development of  nuclear energy for military purposes was the core 
of  South Korean security conceptions during this era. Since 1974, when India successfully tested 
a nuclear weapon for the first time, the US had paid increased attention to similar development 
efforts in other countries, including South Korea. Washington had monitored South Korean 
efforts for its own nuclear missile since March 1975. As the nuclear plan was revealed, the ROK 
changed its original plan. The ultimate goal of  South Korea‘s policy was not the possession of  
nuclear weapons in and of  itself, but the effect this would have for increasing national security. 
Without any doubt, as long as Washington rejected a South Korean nuclear programme, it was 
almost impossible for the ROK to have its own warhead. For this, Park proclaimed his 
willingness to develop the nuclear weapon unless the US provided him with a concrete, and 
better, security programme. But Ford was not able to reinforce US support for South Korea due 
to the anti-war atmosphere in his country. As a result, the ROK-US negotiations were not 
concluded in 1975. Yet the signature of  the contract to obtain a reprocessing plant pushed the 
US to change its strategy: Philip Habib, who knew Park‘s stubborn nature, advocated a stern 
approach to the ROK in the late 1975 and early 1976. Park had to re-consider his cooperation 
with the French government, which could jeopardise the partnership with Ford. Still, he waited 
with the decision to cancel the contract despite mounting US pressure. He needed American 
security guarantees to replace his nuclear programme. In this situation, the murder in the 
demilitarised zone opened a new phase in the ROK-US negotiations. Washington helped Park 
punish North Korean for its violence in the DMZ. Even though operation Paul Bunyan was a 
fairly limited military action, the American support for Park‘s confrontational Northern policy 
saved him embarrassment and reinforced his political stature, relieving his anxiety for national 
security.  
Thanks to the first Korean nuclear crisis in 1975 and 76, South Korea could keep its 
close ties with the United States and prevent a major security crisis after the collapse of  Saigon. 
Despite the military success in the DMZ resulting from the Ford Doctrine, however, it is 
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doubtful that the two allies shared a similar level of  animosity toward the communists. Clearly, 
the White House was reluctant to involve the United States in another conflict. As the US 
commander in South Korea indicated, Washington attempted to limit operation Paul Bunyan in 
the DMZ area and did not want to resume the Cold War in the East Asian region through the 
inter-Korean conflict.81 The Blue House even interpreted the tragic incident in the DMZ, the 
Axe Murder incident, as a crisis of  capitalists in the East Asian region, and prepared a full-scale 
war without initial American involvement, or even without the Americans knowing about it.82 
The operation Paul Bunyan resolved the most urgent problem between Seoul and Washington, 
the South Korean nuclear programme, but did not narrow the gap between the two allies in their 
Cold War perception.  
The union between Park and Ford did not last long because of  this difference. 
American commitment in South Korea‘s national security began to be overshadowed by US 
interest in post- Vietnam War politics. The White House gradually revealed its reluctance to pay 
enormous amounts of  money supporting the South Korean authoritarian regime.83 Park soon 
faced the most serious conflict with Washington ever since they had established a diplomatic 
relationship. Towards the end of  the Ford administration, South Korea‘s illegal lobby 
organization to the US Congress was revealed. Along with the suppression of  human rights by 
the Park regime, this political crime damaged his moral legitimacy as a key partner of  US. 
Consequently, in November 1976, when Jimmy Carter was elected as a new president, he began 
to criticise Park‘s despotic rule. Moreover, he advocated the withdrawal of  US armed forces from 
the ROK as he had repeatedly promised during his election campaign. The new American leader, 
even unknown to most Americans until 1976, broke the American commitment in South Korea 
that Ford made. His policy was what Park was most afraid of  after the Vietnam War debacle, and 
now he inevitably faced the real crisis of  post-Vietnam era. 
 
 
<2> The Beginning of  Discussion on Human Rights and US Armed Forces in South Korea in 
1977  
 
In the latter half  of  the 1970s, the Park regime faced strong opposition, from both his 
own citizens and the United States. Ironically, Park himself  planted the seeds of  this adversity. 
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He persecuted outspoken critics without mercy, and his draconian rule was often criticised in the 
American government circles. Moreover, his harsh treatment of  subordinates, especially 
intelligence officials, resulted in a series of  defections among key figures in Korean politics. 
These converts revealed Park‘s misdemeanour - a famous and serious case of  disclosure - to the 
US. On 24th October, 1976, the Washington Post reported that the White House had found out 
about a bribery scheme orchestrated by the Blue House targeting ninety members of  US 
Congress, as well as other officials. Due to its similarity with previous eavesdropping scandals in 
the White House, this shocking revelation was called ‗Korea-gate.‘ The Post also indicated that 
the Korean agent, Park Tongsun, had distributed sums reaching from $500,000 to $1 million to 
various members of  Congress already. 84  The goals of  South Korean lobbying of  US 
Congressmen were diverse, but the most important one had been to build American legislative 
support for the preservation of  US forces in the ROK ever since the Nixon administration. It 
turned out that the ROK had bribed American officials for a decade. Surprisingly, this bribery 
issue had already been discussed in White House since Lyndon Johnson was president.85  
During South Korean engagement in the Vietnam War, the US government did not deal with 
this corruptive matter in a serious way. When in South Korea, Philip Habib tried to politicise 
Park‘s wrongdoing but failed to score points with it.86 Yet as the White House secured decisive 
evidence of  illegal lobbying activities of  the ROK government, the disclosure of  the bribery 
scheme had a deep impact on the ROK-US relationship.87 
The subsequent revelation of  additional lobbying plans hedged by the KCIA further 
incited tension between the two allies. The Blue House had already planned yet another bribery 
scheme for pacifying American politics, ‗operation snow-white‘. This unnecessary effort 
complicated the situation tremendously. Due to the failure of  his mission, Kim Sanggeun, a 
KCIA official and in charge of  this operation, was ordered to return to Seoul. However, he 
defected to the US because he expected to be punished by Park upon his return to the ROK. 
Even worse, the one who arranged for his asylum in the US was none other than the former 
KCIA director, Kim Hyungwook. Because of  his disappointment with Park who had dismissed 
him in 1969 and deprived him of  his membership in the National Assembly in 1972, Kim left 
for the US. Both Kim Sanggeun and Hyungwook started to uncover the details of  Park‘s illegal 
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lobbying of  US Congress despite ROK efforts to appease them.88 The deplorable human rights 
situation in South Korea, the illegal lobbying of  US Congressmen, and the subsequent betrayal 
of  former ROK intelligence officials seriously damaged the Park regime‘s image in the US. 
Nevertheless, these moral aspects themselves did not directly break the link between 
Washington and Seoul before Jimmy Carter gained the prime power of  the US. As indicated 
above, the South Korean bribery scheme had been an open secret in US politics for years. 
Furthermore, the White House had been well aware of  Park‘s undemocratic rule and the 
constant repression of  human rights. In other words, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and 
Gerald Ford did not seriously question the morality of  Park. Johnson ignored those issues to 
ensure South Korean assistance in Vietnam; Nixon needed Park‘s understanding of  his plan, the 
reduction of  US troops stationed in South Korea and hence did not check Park‘s Yusin 
constitution; and Ford was reluctant to provoke Park who was trying to build a nuclear missile 
and had questioned American commitment in South Korea. However, unfortunately for Park, 
the new US president, Carter did not ignore the bribe scandal. Immediately after his inauguration, 
Carter seriously questioned the morality of  the Park regime after South Korea‘s illegal lobbying 
of  US Congress eventually turned out to be true. He also urged the South Korean president to 
stop persecuting the democratic critics in his country, by drafting a withdrawal plan of  US 
ground forces from South Korea.89 
On 4th November 1976, American news reports shocked South Korean politics when it 
was reported that Jimmy Carter had defeated Gerald Ford. It appeared that the ROK 
government had been caught off  guard by Carter‘s election victory: its Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs urgently prepared the analysis of  Carter‘s policy and his administration. The report 
concluded that the US policy toward the ROK would be stricter due to Carter‘s emphasis on an 
ethical foreign policy.90 In contrast to this urgent atmosphere in his government, Park was rather 
undisturbed. He underestimated Carter‘s leadership skills and questioned the likelihood of  the 
US president keeping his election pledges.91 Nevertheless, it was clear that he was sensitive to the 
criticisms concerning the human rights situation in South Korea. The humanity issue was his 
Achilles heel. Thanks to inter-Korean conflicts, he was able to justify his draconian rule for 
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about one and half  decades. In reality, the iron fist rule of  Park was not a matter of  importance 
to Washington unless his rule directly threatened the national security of  the ROK and the US.92  
However, it was Jimmy Carter who eventually integrated ethics standards into the US 
policy stance toward the ROK.93 Due to the Korea-gate affair and subsequent instances of  
exposure of  Park‘s wrongdoing, the new US trend was accelerated further. That is, the 
combination of  the ROK moral issue and Carter‘s victory soon produced anti-Park sentiments in 
American politics.94 Soon after his inauguration, South Korea became a model case for Carter‘s 
human rights policy. The new US leader started to deal with the ‗taboo‘ of  the ROK-US 
relationship. Carter‘s plan was firmly based on previous American studies of  US military aid to 
the ROK and hence relevant until his first year in the White House. That is, the Ford 
administration also considered the revival of  Nixon‘s plan. For instance, according to the Solarz-
Fraser Amendment to withdraw US troops from South Korea, which was submitted to Congress 
in December 1975, the US government seriously planned the withdrawal of  most of  the US 
troops from South Korea. 95  A report of  the US Centre for Defence Information, the 
assessment of  the Solarz-Fraser Amendment, also advocated the reduction of  US aid to the 
ROK for the modernisation of  ROK armed forces and the despotic rule of  Park: 
 
        While the South Koreans have legitimate military needs that should be treated  
sympathetically, future requests for military aid need to be examined with care. 
The South Koreans have often understated their own strength and emphasised 
North Korean strength in order to justify further assistance […] 
 
Alleged South Korean violations of  human rights are a continuing issues and 
Could have a bearing on future military and economic aid to South Korea  
because of  a provision in the Foreign Assistance Act of  1974 and new  
amendments to the 1975 Military Assistance Authorization Bill passed by  
House and Senate Committees. The 1974 law directs the President to  
reduce or terminate military or economic assistance to any government 
which engages in a consistent pattern of  gross violations of  internationally 
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recognised human rights violations by advising the Congress that extraordinary  
circumstances require it […]96 
 
In short, after its pullout from South-East Asia, Washington did care about the 
economic interests and moral aspects of  American foreign intervention due to its bitter 
experience in Vietnam. Specifically, this study indicated that, the US national interests in 
Northeast Asia, ―a strong and independent Japan and the peace of  the Korean peninsula,‖ could 
be best maintained by naval forces [and hence the land forces could be withdrawn]. In addition, 
it also advised the withdrawal of  US nuclear weapons in South Korea that could result in general 
nuclear war.97 Nevertheless, this idea was not developed as a policy since Ford had to guarantee 
his military support for Park due to the South Korean nuclear crisis. However, Carter, who 
firmly stood on his belief  in moral politics, started to push the plan in the early 1977.    
At the first meeting of  new administration‘s NSC members, the new team selected 
Carter‘s withdrawal plan for priority review and decision making along with the other fourteen 
items.98 On 26th January 1977, the new US president ordered the review of  American policies 
toward the Korean peninsula, including the withdrawal issue. It appeared that Carter did not 
want to hesitate to put his new Korean policy into action. His order to review the policies meant 
considering ―how‖ to withdraw US forces from South Korea, not ―whether or not‖ to withdraw 
them.99On 15th February, Carter sent his first letter to his ‗immoral‘ counterpart in Seoul, through 
Sneider. Carter first informed the internal discussion on the withdrawal of  US ground forces 
from the ROK. This was what the ROK leadership expected, and Park was already prepared for 
this. Yet he felt a strong antipathy toward his self-proclaimed ‗moral‘ partner in Washington 
when he read the sentences in which Carter urged him to consider the human rights issue in 
South Korea.100 In his reply, dated 26th February 1977, the ROK president satirised the lack of  
logic in Carter‘s idea:  
 
        […] Under the difficult circumstances of  national division, the Republic of  Korea has  
        been making steady progress as a free democratic nation while coping with war 
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        provocations and incessant military threats by the North Korean Communist regime 
        which totally denies individual freedoms or human rights to its people and indulges in  
merciless repression […]101 
 
Interestingly, Park did not spend many pages talking about the withdrawal issues, which 
were the most impending issues to the ROK. Instead, he elaborated why he had no choice but to 
limit human rights.102 Without any doubt, Park felt more threatened by Carter because of  this 
issue than that of  security, since US emphasis on morality could reignite the democratic 
movement in South Korea, and hence threaten his presidency.103 
He continuously criticised the US president for his moral concern. On 3rd March 1977, 
just a few days before Carter announced the withdrawal plan, Park spoke to journalists about the 
new US idea,  
 
        Now I am going to make a remark about President Carter. Isn‘t it annoying to say such  
and such about the morality of  another country even though he could not resolve the 
moral problems in his own country. Why didn‘t he mention the Khmer genocide? 
Moreover, he keeps silent toward North Korea, and what does this mean?104 
 
In contrast to his deep concern on the human rights issue, the ROK leader was 
relatively confident on the security issue.  
 
[…] It is possible that some US forces would return to America as Carter pledged, but  
even if  it is the case, we are still able to fight against North Korea […]105 
 
Park emphasised that the military force of  the ROK was by no means inferior to that 
of  the DPRK. But it did not mean that he would let Carter withdraw US ground forces from 
South Korea. Once the US president proceeded with implementing his plan, Park, in fact, 
attempted many secret efforts to frustrate it.  
Unfortunately for the US president, the pullout plan was not completed due to South 
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Korea‘s interference; a lack of  military and legislative support in the US, Japanese resistance, and 
new findings regarding the North Korean armed forces. First, Park tried to win over the 
conservatives in the US military. In early March, Park Dongjin, the ROK Foreign Minister, met 
Carter for a ‗consultation.‘ But the US leader made a unilateral decision to withdraw and 
informed the South Korean official accordingly.106 After Seoul received notification of  the 
withdrawal plan from Washington, American military officials in South Korea started to voice 
their oppositions toward their Commander-in-Chief. After Park and the generals of  the Eighth 
United States Army had played golf, Park spoke with them about the US president‘s withdrawal 
plan. ―Because Carter has military experience, he will be well aware of  the issue,‖ said Park.107 
One of  the US military officials cynically replied, ―He had been on board a submarine for three 
months. That could be counted as his military experience.‖108 
Park refrained from criticising Carter too much himself, but encouraged US 
commanders to express their objection towards their own president. This strategy worked 
effectively. In fact, the US military in the ROK, another important party in the pullout plan, 
stood against their Commander-in-Chief  already because they considered that the North Korean 
military strength was still threatening.  However, they were excluded from the discussion on the 
pullout.109 According to American documents, the US State Department attempted to exclude 
them from the decision making process because they did not agree with Carter,  
 
         I am told that General John W. Vessey, Commander of  our forces in Korea, is  
scheduled to testify on February, 27th before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of   
the House Armed Service Committee on U. S. force levels in Korea. An appearance 
of  this kind would normally be routine. Obviously, it is not at this moment, in view of  
Vessey‘s widely publicised remarks in December opposing U. S. force reductions in 
Korea, and the current inter-agency review of  our Korean policy. I believe it is 
important that Vessey‘s appearance be cancelled – or at a minimum postponed. 
Cancellation should not be difficult to arrange if  the Subcommittee is informed that 
Vessey would not be able to speak freely at this juncture since the Administration‘s 
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review of  the issue will not have been completed by February, 22th […]110 
 
The ostracised US army officials in South Korea considered that the Park regime also 
did not want any reduction of  US armed forces, and therefore made an important decision: 
while the US ambassador, Richard Sneider, talked with the Blue House in order to specify the 
terms of  a pullout, the US Army in South Korea attempted to frustrate it. After President Carter 
signed an order specifying the withdrawal schedule in early May, the American military officials in 
South Korea eventually launched an operation against their president.111 On 18th May, the special 
assistant of  KCIA director, Lee Dongbok, secretly met Jim Hausman, the special assistant of  US 
armed forces commander in South Korea, in a room of  the Plaza Hotel near Seoul city hall. The 
KCIA official later reported his dialogue with the American military official to his superior, Kim 
Jaegyu, the KCIA director. The contents of  this talk were astonishing: John W. Vessey, the 
commander of  US armed forces in South Korea, decided to reject any level of  reduction in US 
troop number. Just six days ahead of  a visit of  senior US diplomats to Seoul who wanted to 
discuss human rights and military pullout issue with Park, Vessey tried to collaborate with the 
ROK government in order to stall the withdrawal plan. He recommended that the ROK officials 
in working-level under ministers should not make any moderate comment during the upcoming 
ROK-US consultation considering his stance, even though President Park should make a political 
[moderate] comment.112 He also requested having a secret adjustment meeting between senior 
representatives of  the two militaries in advance (even unknown to the US ambassador). Finally, 
he informed the KCIA that Carter had promised him that the president would not make any 
decision on the US forces in South Korea without prior consultation. Furthermore, the general 
said, ―I will leave the army if  the US leader does not keep his words.‖113 
Facing the rebellious message from a US commander, the KCIA director decided to 
meet Vessey. On the next day, they met up in Vessey‘s official residence. Wearing an annoyed face, 
the US commander in South Korea broached his idea about Carter‘s policy. He expressed his 
anger about his president‘s inflexibility and expected the pledge would not be materialised. He 
said that Carter‘s plan is divorced from reality, and therefore is a flawed policy that could result in 
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a war. Nonetheless, he wanted to talk with Kim Jaegyu in order to prepare complimentary 
measures for the US ground forces withdrawal, just in case. Vessey‘s idea about complimentary 
measures was simple, but it did make sense: if  the ROK government demands compensation for 
a reduction of  US military forces at a level that makes a pullout more expensive than the status 
quo, this would spark a fierce discussion about the bill and lower its chances of  passage in 
Congress.114 
The secret dialogue between Vessey and Kim was immediately conveyed to the Blue 
House. Vessey‘s suggestion was a key point that demonstrated Park‘s real intention during ROK-
US negotiations after May 1977. As the US commander in South Korea advised, the ROK leader 
did not oppose Carter‘s pullout plan from South Korea. He even reiterated his old catchphrase, 
‗self-reliance of  national defence,‘ and announced ‗non-disagreement‘ over withdrawal of  US 
land forces from his country. Yet the term, ‗non-disagreement‘, does not mean ‗agreement.‘ He 
did not ‗agree‘ with his counterpart in Washington. According to Kim Jeongryeom, Chief  of  
presidential secretary, the ROK president was enraged when he said, ―I will not stop Carter from 
pulling out his forces from Korea.‖115 Even if  he resisted against American pressure, the 
reduction of  US forces in South Korea would be enforced in the near future. The American 
unilateralism in its South Korean policy was already proved by the withdrawal discussion during 
the Nixon era. Clearly, Park‘s over-reaction was calculated from his past experience and current 
intentions.116 
In addition to their secret connection with Park, the US army officials in South Korea 
also publicly criticised Jimmy Carter on his policy toward Korea. During his interview with a 
Washington Post correspondent, Major General John Singlaub, the chief  of  staff  of  the US 
command in South Korea stated, ―If  US land forces are withdrawn on the schedule suggested, it 
will lead to war.‖117 Without any doubt, this rebellious comment from a US official enraged the 
President Carter. Once he read the Washington Post article, the US president called the 
dissenters up to Washington. Although Carter reprimanded Singlaub and removed him from his 
post in South Korea, this was just the beginning of  Carter‘s nightmares. On May, 25th the 
rebellious official expressed his fear of  a war in Korea once again before Congress. Singlaub 
highlighted the significant reinforcement of  North Korean armed forces based on the recent 
intelligence findings and argued that South Korea would be in grave danger if  the US troops left 
as scheduled. He also emphasised that this view is almost universal in the US military in the 
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ROK and elsewhere. 118  After hearing Singlaub‘s testimony, the House Armed Services 
Investigations Subcommittee held a meeting. His testimony put the brakes on Carter‘s plan: the 
Subcommittee assessed, 
 
We have to draw the line on what these people in the administration can get away with. 
The situation is very dangerous, we‘re on the brink of  nuclear war. Congress  
has to move to counter Carter‘s policies.119 
 
Contradicting the president‘s intention, Singlaub‘s removal from his post brought him a 
lot of  sympathy from the legislature and the press. They considered that the president had 
silenced his subordinate who had bravely challenged a flawed idea.120After all, the military 
personnel‘s criticism on Carter‘s new policy triggered the controversy about the pullout of  US 
forces from South Korea.121 The domineering manner of  the ‗moral‟ president adversely affected 
his image, and only helped the opposition in the legislature.122 In short, Carter already faced a 
strong challenge even before advancing his plan onto the international level.  
Needless to say, Singlaub‘s testimony and its influence on the American government 
also inspired South Korea. His advocacy for ROK security was presented in the South Korean 
press, too.123During later vacation visits to South Korea, the public applauded him.124  Thanks to 
the opposition in the US military and a chaotic controversy surrounding the Carter plan, the Blue 
House easily seized the opportunity to kill Carter‘s plan. 
The South Korean elites pulled the strings without any significant mistakes, and the 
Carter administration did not identify the connection between the Blue House and US Army in 
South Korea. In other words, Park was clearly in a stronger position against Carter in terms of  
information. Even worse, the impatient US leader was obsessed with his pledge and continually 
pushed his flawed idea forward without consideration of  its consequences to South Korean 
policy. In this situation, the South Korean leadership decided to utilise the anti- Park sentiment in 
the US Congress to terminate Carter‘s quest. That is, the resistance of  Park against US policy 
would not have been effective and only increase the hostile reaction from the US legislature.   
Park prepared to meet with then US Undersecretary of  State, Philip Habib, and the 
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Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, General George Brown, in the Blue House on 25th-26th 
May. According to American sources, John Vessey, supposedly at the centre of  the anti-Carter 
movement, also attended this meeting.125 The US commander in South Korea had already had a 
series of  talks with the Blue House about the ROK-US negotiations, which had produced an 
agreement. Based on this secret consultation with Vessey, the ROK president decided to demand 
a compensatory scheme rather than to reject the American withdrawal programme.126 First, 
Habib tried to reassure the ROK president. Park pretended to resist the withdrawal plan but did 
not keep his position. The South Korean leader emphasised that the compensation should be 
implemented in parallel with the withdrawal of  US ground forces, while accepting the US pullout 
schedule. The president also did not forget to satirise the conflict between the White House and 
Congress: he said that he would only accept these terms if  the Congressmen who questioned the 
withdrawal plan approved of  it.127 
The US embassy in Seoul expected that the Blue House would request about 1.5 billion 
US dollars for compensation and modernization of  its forces. The State Department considered 
that the costs associated with a pullout were prohibitively high. Moreover, Seoul also requested 
Washington to return the operational control of  the ROK‘s armed forces back to the ROK 
government.128 He needed congressional approval to meet South Korea‘s excessive demands for 
compensation, but the legislature had no idea about this bill: Congress still had not considered 
whether they approved or disapproved of  the bill. Under such pressure, South Korea‘s excessive 
demands for compensatory measures left Carter no other choice but to back down.   
In addition, the revived discussion on the nuclear issue in South Korea presented the 
President Carter with an additional problem. In his cable to the State Department, US 
ambassador Sneider indicated that the ROK media had highlighted the nuclear issue in June. The 
interesting sentence in his report is ―This discussion is clearly tolerated by the ROK 
government.‖129 Park utilised the South Korean press to reveal his thoughts to Washington. In 
fact, during his meeting with other ROK elites at the Blue House in May, he said that he would 
develop nuclear missiles if  Carter removed American nuclear weapons from South Korea.130 It is 
possible that Park revealed his comments intentionally in order to agitate Washington. 
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Furthermore, the Blue House indirectly indicated its nuclear ambitions. Sneider stated, ―[The 
South Korean] Foreign Minister as well as the Deputy Prime Minister, reportedly speculated to 
the press some weeks ago that circumstances in Asia could force ROK consideration of  the 
nuclear option.‖131 
Even the ROK opposition parties opposed the pullout plan of  US forces. They argued 
that the US troops must stay in South Korea in order to prevent Park‘s suppression of  human 
rights.132 Their rhetoric is noteworthy: ―The US forces in ROK are the only available leverage on 
President Park toward respect for individual liberties within the country.‖133 It is true that Carter 
attempted to use the pullout of  US troops for checking Park‘s authoritarian rule.134 But the US 
president did not try to use the pullout plan as the leverage for a moral issue in South Korea in 
order not to stimulate Park. For instance, on 7th May, weeks before the discussion surrounding 
the pullout plan, Habib met Park and said that the White House does not link the human rights 
issue with the pullout of  US forces. The National Security Council and Carter considered that it 
would be a lot easier to persuade the Park regime if  they did not relate both issues.135 But his 
careless decision soon turned out to be a serious mistake. The problem was that Congress did 
consider the morality of  Park. Many members in the US legislature did not like Park due to the 
Korea-gate affair and his inhumane politics. 136However, in this instance, Carter was asking 
Congress to pass his bill for providing enormous military aid to the ‗evil‘ Park regime.137 It was a 
decisive blunder to separate the two policies of  the pullout of  US forces and human rights in 
South Korea, once Park did not oppose the withdrawal plan. Simply put, the US legislature felt 
that Carter had abandoned the oppressed South Korean citizens in order to withdraw the US 
troops, and was even willing to pay a lot of  money to the corrupted Park regime,138 two very 
different pledges conflicting with each other.  
Interestingly, even the South Korean opposition movement was mobilised by Park. 
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Although the South Korean leader did not officially object to the pullout of  US forces, he did 
not really want Washington to move ahead with its plan either. Park met Lee Chulseung, the 
party leader of  the New Democratic Party, the leading opposition, and explained the result of  his 
meeting with Habib and Brown. Because the opposition also did not approve of  Carter‘s plan, 
which would obviously undermine South Korean national security, Lee promised Park that he 
would express his antipathy toward the pullout plan to Habib.139The US official reported Lee‘s 
thoughts to the US Congress, just as Park had anticipated.140 That is, at first glance, the 
opposition groups challenged Park who seemingly agreed with Carter. But, indeed, they sided 
with Park and Vessey, both of  which sought to stall the plan.  
In addition, Carter‘s pledge was also rejected by Japan, America‘s most important partner 
in East Asia. South Korea and Japan shared their information about American policy making 
processes and cooperated to frustrate the pullout plan. It was the Japanese government that first 
requested of  the White House to provide compensatory measures to South Korea. This was the 
result of  close consultation between Seoul and Tokyo. The Japanese Premier, Fukuda Takeo, 
continuously demanded Jimmy Carter give up his plan in May, when the meeting between Park 
and Habib was held.141 Washington was not able to disregard Japanese opinion light-heartedly. 
Because of  Fukuda‘s insistent requests, the White House had to put the compensatory package 
on the agenda even before the ROK broached the compensatory options.142 
Finally and most importantly, the military movement of  North Korea got rid of  the 
fundamental rationale of  the Carter pledge, ―South Korea can repulse North Korean attack 
without US ground troops.‖ The DPRK built a formidable Panzer corps while encouraging the 
US president to push his plan. Before facing the stiff  opposition against his pledge, the US 
president had maintained good relations with Kim Ilsung, because Pyongyang welcomed Carter‘s 
withdrawal plan and made a consistent effort to reassure him. Since Carter had come into office 
in November 1976, Kim had sent him a personal letter, through Pakistan, to congratulate the 
new president. Moreover, in February 1977, North Korea expressed its intention to avoid 
conflict with Washington, to pursue peaceful reunification of  Korea, and to have direct talks 
with the US. Even though Carter could not have a direct contact with Kim because the North 
Korean Premier rejected the participation of  the Blue House, he lifted travel restrictions for US 
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citizens going to DPRK and invited Pyongyang‘s UN representative to an official US 
reception.143 
Yet Carter remained silent about the intelligence report on the North Korean military 
build-up. In order to materialise his pledge, he tried to hide the information and did not inform 
Congress. However, in June, the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of  Staff  reported their findings on 
North Korean armed power to the Senate without prior notice to the State Department. 
Zbigniew Brezezinski, the US National Security Advisor, outlined the desperate situation to 
President Carter on 10th June: 
 
We get conflicting reports of  how the Senate session went this afternoon. After Phil 
Habib‘s opening statement, Senator Case apparently read from notes of  a CIA briefing 
On the Korean threat. As he related it, the CIA briefing was extremely  
pessimistic, raising serious questions about the wisdom of  your policy. The CIA  
briefing took place a few days ago and was based on the intelligence assessment that 
was part of  our PRM effort. Apparently, CIA had not informed State that they had 
briefed the Committee nor of  the Committee‘s reaction.144‖ 
 
Regardless of  being subject to strong criticism for his plan in Congress, and the betrayal 
of  the intelligence agency, President Carter did not immediately delay his schedule. In his letter 
to the ROK president, he repeatedly emphasised that the withdrawal of  ground forces would be 
carried out as scheduled. The US president announced that, the US Secretary of  Defence Harold 
Brown, would discuss the plan with Park soon.145 
Unfortunately, for the impatient US president, he was unable to pass his bill before 
Harold Brown‘s meeting with Park. While the legislature had many reasons for maintaining US 
ground forces in the ROK, Carter was unable to present Congress with any convincing rationale 
for his plan. His only valid justification was the reminder that the ―troop withdrawal is my 
campaign pledge.‖146 On 21th July, Brezezinki eventually concluded that it was impossible to 
secure the legislative support without significant changes to the original plan. Regarding this 
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disappointing situation in Washington, the US National Security Advisor suggested Carter 
should re-consider the draft of  the pullout.147 
Yet this concern was not reflected in Harold Brown‘s meeting with Park. The US 
Secretary of  Defence delivered Carter‘s pullout scheme. The final phase of  the pullout would be 
carried out in 1982. Park did not directly oppose Carter as he had planned.148 However, he and 
other ROK leaders were well informed about the protracted conflict between the US Congress 
and the White House.149 Needless to say, Park did not believe that Carter could persuade the US 
legislature so easily, and he pretended to agree with the US president. It was clear that the Park-
Vessey connection and their strategy effectively eliminated Carter‘s support from Congress in 
1977.  
In short, Park frustrated the Carter administration‘s ambitious Korean policy in its first 
year, which ended with deep scepticism of  his political capabilities. The differences between the 
US military in the ROK and the US president effectively bogged down the withdrawal of  US 
ground forces. Park was able to take advantage of  the split among the American lawmakers, and 
mobilised almost every party related in the new US policy - even including his opposition in 
South Korea and the Japanese government - to stop it.  
However, not all of  Carter‘s efforts were ineffective. As discussed earlier, the Park 
regime felt serious pressure regarding the human rights issue, which had been all but ignored 
before Carter had moved into the White House. Indeed, the South Korean president mobilised 
illegal and/or immoral measures, such as bribery of  US Congressmen and mobilisation of  ROK 
public servants for his presidential campaign and election. And although his actions were 
generally tolerated by Johnson, Nixon, and Ford, they were not by Jimmy Carter. In this sense, 
the very existence of  the Yusin constitution that justified Park‘s lifetime tenure and draconian rule, 
which limited the political freedom in South Korea, eventually became Carter‘s main target 
within South Korean policy.  
In 1978, the barrage of  criticism from the US over the South Korean dictatorship 
began. Now, Carter saw another chance to realise his withdrawal pledge, and Park was not able to 
repel the offensive as easily as he had in 1977. The US president identified the flaw in his 
negotiations with Park, the separation between pullout and human rights. As the South Korean 
citizens started to resist their leader enthusiastically, Carter simply changed his priority from the 
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pullout, to the morality of  South Korean politics. Ironically, despite this change in his priority, 
the Carter‘s withdrawal plan finally began to gain more support both in the US and South Korea. 
In the second round of  Park-Carter discussions, Park faced a serious dilemma between the 
strength of  his dictatorship and security of  his country. Along with the determined challenge 
from the US leader, recent reinforcement of  North Korean ground forces deteriorated the 
stability of  South Korean security. Finally, the ROK president brought about a new 
breakthrough in neutralising both the American pressure and the North Korean threat, a 
proposal for another round of  inter- Korean talks and ROK-US summit meeting. Park tried to 
prevent the US pullout from South Korea and minimise his acceptance of  Carter‘s human rights 
recommendations with these arrangements.  
 
<3> The Road to the Summit Meeting, January 1978 to May 1979 
 
Because of  the heavy emphasis on the pullout issue, human rights in South Korea were 
not discussed as seriously as the withdrawal scheme in 1977. Even Jimmy Carter, who raised the 
profile of  those two issues in US politics, definitively separated them after Park had accepted 
Carter‘s pullout policy. Simply put, the American decision sounded unconditional, regardless of  
the moral perspective of  the Park regime.150 This turned out to be a serious mistake by Carter 
because Congress misunderstood the fact that the President had tried to ignore Park‘s despotic 
rule in order to rush his plan. As we discussed in the previous chapter, Park Chunghee paid more 
attention to human rights concerns in Washington, rather than the withdrawal issue, because he 
was convinced the US ground forces could not be transferred over night. Indeed, Carter had a 
hard time managing the pullout plan in 1977, and did not properly use the US ground forces in 
the ROK as leverage to press for an improvement of  the South Korean human rights record.  
Yet the democratic and liberal challenge to Park‘s dictatorship in South Korea gained 
strength after 1978. As time went by, ROK citizens became increasingly unsettled with their 
president, whom would not stand for re-election. For instance, the student protests that were 
directed against the government quickly attracted supporters: while there were thirteen such 
cases in 1976, the frequency had increased to twenty three in 1977, and reached thirty one in 
1978. Two-thirds of  these movements were held around 18th May  - the day on which the ROK 
held an election for representatives of  the National Council for Unification the political body 
that chose the president - and 6th July, the day on which the NCU elected Park as the ninth 
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president of  South Korea.151 This situation encouraged Jimmy Carter to effectively promote the 
retreat plan as leverage to press for progress human rights issue, and the withdrawal card started 
to show influence on South Korean politics. Until January 1979 when the US Congress found a 
decisive reason to stop the plan, the US president successfully promoted his idea in political 
circles. In order to address security concerns in the US Congress about the retreat, the US leader 
guaranteed that the pullout of  US ground troops would be carried out in a manner which 
preserved the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. This approach facilitated the passing of  
the bill for compensatory measures for South Korea, ―not for Park but for the security of  the 
ROK and East Asia.‖152 His stubborn efforts finally made Park consider that the pullout plan 
could be realised, and would seriously threaten national security. In January 1979, Park proposed 
a ROK-US summit meeting to the US president. Carter eventually changed his focus on South 
Korea from the pullout plan, which was almost impossible to implement, to human rights. He 
used the withdrawal policy to check the inhumane rule of  his counterpart in Seoul.153 
In addition, in order to prepare for a possible retreat of  US forces, the South Korean 
leader considered to reduce instability by engaging in inter-Korean talks - as he had done before 
1972.He attempted to open a new round of  negotiations with North Korea in early 1979. This 
effort, however, was very disappointing due to Pyongyang‘s indifference toward bilateral 
negotiations, which had already turned out useless for the North Korean goal, ‗the retreat of  US 
forces from Korea,‘ during their first contact. Due to the distinct gap between South and North 
Korea, Parks‘s efforts to reduce tensions did not produce any significant result on this occasion. 
Clearly, because he could not ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK leadership had to 
prevent the US troop withdrawal at any cost. Consequently, Park had no choice but to accept 
Carter‘s request for improving the human rights conditions. The two issues were discussed 
simultaneously in contentious talks between two the presidents in June 1979. These political 
deals changed South Korea‘s policy toward the US and North Korea before the ROK-US 
summit took place. 
On the first day of  1978, Park briefly mentioned the most important political events in 
South Korea: he hinted at two national elections to be held that year. One: to choose delegates 
for the National Conference for Unification; the other, to elect representatives for the National 
Assembly.154According to the Yusin constitution, the NCU, chaired by the South Korean 
president, elected the next president of  the ROK. In this way, Park had won the presidential vote 
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in December 1972, and expected a successful re-election six years later. The problem was that he 
was the sole candidate. The NCU was designed and firmly controlled by Park, which implied that 
the president was de facto ‗elected‘ by himself. He maintained the appearance of  a democratic 
system but never allowed any critical debate about his rule. Since the Communist threat had 
increased after the fall of  Saigon, ROK citizens did not seriously question this wartime structure 
until the mid-1970s. After all, it was Park himself  who failed to resolve the inter-Korean conflict. 
The fear of  war in South Korea gradually waned and thus could not be expected to sustain 
Park‘s lifetime tenure for much longer. People started to argue that the political system at the 
time was just a tool to legitimise and perpetuate Park‘s dictatorship. 155 Consequently, he 
increasingly lost his political base.  Thus, in this context, the 1978 election for NCU delegates 
was a very sensitive issue. In his new year‘s speech, Park did not touch upon the NCU election 
scheduled for July of  that year. However, Park Chunghee‘s careless suppression of  both of  his 
direct critics, and groups who opposed the prevailing decision-making process provided Carter 
with hints for his war against Park.156 
Meanwhile, Carter‘s bill was not seeing any progress. The US Congress, the military, and 
the CIA had forced him to make a major change in his draft. In April, the US president revised 
his plan: he decided to withdraw only one combat battalion from the 2nd Division on schedule, 
but keep the other two battalions in the ROK until 1979. Yet, he still urged the legislature to 
enact the authorization for military assistance for the ROK.157Unfortunately for Carter, his 
efforts toward his policy did not have any noticeable impact on South Korean politics. The US 
legislature had already lost its interest in the pointless discussions surrounding the bill, and kept 
rejecting it without any further presidential consultation. Carter‘s nervousness affected by his 
antagonists in Congress was well reflected in his reply to Park‘s letter. In this letter, dated 3rd May, 
Park expressed his gratitude for American help in ensuring the safe return of  passengers of  a 
Korean Airline flight, which had accidentally landed on Soviet territory on 21st April.158 Carter 
tried to hide his difficulties in Washington and emphasised ongoing progress of  the pullout plan. 
More importantly, however, he did not forget his remarks on political freedom in South Korea.  
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While the internal affairs of  your government are not my direct concern, you are  
aware of  the American people‘s strong commitment to the rights of  the individual. I 
am confident that you will find your society and government strengthened by the 
free interplay of  ideas, and I look forward confidently to further steps in the next 
few months along the road of  political evolution and freedom on which you are 
embarked.159 
 
The US president might have indicated his concern on the last NCU and upcoming 
presidential election in the organisation. It is noteworthy that Carter did not address the progress 
of  his pullout bill, but commented on the democratic environments in South Korea. Clearly, he 
started to use this moral concern as leverage on the military discussions and tried to deflect 
further criticism from Congress, which had questioned the moral aspects of  economic and 
military support as a form of  the compensatory measures of  the US pullout.  
Moreover, he also tried to facilitate his retreat policy through his contact with 
Pyongyang and diplomatic efforts with other Communist states. Kim Ilsung first suggested 
bilateral talks between the DPRK and the US through Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav leader. In 
his letter mentioned above, Carter indicated that he rejected Tito‘s proposal and promised he 
would not talk with Kim outside the presence of  ROK representatives. But he also urged Park to 
seek negotiations with North Korea in order to reduce the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In 
a nutshell, both North Korea and the US agreed on a three-party dialogue including South 
Korea.160 Coupled with his mentioning of  South Korean political freedom, Carter‘s negotiation 
with Pyongyang made the US legislature re-consider the withdrawal bill.161 In any case, with the 
presence of  Seoul‘s representative, the peace negotiation between Washington and Pyongyang 
was a useful justification for the pullout of  US troops from South Korea.  
Despite Carter‘s diplomatic manoeuvring, the South Korean president totally ignored 
the American leader. As far as bilateral talks between the US and North Korea were concerned, 
Park did not expect Carter to take a risk. He was aware of  Tito‘s suggestions to Washington 
from late March. On 31st March, Park had lunch with journalists and stated his opinion about the 
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talks. He said that the ROK did not need three-party talks, and that such a negotiation format 
would lead South Korea toward the same destiny of  South Vietnam.162 In his letter to the US 
president in June, Park expressed his unwillingness to join tripartite talks and suggested that 
North Korea was not sincerely interested in the resolution of  inter-Korean problems. Moreover, 
he did not remark on the election or democratic concern in South Korea.163 
Park was re-elected on 6th July with 2577 out of  2578 votes by the electoral college of  
NCU.164 This absurd rate of  ‗yes‘ vote and public resistance toward the authoritarian way of  
election enraged Carter. Evidently, he did not send any congratulatory message to the ROK 
president. Park, though, did not previously take Carter‘s hostility very hard. Since he had been 
able to frustrate the US leader in 1977, he held strong confidence both in his own capacity to 
rule and his feeling of  current national security. Now, though, the ROK president did not 
conceal his animosity toward Carter. On 30th September, he denied the speculations over a future 
US visit during a press lunch. According to Park, Carter suggested a summit meeting if  the Blue 
House set free Kim Daejung and other opposition leaders in 1977. The South Korean president 
added that he did not want to visit the US because he ‗hated‘ Carter.165 
However, Carter was more stubborn than Park thought. In spite of  his lengthy struggle 
with the US Congress, Carter firmly held his position to make good on his pledge. On 26th 
September, the president finally gained congressional support for his promise to provide military 
aid to Park, and the legislature subsequently passed the International Security Assistance Act of  1978. 
Although this law originally aimed at authorizing US arms transfers to Turkey for American 
policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean region, it could be applied to the South Korean case as 
well.166 In his letter to Park, dated 2nd November, the US leader expressed his pleasure in 
proceeding with his plan.167  The South Korean leadership adopted the opinion that, at that 
point in time, no one could stall Carter‘s plan. Park did not want to give up the US land forces in 
return for his previous ‗non-disagreement‘ stance, and in his reply to Carter, he requested talks 
with the US leader to discuss mutual concerns.168 Based on his previous statement ‗I do not 
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want to go to US because I hate him‘, his invitation to Carter implied a significant change of  
mind.169 He was desperate and needed to persuade President Carter to keep US ground forces in 
South Korea.  
The normalization between the US and the PRC further heightened Park‘s anxiety. On 
15th December, the US president sent another letter to Seoul emphasising his diplomatic 
achievement to Park.170 President Carter did not stop agitating his counterpart in South Korea, 
as just one week later, he conveyed his congratulatory message for Park‘s inauguration for his 
new presidency and suggested a meeting on December, 23rd.171 The ROK leader worried that 
Carter‘s diplomatic success and the East-West reconciliation trend had encouraged the pullout 
proponents in Washington. He presented his thoughts regarding the recent Sino-US 
normalization and its impact on inter-Korean relationship to Carter:  
 
[…] It is my hope that the establishment of  diplomatic relations between the United 
      States and the ―People‘s Republic of  China‖ and the accompanying improvement in 
 dialogue between the two countries will contribute to reducing tension and enhancing 
peace in the Asian and Pacific region. […] However, what keeps me concerned is that 
we may fall into an error of  overestimating the role of  China and of  underestimating 
the impact of  diplomatic and military manoeuvres of  the Soviet Union in our area. I 
am also concerned over the attitude of  North Korea, which may find some 
disadvantage in the current efforts of  China to cultivate closer and friendly relations 
with the United States and other Western powers. […]172 
 
The ROK leader was certainly concerned about the impact of  an improved US 
relationship with China. Park worried that Carter might want Beijing to rebuild its diplomatic 
relationship with Seoul and use Chinese influence on Pyongyang in order to reduce the tension 
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on the Korean Peninsula. This scenario would have provided perfect conditions to promote a 
pullout policy. Yet the Chinese Vice-premier, Deng Xiaoping, who visited the US in January 1979, 
rejected Carter‘s proposal for direct talks between the PRC and South Korea. Even worse, he 
refused to push Kim Ilsung, since the PRC feared losing its influence over the DPRK, just as the 
USSR had before.173 
Despite Park‘s concern, Carter‘s efforts for US relations with China did not produce any 
political impact on the pullout scheme. Deng did not want to destabilise the Chinese footing in 
North Korean politics due to Sino-Soviet split.174 In 1978, the PRC promised to provide 
economic aid to the DPRK and keep a good relationship with Kim Ilsung in order to keep the 
Soviet Union in check. Clearly, it was Kim who could change the balance between Beijing and 
Moscow in East Asia. Even though North Korea was more likely to rely on China than the 
USSR, it could change its primary patron relatively freely. For this reason, during the UN general 
assembly in September 1978, Beijing supported the North Korean idea, stating that ‗the Korean 
problem must be settled by Koreans, and the US forces must leave from the Korean Peninsula.‘ 
Furthermore, Moscow which had lost much of  its influence on Pyongyang, started to make 
friendly gestures toward South Korea. The Soviet representative called South Korea by its official 
name, Republic of  Korea, for the first time ever in the UN assembly.175 This Sino-Soviet rivalry 
staged on Korea blocked the direct influence of  those patrons of  Pyongyang. Deng, therefore, 
was reluctant to make any move that could deteriorate his relationship with Kim. Consequently, 
Carter‘s diplomatic relations with Deng did not produce any breakthrough regarding a lasting 
peace in Korea, and did not contribute to his withdrawal policy as he expected. 
Moreover, although Carter could pass the bill for compensatory measures following the 
US pullout, the US president did not gain support for his ultimate goal, the withdrawal bill, itself. 
In practice, he eventually faced the most serious challenge from Congress. The most important 
justification for Carter and his new South Korean policy was that this reduction programme be 
―carried out in a manner which preserves the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.‖176 
However, President Carter and his officials in the executive branch concealed a CIA report 
indicating military superiority of  the DPRK over the ROK.177This information was leaked out, 
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however. In early January, 1979, Samuel S. Stratton, the Chair of  the Investigations 
Subcommittee, and Robin L. Beard, the ranking Minority Member in the US Congress, requested 
the release of  the CIA report on the updated estimate of  North Korean military power after 
they had come across such information in the January issue of  Army Times. Stratton and Beard 
found one article in the issue stating that Pyongyang had 600 manoeuvrable battalions, ―more 
than double of  the South Korean total.‖178 But there were more serious statements that the two 
Congressmen could not ignore: the article argued that this information was presented to ―key 
Congressional committees in secret session‖… and ―the new estimates have been confirmed by 
the CIA.‖179 Although Stratton and Beard were briefed on some military issues involving the 
Korean Peninsula in 1977, they were unaware of  this specific intelligence report.  
In their letter to Carter, the angry Congressmen demanded the president share the 
CIA‘s findings as soon as possible and delay the discussion on the pullout plan.180 This ―Army 
Times‖ scandal nullified Carter‘s efforts for his Korean policy in 1978, so that the discussion on 
the withdrawal bill returned to the starting line. The NSC members considered this scandal as a 
good opportunity to stop their president‘s reckless action. In his interview with a South Korean 
journalist in 1987, Brezezinki said that no one in the White House agreed with Carter about his 
pullout plan at the beginning, even though he could not reject his president‘s policy due to his 
status.181 Brezezinski replied to Beard, that he understood the viewpoint of  Congress, and 
promised to consult with the legislature.182 
On 22nd January, President Carter had to issue another order to the NSC. Based on the 
new executive order, the decision makers needed review the change in the military power 
between the two Koreas, and seek out diplomatic ways to reduce tension on the Korean 
Peninsula.183 Frustratingly for Carter, the withdrawal plan was delayed again, and almost fell 
through, because many members of  Congress felt he had deceived them. He had to hold further 
troop withdrawals.184 Carter‘s threat, and the realization of  the pullout policy, was not as serious 
as the ROK leader had feared.  
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The problem, however, was that Park could not exactly understand how the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry affected inter-Korean affairs, nor how the ―Army Times‖ scandal was serious enough to 
frustrate Carter. First, Park did not believe that Moscow really wanted to improve its relations 
with him. In the UN general assembly, the USSR neither supported nor opposed the DPRK‘s 
motivations, even though it referred to South Korea as the Republic of  Korea. The Kremlin 
seemed reluctant to drop Pyongyang easily. The KCIA was also cautious toward this Soviet 
approach, as it argued that the friendly Soviet attitude toward South Korea might only be a bluff  
for the benefit of  North Korea, rather than a sincere effort for rapprochement with Seoul.185 
Secondly, the ROK government did not know that Carter was unable to manage the 
retreat bill any longer. According to Kim Jeongryeom, the Park regime was not aware of  that 
most or all of  the White House officials disagreed with the President until Brezizinski exposed 
the fact in 1987.186 In Park‘s understanding, the US government review of  the pullout policy just 
delayed the schedule, but could not really erase the plan on the list of  presidential pledges to be 
upheld. Therefore, he had to prepare for the US withdrawal, and stop the US president by 
himself, if  necessary. 
So, in January 1979, Seoul proposed the summit meeting to Washington once again. 
While preparing for the ROK-US summit and a possible US retreat from its soil, the South 
Korean leadership began to consider another option to shore up national security. It tried to 
reduce the North Korean threat through another round of  inter-Korean talks. On 19th January, 
Park suggested negotiations aiming for a mutual non-aggression pact. He promised that he 
would not prevent the withdrawal of  US troops if  North Korea agreed to his terms. The South 
Korean leader considered that at this rate, Carter would make good on his pledge. As a safeguard, 
the mutual non-aggression pact was essential to maintain national security for the ROK.  
Pyongyang, though, saw through Seoul‘s intentions, and was not so naïve as to lose its 
initiative in the inter-Korean affairs. On 23rd January, the central committee of  the United 
Democratic Front of  the Fatherland responded positively to Park‘s proposal, indicating it would 
like to welcome talks with Seoul if  they could put an end to hostilities in the DMZ. However, 
Pyongyang also wanted to involve oppositions and other anti-government parties in South Korea, 
along with the ROK government in this dialogue. Kim Ilsung‘s response to Park soundly 
illustrated his view that this contact must be the platform for ―all Korean peoples,‖ rather than 
just the political elites. The UDFFL was the only branch of  the DRPK Labour party who did 
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not have any practical authority for inter-Korean affairs. Moreover, the DPRK representatives 
for the negotiations between the two Koreas were not government authorities, but members of  
UDFFL.187 
Essentially, Kim Ilsung did not have any intention to help Park reduce the impact of  an 
American retreat. The inter-Korean meeting became pointless due to a lack of  authority 
bestowed upon the North Korean representatives: both sides met three times on 17th February, 
7th March, and 14th March, but the most significant issue they discussed was to organise a South-
North table tennis team for the world table tennis championship.188 
Consequently, Park did not contribute to reducing tensions between the two Koreas. 
Because of  his pointless efforts in the inter-Korean dialogues in early 1979, Park became more 
desperate for the summit meeting with Carter, scheduled to take place in that summer.189 He 
believed that he must stop the US pullout at any cost. For this, Park was even willing to seriously 
discuss human rights issues with Carter, because he considered that to be less harmful to his rule. 
Carter also wanted to meet Park but did not intend to discuss his pullout policy with him. Rather, 
the US leader attempted to encourage Park to join three-party talks among the two Koreas and 
the US in order to revive congressional support for the bill. Moreover, he wanted to discuss the 
human rights issue in South Korea.190 In short, the two presidents had totally different agendas 
for their summit meeting in June and July 1979, and were reluctant to address their counterpart‘s 
key concerns.  
This difference, however, ultimately resulted in their dramatic compromise. Carter‘s 
continuous quest for a withdrawal bill and the dynamic international movement in East Asia 
profoundly changed the dynamics of  the Park-Carter conflict. Thanks to the challenge of  the US 
military and Congress toward their president in 1977, the ROK government expected the demise 
of  the pullout plan in 1978. However, the US president did not give up his intentions. Even 
though he suffered a serious setback and embarrassment as a consequence of  ―The Army Times‖ 
scandal in January 1979, his commitment and diplomatic efforts to improve relations with the 
PRC and North Korea put Park under pressure. The ROK president attempted to reduce the 
North Korean threat in order to prepare for the potential retreat of  US land forces. However, 
the disappointing result of  inter-Korean talks in early 1979 greatly complicated the South 
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Korean leader‘s task to bolster national security. Park‘s position in the pullout issue totally 
changed: the South Korean president now clearly emphasised the importance of  US troops for 
ROK national security and was willing to accept Washington‘s request for the improvement of  
human rights to some extent. Despite his diplomatic efforts, however, Park‘s readiness for 
concessions regarding the human rights issue further encouraged the public resistance toward 
him after the summit meeting. Eventually, the 62-year-old president of  South Korea met his end 
because of  the public‘s aspirations for democracy in October 1979. 
  
(4) The ROK-US summit meeting and end of  the Park regime: the birth of  a new Northern and 
foreign policy  
 
The summit meeting marked the beginning of  the end of  Park‘s rule, since it catalysed 
the protest actions of  ROK citizens further and, at the same time, divided the political elites.191 
Washington pushed Seoul to consider a more lenient rule. Park‘s concessions inspired his 
domestic enemies who already harboured a strong antipathy toward him due to economic and 
social reasons. First, since mid- 1970s, the ROK government had faced violent protests of  
manual labourers complaining about their poor working conditions. In this situation, the second 
oil shock threw the economy into turmoil, and strengthened the existing anti-government 
sentiment. The global economic downturn had a devastating effect on the South Korean 
economy. Many companies shut down due to dramatic increases in operating costs, and a lot of  
workers lost their jobs and/or salaries. This economic depression resulted in intensifying the 
existing antipathy toward Park, whose long-term rule had been justified by stellar performances 
in the two key areas of  economic development and national security.192 Moreover, the Park 
regime wrongly assumed that their harsh punishment of  protesters was essential to keeping the 
integrity and stability of  the ROK economy and blocking the rise of  any leftist ideology. In fact, 
this draconian approach only sparked adverse chain reactions: the brutality of  security forces in 
quenching public protests drew attention to Park‘s image as a despotic leader, which led to 
encouraging student protests.193 The political opposition joined this anti-Park trend. Under their 
new leader, Kim Youngsam, the New Democratic Party supported demonstrations of  manual 
labourers and students. Inspired by Washington, the democratic resistance became stronger and 
brought down the dictatorship as well as its foreign policy mantra: ―anticommunism‖. 
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Upon deciding to meet with Park Chunghee, Jimmy Carter asked him to consider the 
human rights situation. One of  the important justifications for the pullout policy was that the US, 
as a matter of  principle, refused to support dictatorial regimes, and Carter did not want the US 
public to regard this summit dialogue as giving any kind of  political support for the unpopular 
and undemocratic Park regime. Clearly, the US president intended to use this opportunity to 
improve his influence on South Korea and facilitate both the pullout of  ground forces and the 
furthering of  human rights.194  
The US public perception of  this summit discussion did not differ from his expectation. 
For instance, in March 1979, 37 American missionaries in the ROK sent a letter to Washington 
and called for Carter to cancel the upcoming summit. They argued that since the Park regime 
had lost popular support, the Park-Carter meeting could be misunderstood as American backing 
of  the regime.195 Once the Blue House found out about the opposition movement run by 
American missionaries on its territory, its activities were suppressed and its participants 
expelled.196 This South Korean action worsened American concerns even before the summit 
meeting. Following this, through the US ambassador to ROK, William Gleysteen, Carter 
attempted to push Park toward significant action in the human rights field, e.g. to release political 
prisoners.197 However, Gleysteen, the successor of  Richard Sneider, disagreed with the President. 
Gleysteen argued that Park would not take any suggestions for political freedom in his country 
before having direct talks with Carter.198 As both camps agreed to hold a summit dialogue in 
June and July, this American pressure became meaningless.  
Despite Park‘s indifference to American requests, however, the democratic situation in 
South Korea changed, and the resistance toward Park gained in strength. At the New Democratic 
Party convention on 30th May, Kim Youngsam won the election for the chairmanship against the 
incumbent Lee Cheolseung.  As a hardliner of  South Korea‘s main opposition party, Kim 
declared his victory with his ambition to restore democracy in South Korea.199 Park did not want 
Kim to be elected. But it did not go Park‘s way. Kim started to encourage the democratic 
resistance toward the dictatorship. In a nutshell, Park suddenly had to face two enemies, Carter 
and Kim, both of  whom shared the same ambitions for South Korean democracy. 
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In June, the US president still kept his pullout pledge in mind although his advisers 
considered how to stop processing the pullout plan. On 7th June, Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of  
State, convened a meeting of  the Policy Review Committee in order to discuss the withdrawal 
policy. The committee suggested that the White House should consider diplomatic measures for 
a peaceful and pivotal role in East Asia, to pave the way for the future pullout of  US forces. Yet 
the committee‘s main idea was to stop processing the pullout plan, as at that precise moment it 
was not realistic, due to strong resistance from Congress. Specifically, they thought Washington 
should request Seoul increase defence spending and improve its political freedom in order to 
stabilise the Korean Peninsula.200 However, the US president did not give in. He hoped that 
planned peace negotiations between Seoul, Pyongyang, and Washington would revive his pullout 
bill in Congress, and ordered the US embassy in Seoul to discuss this topic with Park.  
The US ambassador, William Gleysteen, was worried of  further estrangement between 
the two allies before the summit talks.201 The South Korean officials opposed the idea of  
tripartite talks. Seoul feared Washington would sell it in the very same way that brought down 
Saigon. Interestingly, though, the South Korean president said that he would agree to consider it 
‗only if  the US is willing to stop the discussion on the withdrawal.‘202 Probably, Park also did not 
want the tripartite talks but did not reject US proposal for his meeting with Carter in July.  
However, South Korea‘s positive response did not make any impact on the decision of  
Carter‘s advisers. The NSC made a unanimous recommendation that the US president suspend 
further reduction of  US troops from South Korea.203 Simply put, the US president could not 
revive his pullout bill with the tripartite card. Without any fruitful result in their pre-summit 
negotiations, both leaders met in late June.      
Due to their mutual hostility, the summit talks between two presidents were not smooth 
from the start. On 29th June, Carter arrived in Seoul via Tokyo where he had attended the G7 
meeting. He just shook hands with Park - who had waited for him more than two hours due to a 
delay of  Carter‘s flight - and directly headed to his residence on the US army base.204 Park 
Dongjin, the ROK Foreign Minister, testified that although both leaders shook hands, their first 
meeting was very awkward.205 They appeared to be preparing for the ―quarrel‖ expected for the 
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next morning. This interpretation was no exaggeration: according to Gleysteen, their meeting 
was one of  the most terrible summit meetings he had ever attended.206  
Gleysteen, who wanted to restore the ROK-US relations through this meeting, was very 
disappointed with the serious and warlike atmosphere. Both stubborn leaders did not listen to 
the other. It was Park who started the battle. Through the US ambassador, Carter‘s aides had 
requested Park not to talk about the pullout plan, which was on the verge of  termination in the 
US Congress. Gleysteen clearly delivered the American intentions to Kim Yongsik, the ROK 
ambassador to the US. However, Park just ignored it. The withdrawal agenda was his sole interest 
in meeting with Carter. Without any explanation for the process of  summit talks, for 45 minutes 
including time for interpretation, the ROK president lectured why the withdrawal of  US troops 
was not conducive for maintaining security on the Korean Peninsula, in East Asia, and the 
Capitalist block in general.207 The US president, who was attending an unexpected lecture, was 
angry. During Park‘s torturing oration, the angry American leader passed a note to Vance, ―If  he 
goes on like this much longer, I‘m going to pull every troop out of  the country.‖208 
After having a short break, both presidents had a private dialogue. Extremely annoyed 
by Park‘s lengthy lecture, Carter flatly stated that he rejected Park‘s demand to cancel the 
withdrawal scheme and was not willing to make any promises. He also argued that South Korea 
should increase its defence spending to balance the military capabilities between the South and 
the North. Park responded that he needed time to increase allocated additional funds for the 
military. Facing the South Korean‘s determined words, Carter moved on to discuss human rights 
issues. He demanded from Park to lift his Emergency Decree no. 9 that banned any discussion 
and criticism of  the Yusin Constitution.209 Regarding this political freedom issue, Park calmly 
said that he would carefully consider Carter‘s advice, even though he could not lift the decree due 
to the continuous threat from North Korea.210 
Their first meeting had accomplished nothing to reduce animosity or establish 
agreement. In retrospect, it was a huge mistake by Park to provoke Carter. However, the US 
president also made a mistake: despite his many demands he ignored the South Korean‘s first 
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priority, to stop the withdrawal plan. As the Policy Review Committee and NSC suggested, 
Carter considered stopping his plan, which was on the verge of  termination in the US legislature, 
even before his summit meeting.211 However, he was too angry to negotiate with Park. As a 
result, their first dialogue became an emotional quarrel rather than a rational discussion. Both 
leaders completely lost sight of  why they had convened a summit in the first place. Moreover, 
after talking with Park, Carter had a meeting with Kim Youngsam, chairman of  the main 
opposition party, for thirteen minutes, three minutes more than the original schedule. Because 
Carter and Kim talked about the negative aspects of  Park‘s regime, this extensive meeting time 
also heightened hostilities between the two summit parties.212 
Immediately after finishing the first day of  the summit, Carter held an agitated 
discussion with his aides in the limousine en route to the US ambassador‘s residence. The US 
President was very angry with his counterpart in Seoul who seemingly did not understand the 
purpose of  his visit. For this reason, the US ambassador to Seoul was the main target of  Carter‘s 
criticism. Gleysteen was severely scolded for his poor performance in communicating with the 
Blue House. The American president urged his aides to formally deliver his demands, which he 
had already made, to Park that day to the Blue House.213 Vance and Gleysteen immediately 
talked with South Korean officials about what they could offer to the Blue House and what they 
wanted in return. In this ministerial meeting, both camps finally managed to maintain a rational 
discussion. This time, they reached an agreement without rapidly.  
Vance then dropped a hint to the ROK government on how to soothe Carter: he 
provided a list of  political prisoners in South Korea and requested their release. On 1st July, 
before the US leader‘s departure, Park promised to increase its defence spending to 6% of  GNP 
and said that he ―understood‖ Carter‘s concern on the human rights issue.214 The US president 
was willing to pay for the South Korean favour. In his last meeting with Park in the afternoon of  
1st July, Carter also promised that he would seek for a ―satisfying conclusion‖ on the pullout 
policy that took into account Park‘s demands.215 According to the joint communiqué, announced 
the same day, both camps additionally agreed to have three-party talks along with Pyongyang.216  
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The atmosphere at the farewell after the summits was totally different from the first 
meeting between Park and Carter. Both leaders went to the airport in the same limousine and 
had a private talk. Carter even conveyed his Christian idea to Park.217 On 5th July, via the US 
embassy, Seoul sent a message to Washington that it intended to conduct the release of  180 
political prisoners in line with Carter‘s request. On 20th July, President Carter announced that the 
US government had suspended the discussion on the withdrawal policy.218 
Many scholars have argued that this summit meeting meant the end of  Carter‘s two 
pledges for South Korea, and the US president had failed to push Park to change his domestic 
politics and anticommunist policy. Based on the joint communiqué, which only includes one 
section for human rights among 21 articles, it is considered that the US failed to establish moral 
politics in South Korea. Especially, the communiqué appeared to emphasise the mutual 
cooperation between Seoul and Washington in the military and economic fields. Lee Samsung, 
Kim Bongjung, and Donald S. Spencer criticised the summit dialogue as an elaborate show to 
hide Carter‘s failure in negotiations.219 Because the Blue House had a negative idea on three-
party talks and fundamental change in the inter-Korean relations by the diplomatic measure, 
even after the announcement of  joint communiqué, this argument partially makes sense.220 
However, this interpretation is not exact.  
First of  all, as Park Wongon indicated, the joint communiqué, announced publicly, 
could not reflect the details of  South Korea‘s sensitive information that it would release its 
political prisoners and promise concessions in its domestic politics. In fact, the yield of  the Park 
regime encouraged their antagonists, who believed Washington supported them.221 Moreover, in 
contrast to the American concern on the summit talks, negative public opinion in South Korea 
about the Park regime did not change. It became worse due to the economic hardship that 
abounded, and Park‘s ineffective and harsh rule. Because of  the second oil shock, many 
companies enacted worker lay-offs or stopped paying wages. As a result, the labour movement 
consisted of  very large numbers. The Blue House suppressed it with an iron fist, but, at the same 
time, sparked protests of  students who questioned necessity for differences between Park‘s 
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Korean-style democracy and Western-style democracy. Before Park‘s death in October, the massive 
student and labour protests erupted in the major cities of  ROK.222 In this situation, the new 
NDP leader, Kim Youngsam, sided with workers and students.  
His anti-Park spirit enraged the Park regime. Despite numerous attempts of  the ROK 
government to eliminate Kim from the political arena, the democratic leader never stopped his 
resistance toward Park. Because he believed that Carter had successfully pushed Park to improve 
South Korean democratic environment during the summit talks, Kim appealed to Washington 
for support to his democratic movement. During his interview with The New York Times, Kim 
publicly demanded Washington to put additional pressure on Park:  
 
[…] Whenever I tell American officials that only by public and direct pressure on 
Park can the U.S. bring him under control, they say that they cannot interfere in the 
domestic politics of  South Korea,‖ he said. ―This is a phony theory,‖ he 
continued.―Doesn‘t the U.S. have 30,000 ground troops here to protect us? What is 
that if  not interference in domestic affairs?‖223 
 
Regarding the fierce condemnation of  the Park regime by Kim and the opposition 
movement, Gleysteen indicated that those antagonists expected Washington to force Park to 
yield more. He confirmed that the summit meeting had, in fact, undermined Park‘s rule.224 
Indeed, the US ambassador had continuously conveyed Carter‘s concerns about the recent 
upheavals in South Korea and criticised Park for his political violence against Kim Youngsam 
and other people whom Carter had met during his visit to Seoul. On 27th September, Washington 
delivered a strong message to Seoul: during his meeting with the ROK Foreign Minister, Richard 
Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of  State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said that the 
White House would stop providing loans to the ROK because of  Park‘s brutal repression of  
opposition groups.225 Nonetheless, infuriated by the provocative actions of  the young chairman 
of  the NDP, Park decided to eliminate his political opponents from the political arena once and 
for all. This strong response revived the Carter distaste towards him. After Park cancelled Kim‘s 
membership in the National Assembly on 4th October, the White House summoned Gleysteen 
to Washington. The South Korean leader stated that it was impossible to tolerate any more 
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protests.226 Despite their dramatic reconciliation only two months earlier, both governments 
resumed their conflict. Even though Park had released the political prisoners, as Carter had 
demanded, he did not stop the harsh punishment of  his critics, which led to a deterioration of  
human rights conditions in South Korea. Without any doubt, ROK-US relations were worse than 
before the summit meeting.  
Park might have believed that the anti- government movement would not last long and 
could be reined in only using strong measures. He anticipated that his enemies would be further 
encouraged if  he ruled as leniently as Carter had requested. Yet Kim Jaekyu, who was in charge 
of  quelling the protests, felt the limits of  violent repression and took American 
recommendations seriously. The KCIA director was under pressure from the endless row of  
student rallies protesting Park‘s dictatorship. Before he was sentenced to death for murdering the 
ROK president, Kim clearly demonstrated the differences between him and Park regarding the 
response toward the protesters. He wanted to accept the American requests for moral 
consideration for political criminals and to improve the ROK-US relationship.227 However, Park 
ignored his opinion. Clearly, because Carter had already stopped discussions on the withdrawal 
of  US ground forces from South Korea, the ROK president did not see any benefit for 
additional concessions in the international context.  
Kim Jaekyu feared for his future. He knew what had happened to his predecessors who 
had gotten into conflict with Park. For instance, he ordered Kim Jaekyu to kill Kim Hyungwook, 
who had criticised the president and had a vast knowledge of  Park‘s secrets.228 Even though 
there was no clear evidence for the reasons why he murdered Park, the rebellious officer might 
have worried about Park‘s severe punishment because of  his failure to quell the protests. As the 
president kept reprimanding him frequently, the KCIA director was extremely angry with Park, 
with whom he had attended the Army Academy.  
On 26th October, Kim Jaekyu killed Park.229 In some sense, the democratic resistance 
and the ROK-US split acted together to finish Park‘s regime. Kim stated later that he had killed 
Park to ensure the revival of  South Korean democracy and the restoration of  ROK-US 
relations.230 And he also argued that the US embassy signalled that Washington would condone 
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Park‘s removal from office.231 Considering his comments during the trial, Kim might have 
believed that the South Korean public, and Carter, could protect him from being prosecuted by 
the remnants of  Park‘s regime. However, the KCIA director made two important miscalculations: 
first, he himself  had been a senior member of  the regime and had directed the brutal 
suppression of  the protesters. For South Korean citizens, his assassination was the result of  a 
power struggle that led to rebellious action. The US president, the self-proclaimed advocate of  
moral politics, was not able to protect the murderer. Secondly, and even worse, he failed to 
dominate South Korean politics since the ROK military quickly learned what happened in the 
night of  26th October. Chun Doohwan who took over supreme command of  South Korea‘s 
military quelled the chaos on the streets. Kim was arrested and executed in May 1980, six months 
after he had shot Park. Over the following months, other high-ranking members of  the regime 
were replaced.232 
The demise of  South Vietnam opened a new era of  South Korean history. The 
subsequent fluctuation of  American policy toward the ROK undermined the stability of  the 
Park regime and eventually contributed to its end. After Saigon had collapsed, Park had 
questioned the reliability of  American support. Especially after 1973, South and North Korea 
revived their mutual hostilities. The pullout of  US forces from Vietnam then alarmed Park. The 
Blue House had to find ways to maintain national security to compensate for the withdrawal of  
US units.  
Until 1976, Seoul struggled to bolster its national security by pursuing a nuclear 
weapons program. Washington detected this desperate effort in early 1975. Ford and Kissinger 
considered that the South Korean development of  nuclear missiles would unsettle the military 
balance in East Asia by encouraging nuclear proliferation in the region. Under strong American 
pressure, the Blue House halted the development, but demanded the American commitment to 
South Korea. For this request, Ford moved forth on his doctrine and guaranteed the US 
intervention in the inter-Korean conflict. He confirmed this after the axe murder in the DMZ by 
supporting Park in punishing North Korea. As Pyongyang did not challenge this joint ROK-US 
retaliation, Park was assured of  the viability to maintain national security with the American 
power. Although it is highly doubtful that the Ford administration accepted Park‘s Cold War 
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mindset, the progress of  operation Paul Bunyan in the DMZ suggests that Ford aimed to assure 
American commitment to the security of  US/East Asian allies after the fall of  South Vietnam. 
Coupled with ROK-US nuclear discussion, the inter-Korean military conflict and US 
intervention in the early post-Vietnam era re-confirmed the United States‘ role in South Korean 
politics and South Korea‘s Cold War confrontational strategy against communists.233  
Yet as Jimmy Carter took over the Oval Office, the partnership between Seoul and 
Washington was seriously questioned, and Park Chunghee faced his worst crisis ever. Carter‘s 
pullout plan of  US ground troops threatened the foundation of  South Korean security and its 
aggressive policy toward the DPRK. The new US president‘s emphasis on humanitarian rule in 
the American ally states provided a strong justification to his policy toward Seoul which had been 
infamous for its despot and immoral political contact to US politicians.234 However, because 
South Korea cancelled its nuclear plan in 1976, it lost a powerful leverage for its negotiation with 
the United States. Even worse, the South Korean elites did not seriously consider the moral 
aspect of  their rule. Without any doubt, South Korea became the model case of  new US foreign 
policy.  
Until early 1978, Park was able to prevent the passage of  the bill in the US Congress 
using the cooperation of  US military commanders responsible for South Korea. However, Carter 
did not give up his plan. The White House‘s persistence pushed the Blue House to consider a 
deal concerning the human rights issue. For Park, who failed to ease tension on the Korean 
Peninsula through his talks with Kim Ilsung, the US land forces were essential for national 
security. Despite their mutual dislike, Park and Carter agreed on a summit dialogue in order to 
attain their respective political interests. During the meeting in June and July 1979, Seoul and 
Washington narrowed their gap, agreed to suspend the withdrawal plan and improve the human 
rights conditions in South Korea.235 Without any doubt, Park was pleased to keep the US forces 
essential to his confrontational policy toward Pyongyang. Yet he underestimated the encouraging 
influence the ROK-US talks had on the South Korean pro-democracy movement.  
In South Korea, the summit meeting incited public resistance toward the Park regime 
which had already been fierce due to an economic downturn following the second oil shock.236 
Many of  Park‘s enemies were convinced that Carter had successfully conveyed the American 
moral concerns to the ROK president during their summit meeting. They expected that the 
White House would push Park to agree on further democratic changes if  they persistently 
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challenged his authoritarian rule. The president, however, continued to suppress his critics, which 
reignited hostilities between him and Carter. 237 Park did not consider that he had no leverage to 
nullify Carter‘s pressure on his rule and tried to keep both his political power and US forces in 
South Korea. The serious tensions between the Park regime and ordinary people, and between 
Seoul and Washington sparked dissent among the political leadership and eventually motivated 
Park‘s assassination. Park‘s two-decade –long rule, in which he had persistently tried to resist the 
global trend towards democracy and détente, were abruptly brought to an end by the bullet of  
his own subordinate.  
Park‘s unexpected demise triggered the revival of  South Korean democracy and its 
reconciliation with the communists. During his tenure, he continued to keep his own Cold War 
mindset in spite of  frequent, and often unexpected, changes of  his main diplomatic partners, the 
US presidents. As such, his foreign policy, including his approach toward the North, reflected the 
global political changes and domestic democratic challenge he faced. The mutual mistrust 
between Park Chunghee and Kim Ilsung, coupled with Park‘s aspiration for absolute power, 
prevented the sincere reconciliation between the two Koreas. Needless to say, the collapse of  the 
communist bloc was the decisive factor for the normalization between South Korea and the 
communists, including North Korea, during the 1990s. Nonetheless, we cannot negate that the 
end of  Park‘s dictatorship, and his conflict with Kim Ilsung, accelerated the end of  Cold War in 
East Asia. Indeed, the fiercest period in the Cold War history of  South Korea was closed in the 
late 1979.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
237 William H. Gleysteen and William H. Gleysteen Jr, op. cit., 51. 
  
190 
 
Conclusion: South Korea’s Northern and General Foreign Policy in the Late Cold War 
 
Park‘s death opened a new era of  South Korean history. The ROK entered a 
transitional period, transformed itself  into a civilian regime and started to consider its 
relationships with the communist powers in earnest.1 Even though another military official, 
Chun Doohwan, staged a coup in December and delayed this trend, liberals, encouraged by the 
collapse of  the Park regime, vigorously struggled to institute a democratic government and 
worked towards the normalisation of  relations with the communists. In an unexpected turn of  
events, the American reluctance to prevent the establishment of  a new military regime after 
Park‘s demise resulted in the rise of  an anti-US sentiment across South Korea.2 Carter was 
criticised by the South Korean public for not stopping Chun‘s coup, and not punishing him for 
the genocide he conducted in Kwangju.3Carter‘s successor in the White House, Ronald Reagan, 
invited Chun to Washington in January 1981. For South Koreans, Reagan‘s decision sounded like 
the American recognition of  another Park Chunghee.4 In some sense, the US lost its role as 
guardian of  South Korean democracy. The fury of  South Korean citizens directed at their new 
military regime, and the US, further undermined the basis of  Chun regime and the Cold War 
ideology in South Korea. Chun Doohwan, who mimicked Park, ended his tenure in the late 
1980s. Then the ROK returned to holding direct presidential elections.  
In terms of  diplomacy, South Korea initiated relationships with communist countries 
due to fading global Cold War tensions and a new ideological discourse in its society. The Chun 
regime prepared to establish relations with the USSR, and its successor, Roh Taewoo, finally 
normalised ROK-Soviet relations in 1990. In 1992, President Kim Youngsam established 
diplomatic relations with the PRC, and Park‘s old rival, President Kim Daejung, dramatically 
improved the inter-Korean relations with his liberal sunshine policy. Clearly, the collapse of  the 
communist bloc was decisive for reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and helped South 
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Korean diplomacy with communist countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s.5  
The rise of  a liberal ideology after Park‘s death also encouraged this nordpolitik 
diplomacy in South Korea, which had maintained an aggressive policy toward communism until 
the early 1980s. In short, the demise of  the Park regime, which espoused anticommunism and 
Korean- style democracy, led first to another military regime in South Korea, but eventually opened 
the way for establishing a democratic and liberal nation later.6 
This case study showed how and why the ROK defined their own concepts of  the Cold 
War, specifically with the decision making process of  its leadership in the 1960s and 70s, during 
the Park regime. Throughout the Cold War era, the Republic of  Korea had intensely competed 
with its rival, the Democratic People‘s Republic of  Korea. The gradual eclipse of  the communist 
bloc in the late 1960s and 1970s, and American hardship in the Vietnam War, pushed the 
participants in the Cold War to join the global détente trend.7 Nonetheless, this does not 
necessarily mean that all participants followed this line of  thinking. More accurately, some 
countries did not consider that the victory or defeat of  their camp decided their own destiny.  
South Korea was one of  those cases. Simply put, for Koreans, the end of  the Cold War 
meant the collapse of  Seoul or Pyongyang rather than the demise of  ideological conflicts in the 
world. As such, this thesis aims to better our understanding of  how Park Chunghee and his 
regime maintained their struggle against communists when Seoul‘s allies, specifically Washington 
and Tokyo, moved toward the reconciliation with Moscow and Beijing. As we witnessed, the 
Park regime considered the North Korean threat as constant. From the perspectives of  the ROK 
elites, the goal of  the DPRK‘s policy toward the ROK was a reunification under the banner of  
the Red Army. Consequently, the South Korean leadership aimed to ensure its national security 
and protect itself  from the threat Pyongyang was posing. In this context, its efforts for peace 
negotiations with North Korea were another mode of  war for the national security of  the ROK 
under American and public pressure which considered that South Korea was not the exception 
of  the global détente order. To this end, we will review the three significant driving forces of  
South Korea‘s Northern policy and related foreign policy between 1968 and 1979, the 
international political changes, the domestic liberal movement, the Park regime‘s recognition of  
the North Korean threat, and the influence of  South Korea‘s foreign policy on the broader Cold 
War in East Asia will also be discussed. 
In many cases, global issues initiated the discussion on the ROK foreign policy. The 
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strategy and power of  the Capitalist camp served as general indicators for its security in the Cold 
War, and mainly drove South Korea‘s approach toward its North Korean, and other, foreign 
policies. First, the ROK-US relations formed the basis of  its diplomatic strategy after its 
liberation from Japan in 1945. As a client state of  the United States during the Cold War, South 
Korea‘s diplomacy can be characterised as friendly toward America‘s allies, and hostile toward 
America‘s enemies, usually communists.8 Yet, this relatively stable and clear policy orientation 
started to be questioned by the change of  global environments in the late 1960s.  
As we have discussed, the US foreign policy regarding its hardship in Vietnam and the 
Sino-Soviet split generally pushed South Korea to reconcile with the communists. However, the 
progression of  the Vietnam War itself  illustrated the risk of  negotiations with Pyongyang, and 
hence strongly impeded the bilateral relations. Also the Japanese political and economic support 
for the Park administration, intended to shore up its national security, helped the Blue House 
maintain its anticommunist policy.9      
The American hardship in the Vietnam War and its impact on ROK politics opened up 
a new discussion between Seoul and Washington regarding South Korea‘s Cold War strategy. 
Interestingly, the two allies differed in their interpretation of  the American campaign and its 
disappointing progress. For Washington, its setback was geographically limited to Southeast Asia 
and did not undermine its standing as a global power. During and after the war, the White House 
generally attempted to reduce its intervention in the region. But it could consolidate its influence 
with its diplomatic approach toward Moscow and Beijing in the East Asia and prevent the 
additional conflict with communists. Otherwise, as Henry Kissinger emphasised, the US 
withdrawal from Southeast Asia would have undermined its credibility abroad.10 As such, the 
South Korean elites regarded the US pullout from Vietnam as a prelude to another Korean War. 
The similarity between Korea and Vietnam, both nations being divided by two different 
ideologies, and the North Vietnamese victory despite American negotiations, reminded the 
South Koreans of  the risk of  negotiations with communists. The progress and outcome of  the 
Vietnam War kept the ROK leadership from developing more liberal policies toward North 
Korea and other communist countries.11 Both Koreas observed closely the victory of  Hanoi 
over Saigon. This unexpected development encouraged Pyongyang to assume a more aggressive 
behaviour, and made Seoul more cautious in their bilateral relations, despite the trend of  
                                                          
8 Bruce Cumings, op. cit., 318. 
9 Cho Yanghyun, ―Détente Cheje Jeonhwangi‘eui Hanil‘gwangye [The Korea-Japan Relationship within the 
Structural Change of  the Cold War System in East Asia: Focusing on the Case of  Okinawa Reversion and the U. S. 
Troop Withdrawal from Korea].‖ International Regional Research 20 (2011): 74. 
10 Seymour Hersh, The Price of  Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 46-53. 
11 Shin Wookhee, op. cit., 272. 
  
193 
 
détente.12  
But the Nixon Doctrine, and the subsequent reduction of  US troops stationed in South 
Korea, forced Park to seek out ways to keep a strong US military presence in his country. He 
entered into negotiation with the Premier of  the DPRK under the condition that Nixon 
suspended his troop withdrawal plan. Therefore, for Seoul, the goal of  the first round of  inter-
Korean peace talks was not reunification, but the prevention of  a US pullout.13 In 1972, two 
rounds of  talks in Pyongyang and Seoul, and the subsequent announcement of  a joint 
communiqué finally culminated in a mutual agreement for peaceful reunification. Nevertheless, 
the real matter was definitively the presence of  US military power in South Korea. In their 
negotiations, North Korea benchmarked North Vietnam, trying to expel US forces from the 
Korean peninsula, while South Korea learned a lesson from the mistake of  South Vietnam and 
therefore tried to keep American forces within its territory.14 South Korea‘s continued appeal for 
its security led to a change of  the American decision, and in 1972, Washington considered the 
similarities between Seoul and Saigon, and attempted to soothe South Korea‘s feeling of  
insecurity. Nixon decided to stop the withdrawal of  US forces after having talks with Moscow 
and Beijing. 15 This decision eliminated the most divisive issue of  the inter-Korean negotiations, 
the US troops in South Korea. The differences between Seoul and Pyongyang concerning US 
military power stationed in South Korea ended their short détente in 1973.16  
The collapse of  South Vietnam in 1975 pulled the US back from its active movement 
toward détente in East Asia, partly because of  the serious agitation in South Korean politics. The 
fall of  Saigon preoccupied Park Chunghee. His intention to obtain nuclear warheads became 
clear in 1975, and he remained hostile toward the communists, intending to do so even in the 
case that the US would not keep their commitment. Without any doubt, the South Korean 
attempt directly refuted American diplomatic efforts for reducing the tension between the East 
and West, especially the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). From the perspective of  
broader East Asian Cold War history, the aggressive and anti- détente decision taken by Park 
Chunghee implicated that the US position in the region was damaged by its withdrawal from 
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Vietnam. As the former US ambassador to South Korea, Richard Sneider, argued, South Korea 
became a middle power which could affect American policy in the East Asian region.17 
Nonetheless, it is highly doubtful that South Korea really attempted to reject its 30 decade-old 
status, that of  being a client state of  Washington. Park was willing to utilise his nuclear project as 
a negotiation card with Ford for an American commitment in South Korea in the post- Vietnam 
era.18    
Seoul gave up on the project after a lengthy brawl with Washington in 1975 and 76 
because Gerald R. Ford rejected nuclear proliferation in East Asia and reassured Seoul of  
continued American support for South Korea. The Ford Doctrine, the murder incidents at the 
DMZ in 1976, and the subsequent US-ROK retaliation with the DPRK, demonstrated how 
Washington sought stability for South Korea after their own failed campaign in Southeast Asia. 
In order to prevent nuclear proliferation in East Asia and avoid any additional loss of  American 
influence there, Ford supported Park and his anticommunist and anti-North Korean rhetoric. 
Despite his conflict with Park over the South Korean nuclear issue, the US president reaffirmed 
his commitment to the ROK to ensure security, and thereby strengthen the basis of  South 
Korea‘s hostile approach toward the North. With American backing, Park Chunghee made a 
reprisal attack to the North Korean side of  the DMZ, and gained his first military victory over 
Kim Ilsung, who refrained from further military confrontation on this particular occasion.19 
Indeed, Seoul‘s continuous and hostile approach to communists accelerated the eclipse of  
détente.    
However, the US defeat in Vietnam increasingly undermined the public support for 
Ford‘s policy. Once Jimmy Carter, who advocated the pullout of  the US from East Asia citing 
the Vietnamese debacle, became president in 1977, Park faced the most serious challenge to his 
anticommunist policy. Thanks to strong opposition inside the US government, Carter‘s plan 
never became reality. However, his pressure on the Park regime eventually led the demise of  the 
Park regime and opened the discussion on diplomacy with communists in South Korea.20  
The American response to the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s and 70s also intensified the 
liberal movement in the ROK. Generally, this setback in the communist camp limited any 
damage the American influence had suffered from the Vietnam War, and encouraged 
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Washington to take the initiative for shaping the relations between the three world powers.21 As 
described in chapter 2, the US attempted to assert its status in the region using diplomatic, rather 
than military, efforts. In a broad context, Nixon and Kissinger expected that a possible 
reconciliation between Washington and Beijing, as well as between Washington and Moscow, 
would reduce the threat Pyongyang posed for Seoul because they believed that the two patrons 
of  North Korea would restrain Kim Ilsung.22 Once Washington made its withdrawal plan clear 
in 1971, Seoul prepared to jump on this irreversible trend of  global politics and attempt to 
change the mode of  inter-Korean competition from military to diplomacy means. The ROK‘s 
bandwagon tactics were illustrated by its proposal for direct inter-Korean talks after Nixon had 
announced his visit to Beijing in November 1971. Pyongyang also kept pace with Beijing and 
accepted the South Korean proposal.  
However, the effect of  this détente was temporary. Park considered that the influence the 
USSR and the PRC held on North Korea was not enough to contain Kim Ilsung‘s aggression.  
This concern was confirmed by the DPRK‘s ambush on the Blue House, and the abduction of  
the USS Pueblo in 1968. Kim Ilsung did not seek the consent of  either Mao Zedong or Leonid 
Brezhnev before his raid on the Blue House, and neither the Chinese nor the Soviet leader 
intervened. Clearly, for the South Korean leadership, the Sino-Soviet conflict and their 
reconciliation with the US did not guarantee the real end of  the Korean War. As Pyongyang 
aggressively demanded the total retreat of  US forces from Korean soil after the announcement 
of  the South-North joint communiqué, the ROK elites immediately rejected the American 
optimism on the Sino-Soviet conflict. The result was the ROK-DPRK negotiations remained 
inconclusive and ended quickly, despite the warming Sino-US and US-Soviet relations.23  
This limited influence of  both the PRC and the USSR on Kim Ilsung also made Park 
indifferent to potential diplomatic opportunities stemming from improved relations with the 
leading communist powers. During talks with Pyongyang in the early 1970s, Seoul reconsidered 
its relationships with other communist countries.24 But this grand agenda became obsolete once 
the two Koreas returned to their old hostilities. The ROK elites may have believed that both of  
Pyongyang‘s patrons were competing for a North Korean allegiance. After Jimmy Carter had 
accomplished the normalisation of  US-China relations in 1978 and early 1979, he urged both 
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Seoul and Beijing to establish diplomatic relations. However, Park was reluctant to talk with 
Deng, and Deng rejected Carter‘s request to intervene in the Korean conflict.25  
When the Kremlin - increasingly irritated by closer North Korean ties with the Chinese - 
tried to approach South Korea in late 1978, ROK elites suspected the Soviets only intended to 
provoke Pyongyang for its competition with Beijing, and re-gain its control over North Korea.26 
Interestingly, since the mid-1980s, Park‘s successors, Chun Doohwan and Roh Taewoo had made 
considerable efforts to maintain good relations with both communist powers in order to resolve 
the Korean conflict in the name of  nordpolitik. This diplomatic revolution in South Korean 
politics opened another phase of  détente in the early 1990s.27 Once again the limits of  Soviet 
and Chinese influence on the DPRK became obvious, as both powers failed to restrain North 
Korean aggressions, e.g. the North Korean Nuclear Crisis.  
The Japanese Cold War mentality also influenced the ROK‘s Cold War strategy, as both 
nations were deeply concerned about a possible American retreat from East Asia. Tokyo was 
sensitive to the American strategy and cooperated with Seoul in order to reduce the security 
threat from the communists. However, as Victor Cha clearly indicated in his volume, Alignment 
Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, the cooperation between two East 
Asian allies was not consistent due to their mutual animosity.28  
More seriously, their concept of  what constituted the ‗communist threat‘ differed. To 
Japan, the communist threat originated from the Soviet Union and China rather than North 
Korea, while South Korea considered the DPRK as its main enemy. Despite their efforts to 
mend fences in 1965, both the USSR and the PRC continued following different approaches 
toward North Korea. Japan, for instance, was unmoved by North Korea‘s guerrilla actions on 
South Korean territory in 1968. Tokyo believed that its close ties with Seoul would irritate 
Pyongyang and aggravate Kim Ilsung‘s hatred toward Korea‘s past imperial ruler.29 Yet this idea 
was firmly based on the American defence commitment in the archipelago and peninsula. The 
US struggle in Southeast Asia undermined the rationale of  its expensive role in the region while 
the policies of  the Nixon and Carter administrations fully destroyed the neutral Japanese 
position between the two Koreas. The change in ROK-Japan relations was dramatic considering 
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their long running mutual animosity. The Japanese political and economic support for ROK 
security reduced the shocks of  the new American policy, and encouraged South Korea to build 
its military power after the disappointing end of  inter-Korean diplomacy.   
The two East Asian nations quickly improved their bilateral relations after Nixon 
implemented his plan to withdraw American troops from South Korea, and proposed the 
Okinawa reversion to Tokyo. Both South Korean and Japanese leaders, uneasy observers of  
American security policy, consistently requested of  Nixon to keep the US forces in South Korea 
without any considerable reduction. But the White House considered the withdrawal of  US 
troops a prerequisite for negotiations with Beijing. This clear gap between Washington and its 
two allies in East Asia encouraged the political and economic partnership between Seoul and 
Tokyo.30  
Both nations combined their power to maintain the regional security. Park Chunghee 
and Sato Eisaku, the Prime Minister of  Japan, asked Nixon to keep US forces in Okinawa - 
which was formally returned to Japan in 1972. Sato provided generous aid to South Korea. This 
financial support allowed Park to initiate his ambitious economic and military plan for 
developing the heavy chemical and defence industry.31 Moreover, Japan‘s economic support 
contributed to Park‘s re-election in 1971.32 Although the Park regime sought consultations with 
Pyongyang - temporarily changing its approach toward the communists following the presidential 
election - Japanese assistance did not stop, and the conflict between the two Koreas soon 
resumed. Without any doubt, the modernisation of  South Korean forces was an important 
prerequisite for Park‘s aggressive policy toward Kim Ilsung.  
However, the ROK-Japan relations between 1973 and 1974 were quickly soured after 
Nixon cancelled his withdrawal scheme. This development demonstrated that the continued 
American commitment in East Asia and reconciliation between Japan and the two Communist 
giants eliminated the Japanese motivation to cooperate with South Korea. Japan held a strong 
antagonism toward Park‘s anticommunist rhetoric.33 Sato successor, Tanaka Kakuei, complained 
about the brutality of  Park‘s authoritarian regime, and did not shy away from punishing Kim 
Daejung, a major opposition figure who was based in Japan. Conversely, following Moon 
Sekwang‘s failed attempt on Park‘s life, the South Korean leadership criticised Japan for its 
relaxed supervision of  North Koreans in Japan following Moon‘s arrival from Tokyo to kill Park. 
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These two incidents may suffice to illustrate the fundamental differences between South Korea 
and Japan concerning the understanding of  détente.  
The second cooperation started after the end of  the Vietnam War in 1975. Observing 
the American decision to pull out of  Vietnam, both Seoul and Tokyo worried about the possible 
pullout from Northeast Asia as well. The new Japanese Premier, Miki Takeo, fully recognised the 
importance of  the ROK for the peace of  Japan, and was determined to restore Japanese 
relations with South Korea. Miki consulted with Park about their common future and reaffirmed 
Japanese support for US forces in Okinawa that were to be essential for South Korea as well as 
for Japan.34 South Korea welcomed the friendly Japanese gesture and decided to consult Japan 
on all security issues for the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia.35 Coupled with the Ford 
Doctrine, Japanese support for South Korean security in the post- Vietnam War period 
encouraged Park to pursue a confrontational Northern policy. 
The second ROK-Japan détente reached its peak under the influence of  Jimmy Carter‘s 
pullout plan. Although this issue did not immediately touch upon the relations between the US 
and Japan, Carter‘s popularity in Japan suffered from his troop withdrawal plan. For Japan, the 
American pullout from South Korea would take away a vital element of  its national security 
framework, and could well be interpreted as prelude to an impending withdrawal from Japan.36 
Once Park changed his negotiation strategy and demanded prohibitive compensatory measures, 
Tokyo also urged Washington to accept South Korea‘s proposal. These complaints from its most 
important ally in East Asia were seriously considered by US officials and Congressmen. Japan 
rejected Carter‘s standpoint and supported the ROK in its efforts to keep the US Army within its 
territory. 37 In sum, ROK-Japan relations mitigated South Korea‘s security concerns under 
American and North Korean pressure and supported its aggressive Northern policy.  
International factors dictated the general direction of  South Korea‘s foreign policy. In 
general, the changes in the American Cold War strategy since 1968 had undermined the 
ideological basis of  South Korea‘s aggressive Northern policy and opened up the way for inter-
Korean negotiations. Yet the American defeat in the Vietnam War, and the muted American 
reaction to the North Korean threat, pushed South Korea to keep its antagonism toward 
Pyongyang and reject talks with the communist North. Japanese fear of  American abandonment, 
meanwhile, mitigated hostilities between the two US allies.     
It is true that the global détente trend contributed to the growth of  the liberal South 
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Korean voice to some extent. The reconciliation among major players of  the Cold War 
increasingly attenuated the ideological rationale of  minor actors.38 Yet the rise of  a liberalist 
movement in the ROK did not coincide with, or result from, the global détente trend. First and 
foremost, before the Korean War, the Korean society was not ideologically homogeneous, and 
there had been a number of  socialist movements in South Korea.39 The Korean War defined 
anticommunism and anti-North Koreanism as the two overriding principles of  South Korean 
diplomacy. These pervasive ideas overwhelmed any lenient view toward communists, and even 
justified the military rule under the Park regime. As the result of  presidential election in 1967 
indicated, the Park regime‘s mantra, ―strengthen national security based on anticommunism and 
economic development,‖ successfully appealed to the South Korean public.40  
The liberals lost support but did not disappear. As time went by, the composition of  
electorates changed and South Korean citizens started to question the rationale behind the 
lengthy and despotic rule of  Park‘s military regime and its foreign policy concept. Koreans born 
during the war tended to concur with the liberal politicians that Park‘s anticommunist policy did 
not really prevent the North Korean threat, but merely served as justification to perpetuate his 
rule.41  
Moreover, the ROK leader did not fully respect democracy and the nationalistic idea of  
‗one Korea.‘ The Park administration rarely made efforts to set its master plan for transition to 
democracy in the post-Park era and Korean reunification until 1970s. In what he saw as a realistic 
view - which is a very important premise of  his diplomacy and will be discussed later - the 
security of  South Korea was more important than democracy and national unity.42 In short, Park 
planned ‗to build the economy and national security based on anticommunism first, and then 
think about democracy and reunification later.‘43 
The public antagonism against Park‘s confrontational policy toward Pyongyang raised 
the profile of  liberalists who advocated the restoration of  civilian rule and the reconciliation with 
the communist North. The Kim Daejung candidacy in the presidential elections of  1971, marked 
the impressive debut for the liberalist movement. Kim‘s intent to engage in peace talks with 
Pyongyang which would also include the US, Japan, the PRC, and the USSR, earned him the 
respect and enthusiastic support of  many young voters. Park‘s narrow victory over Kim Daejung 
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in the 1971 presidential elections was disappointing and led him to consider the influence of  
liberal thought on his domestic popularity.44 Soon after the election, the president proposed 
inter-Korean dialogue to Kim Ilsung. 
After Park indicated the North Korean aggression during the peace talks, the domestic 
resistance toward the Park regime became weak; and the purge of  Kim Daejung from the ROK 
politics in 1973 further undermined the liberal voice in the Korean politics. The resumption of  
North Korean provocations in 1974, including Moon Sekwang‘s failed assassination attempt, 
entirely undermined the ROK public hope for reconciliation with the communist North and a 
peaceful reunification of  the peninsula. The defeat of  US and South Korean forces in Vietnam 
silenced discussions over the reconciliation with communists on a political level. 45 With regard 
to its post-Vietnam security measure, the Park government suppressed its liberal critics and 
convicted them for supporting communists. The Ford administration, which prioritised the 
stability of  its Asian allies after the Vietnam War, kept silent on Park‘s purging of  political 
enemies, and even supported Park‘s hostile reaction toward the North Korean provocations of  
1975 and 1976. Seemingly, the domestic elements that endorsed inter-Korean negotiations in the 
early 1970s did not have a significant impact on South Korea‘s foreign policy between 1973 and 
1976. 
However, in the late 1970s, the public outcry against the increasingly obvious gap 
between the rich and the poor stalemated inter-Korean relations, and Park‘s draconian rule 
ultimately revived the liberal voice in South Korea. The advent of  the Carter administration and 
his criticism of  human rights violations committed by the Park regime further encouraged ROK 
liberals. 46  In contrast to his predecessor, Jimmy Carter did not turn his back on the 
undemocratic nature of  the Park administration. Park rebuffed allegations that the punishment 
of  his critics was unfair and despotic, however, he did recognise that Carter‘s criticism was not 
entirely groundless.47 As time went by, the ideological link between Jimmy Carter and South 
Korean Liberals improved. This encouraged opposition parties, as well as the general public, to 
speak out against Park‘s rule. Kim Youngsam‘s valiant challenge of  Park‘s despotic rule was based 
on his idealistic connection to Carter. Indeed, it was the liberal movement, along with American 
influence, that led to the demise of  the Park regime and changed the course of  South Korean 
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diplomacy.48  
As indicated by existing evidence, the realistic and authoritarian nature of  the Park 
regime had dictated South Korea‘s Cold War strategy and suppressed any conciliatory approaches 
toward the communist North after 1961. The changes in his foreign policy reflecting his 
consideration for nationalistic and ideological ideas did neither last long nor change the 
fundamental nature of  his government. In fact, Park considered the international ideological 
conflict and South Korea‘s national sentiment for facilitating his ‗realistic‘ idea and ‗dictatorship‘. 
The fear of  communism and a possible North Korean aggression was strong among 
South Koreans who had experienced the Korean War themselves. Based on this preconception, 
the Park regime prioritised national security issues, the fight against communism and economic 
development.49 Clearly, despite Park‘s strong rhetoric for anticommunism, his policy was not 
ideologically motivated. In a nutshell, the emphasis of  his policy was the defence against an 
impending North Korean threat and not the ideological or institutional rivalry between capitalist 
and Marxist thought. With regards to economic institutions, the South Korean market was tightly 
controlled by government authorities and did not show the typical characteristics of  a capitalist 
state.50 Moreover, his efforts to normalise relations with Korea‘s former enemy, Japan, for the 
sake of  improving his standing vis-à-vis Park‘s present enemy, the DPRK, also was indicative of  
the regime‘s pragmatic nature.  
The realistic ROK elites refused to align their domestic and foreign policy goals with the 
fast changing international environment of  the 1970s. First and foremost, their goal was ―to 
build national security based on anticommunism and economic development.‖51  Despite the 
global détente mood in the early 1970s, the recognition of  the Park regime by the DPRK and 
other communist countries did not bring any quick changes. Discussions within ROK 
government circles surrounding the inter-Korean negotiations of  1971 and 1972, clearly pointed 
out Park‘s reluctance to recognise Kim Ilsung as a diplomatic partner. Based on his view of  
North Korea that did not change until his death, his aim was ―to build a safe nation.‖ This 
implied the need to maintain the balance until the collapse of  Pyongyang and other major 
communists. He never overlooked the North Korean threat even after he ‗reluctantly‘ agreed to 
work for reunification with Kim Ilsung. Specifically, the ROK leader was sceptical that his 
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indirect talks with Kim could actually resolve the Cold War on the Korean peninsula.52 Through 
a series of  dialogues, the South Korean leader intended to end the ‗military conflict‘ in Korea, 
but continue his war against communists with diplomatic methods. For the realist, Park, the 
inter-Korean talks were the only measure for reaching a very realistic goal - the present security 
of  South Korea rather than the road to the national dream of  reunification.53  
Indeed, the North Korean aggression before and after the negotiations proved Park‘s 
idea realistic to some extent. Nonetheless, his failure to resolve the inter-Korean conflict 
highlighted the fundamental flaws in his basic strategy. As South Korea became a middle power 
and developed both a strong economy and military in 1970s, these factors did little to prevent 
the North Korean threat. The South Korean obsession with North Korea estranged its allies 
further because Park had sought to extract as much aid as possible from his major allies, 
Washington and Tokyo. His quest for ROK security strained the alliance with the US and Japan 
when those allies lost their strategic interest in the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the split with 
Washington deteriorated the most prominent basis of  South Korean security, the American 
military support.54 The weakened ideological link between the ROK and US mounted the sense 
of  insecurity in the South Korean leadership, and therefore it remained conservative and 
aggressive toward communists.   
Coupled with its realistic idea, the authoritarian nature of  the Park regime also affected 
the South Korean Cold War strategy. This perspective makes up what the realist argument does 
not fully account for. The Park regime, which had come to power through a coup, constantly 
needed to provide valid justification for its long-term rule because its patron, Washington, and 
the South Korean electorate, resented the cruel and despotic government. The leadership had 
drawn its legitimacy from its ability to shore up national defence capabilities and protect the 
country from the communist threat. 55  This main rationale for undemocratic rule won 
considerable support from Washington until the 1960s which wanted the economic development 
and stabilization of  South Korea despite its reluctance to support the despot.56 
Ironically, though, the regime relied on the existence of  an enemy to justify its grip on 
power and was reluctant to adopt the global détente to the domestic political sphere. Park‘s 
decision to dispatch the armed forces to Vietnam directly refutes the realist logic, which had 
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served to explain his cautious approach toward Pyongyang. It was unreasonable for South Korea 
to dispatch a large troop contingent (approximately 320,000 soldiers) to Southeast Asia, while it 
faced down a strong enemy at its northern border. Clearly, thanks to its generous support for the 
American campaign, Washington did not re-deploy its troops stationed in South Korea to 
Southeast Asia.57  
It is still subject to controversy why the Park regime readily engaged itself  to fight in 
Vietnam, despite its own confrontation with the communist North. An analysis of  the 
authoritarian rule in South Korea can explain South Korea‘s road to Vietnam. Park had originally 
intended to establish himself  as the staunchest US ally and to gain more political support from 
his patron. Furthermore, he had attempted to export the South Korean understanding of  the 
Cold War onto the rest of  East Asia. In other words, he wanted his people to take the 
communist threat more seriously and become aware of  the danger that the conflict between the 
two camps of  the cold war could have on the Korean conflict as well. Until the collapse of  
Saigon in 1975, the South Korean president often linked the destiny of  his own country to that 
of  its ally in Southeast Asia, more than 3,000 km away and enunciated that South Korea could 
not be safe while South Vietnam was still in danger. The analogy was deliberately used as a  
pretence for persecuting his opponents who complained that Park‘s Northern policy did not 
resolve the inter-Korean conflict, but served primarily to support his dictatorship.58 Once South 
Vietnam faltered, Park tightened laws to categorise and punish his enemies as communists or 
pro-communists with his ―Vietnam-is-Korea‖ logic, stating, ―Saigon was lost due to the 
communists in its territory rather than North Vietnam.‖59 Ford, preoccupied by soothing the 
anxiety of  America‘s remaining allies in East Asia, did not take this draconian method of  Park 
seriously.60 
Furthermore, Park consistently condemned the hostile nature of  Pyongyang, even 
throughout his negotiations with Kim Ilsung. With his anticommunist rhetoric, the South 
Korean leader prolonged his tenure and eliminated the public election for presidency in 1972, 
only three months after the inter-Korean talks produced the joint communiqué for peaceful 
reunification. The resumption of  sabre-rattling between Seoul and Pyongyang after 1973 shored 
up legitimacy of  the Park regime and encouraged the government to hold on to its strong 
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anticommunist policy.61  
 Yet, in the late 1970s, as it had become increasingly clear that Park could not resolve the 
inter-Korean conflict and remained in power without any intention to restore presidential 
elections, the democratic resistance arose fiercely. Park oppressed the opposition on the grounds 
of  his old Cold War logic.  At this point, however, the new administration in Washington 
started to pay more attention to the moral aspects of  Park‘s rule, and threatened to withdraw its 
land forces from South Korea in order to coax the dictatorship to undertake political reforms. 
The pressure on his despotic rule entirely destroyed the security-based logic of  Park‘s leadership. 
The South Korean president maintained that human rights had to be limited for the sake of  
national security. In Carter‘s view, however, the US should not support such an undemocratic 
state.62 Consequently, the security of  the South Korea was jeopardised by the very policies that 
were supposed to improve it. With doubts over its legitimacy rising among the general public, 
Park‘s regime lost popular support and had to face mass protests which, eventually, if  not 
indirectly, led to its collapse. The Park regime‘s demise eliminated the authoritarian nature of  
policy makers that sought to implant the idea of  anticommunism in South Korea and opened the 
door for more fruitful discussions over the proper approach to deal with the communist powers 
and North Korea after late 1980s.  
      In the global Cold War perspective, however, the unexpected death of  Park and thereby 
destabilisation of  South Korea accelerated the declination of  détente in East Asia. The USSR 
invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, which introduced the second Cold War. As Westad has 
argued, the Soviet invasion of  Afghanistan demonstrated the aggressive Soviet intention in the 
Third World to hard-liners in the Carter administration.63 Due to South Korea‘s instable political 
ground after its prime leader‘s demise, Jimmy Carter completely cancelled his pullout programme 
in April, 1980.64 After Soviet aggression resumed the Cold War, Carter did not properly check 
another ROK military coup, and its inhumane rule over South Korea. As such, the US president 
could neither reduce American intervention nor keep American credibility in East Asia.65 
Carter‘s successor, Ronald Reagan, re-assured US commitment to security of  its East Asian allies 
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against the communist threat and resumed the war against communists.66 
In conclusion, ROK diplomacy during the Cold War was influenced by the global 
environment, domestic political discourse, and the nature of  its supreme decision-makers. 
Interestingly, despite its basic reliance on the US, Seoul‘s foreign policy agenda was not entirely 
based on American strategy. This thesis has demonstrated how and why the global détente was 
not fully materialised on the Korean Peninsula. It has also been shown that the democratic 
movement pushed the ROK government to enter negotiations with North Korea. Finally, the 
thesis has described the ROK policy-making process at the top level, which frequently resisted 
international and domestic pressures on its anticommunist policy, which constituted its primary 
ideological foundation. Until his death, Park consistently held on to his belief  that no real 
détente could ever be achieved without the prior collapse of  the communism, which of  course 
included the DPRK. In essence, Park‘s stubbornness limited the flexibility and success of  South 
Korea‘s foreign policy, and precluded reconciliation with the country‘s Cold War enemies. 
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